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v. 
INTRODUCTION 
The_ subjeet of the impaet of Soviet rule on the Armeni-
an people is a new one for Ameriean researeh. Initially. I 
developed an interest in it out of curiosity. for I eould not 
understand why so many Armenians I had met in the United States 
of Ameriea were sympathetie to Soviet rule in Armenia. Fre-
quently, I heard statements and diseovered attitudes whieh 
appeared to be often absurd, rarely relevant, and generally 
uneritieal. I became eurious as to the truth eoneerning SoTi-
et rule in Ar.menia and desirous of understanding the historic 
events in the Armenian area whieh had rendered many otherwise 
elear-thinking individuals suseeptible to obvious propaganda. 
I soon found that aetual events had little bearing on 
Armenian attitudes. that the Armenian people displayed a pure-
ly emotiomal response toward Soviet rule. Exeept for aetive 
members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, whose orien-
tation eontinued to be toward the defunet Armenian Independent 
Republic, the Armenian people seemed unable to believe unfa-
Torable facts eoneerning Soviet rule. Even when sueh faets 
were reported in the S.oviet Armenian press, the external Ar ... 
menian population appeared unwilling tq aesept them. J?robing 
deeper. I found that the emotional reaction of large numbers 
of Armenians toward Soviet rule and their sense of identifi-
eati on with ••progress n in Soviet Armenia ctould be explained 
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only in psyehologieaJ. terms, for they displayed an urgent de· 
sire for assuranee that the Armenians in the Soviet Union were 
at least as progressive and seeare as other Soviet :peoples. The 
relative seeurity of the Armenian people under Soviet rule was 
used as an argument to explain away all shorteomings, for the 
Soviet authorities were said to have brought :peaee to the Trans-
eaueasus and preserved the existenee of the Armenian :people. 
( 
~us, my first problem was to diseover the aetual extent 
of the genoeide :praetieed upon the Armenians by the TUrkish 
governments, the aetual Armenian population losses, the rela-
tionshi:ps between the Tearist authorities and the Russian Ar-
menians, and the real relationships of the Armenian Indepenc 
dent Republie with its neighbors and its Moslem minority.In 
short, to understand the symptoms of a national trauma, it 
was neeessary to understand the historieaJ. events and rela-
tionships whieh had eaused that deep shoek. 
If Soviet Russia had taken over oaueasian Armenia for 
the purpose of protesting the Armenian people, the demand of 
the Armenian Revolutionary Federation that the Armenian :people 
throughout thw world work and saerifiee for a new independenee 
would be ingratitude. If Soviet rule in Armenia meant equali-
ty, autonomy, eeonomie aid and great advanee in the standard 
of living, expansion of the borders to inelude all the pre-
dominantly Armenian areas of Transeaueasia, and advaneement 
of Armenian national interests, it would be fatuous for the 
expatriate Armenians to eontinue in the national movement. 
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My seeond problem, therefore, was to diseover what Soviet 
rule meant as regards the Armenian interests in Transeaueasia. 
Had Armenia progressed, and, if so, when and at what eost? Were 
the Armenian people given a real equality of opportunity, one 
based on need? Was Armenian development benefitting the popu-
lation or the communist authorities and the Russian state? How 
had Armenia been rehabilitated and ree<i>nstrueted after the de-
vastation of world War I? Who had helped? Had Russia really 
proved Armenia's friend at that time, or had some other nation? 
How had Armenia been sovietized? What was the eondition of the 
Armenian Independent Republic that some Armenians .still orient 
themselves toward it, while others aetively rejeet .its plaee 
in the national history.? What was the meaning of Soviet nati-
ona.li ty poli ey? 
These were the vital questions. Many others arose,sueh 
as the attitude of the Armenian peOJ>le in the Soviet Union to• 
ward the Communist regime, but the basie questions remained 
those whieh formed my two major problems, the baekground of 
feelings of national insecurity and the meaning of Soviet ad-
ministration of Caucasian Armenia. It is my belief that the 
facts I have assembled in this investigation do answer the 
questions posed. I have tried to lead the reader. through a 
maze of faets to the point where he will be able to draw his 
own eonalusions. The few eonsiiered opinions I have rendered 
along the way do not add or·detraat from the faets available. 
Du.ring the entire eourse of this investigation, I have made 
every effort to apply Ameriaan standards of investigation,re-
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!'raining whenever I have been aware of a bias from injeeting 
it intGI my :present~ti~m of the faets. 
'\ 
I have no apologies to offer for any weaknesses whieh 
may be fC!ilund in the text, for they are my fault exelusively. 
I trust that whatever may prove valuable or valid in this in-
vestigation to ·some extent reflects the excellent training, 
helpful adviee, and instruetive supervision offered me by the 
History Department and ]3Qston University. More speeifieally, 
I ~at express my deep gratitude and obligation to the two 
readers who have guided my researches and writing, Professor 
Frank Nowak (Hi story Department) and Profe as or Andrew Gyorgy 
(Government Department), without .whose tolerant aid and en-
couragement I would not have been able to :perform this inves-
tiga.tien. 
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VI. 
OTHER INVESTIGATIONS IN THE FIELD 
The seholar seeking for material on Soviet rule and the 
Armenian people is faeed with a thankless task. If he searehes 
for a eomprekensi ve study, rather than for wri tinge on isola-
ted parts of the field, he is spending his time needlessly, 
for no s~eh study existse 
This investigation must be e~msidered a venture in to a 
near].y unexplared field. The few previous investigations into 
various aspeets of the field shed little light on the details 
ar meaning of Soviet rul.e. Thus, Firuz Ka.zemzadeh (~ strug-
gle !..!!: Transeaueaaia) • Simon Vratzian (Raia.sdani Ra.nra.bedou-
tyoun), :s. :Borian (Armeni,a:.~zhdunarodnaya Diplomatia,i SSSR), 
and the investigations of the United States House of Represen-
tatives Seleet Cemmi ttee on Communist Aggressf0n almost ex-
elusively eoneerned themselves with the eondi ti ons under whi e~ 
Ba>lshevik expansion 0eaurred in the Transeauea.sus and the m.e-
ahanies of that expansion. 
v. Navassardian (Bolshevizm yev DashnaktzoutyounM) is eli-
ser to the subjeet of this investigation, but his approaeh is 
that of a politieal journalist. Coneerned primarily with the 
poli ti eal p~lesophies eontending for the loyalty of the Ar• 
menian people, Na.va.ssardian presents much material of valae 
in understanding the meaning of Soviet rule in Armenia, but 
he fails to answer the questions whieh are the basis for this 
study. 
XT. 
Havha.ne ss Hagopian ( Kharhrtain 11aiasdan:)" has written a 
prepaganda traet rather than a study. He glorified the Saviet 
regime of the 1920's and presented a pieture ef an Armenia 
whish bore little relation to reality. Despite his propagan-
clistie presentation of plans for the future rather than details 
e:f' the time of his writing, some s·catisties ef value ean be 
extracted. :f'rem his text. Unfertuna·~ely, sueh figures must be 
used earefully, fer they were exelueiYely the effieial ]propa-
ganda. figures of the government and unqualified by eri tieal 
analysis. 
The important series af a.rtiel.es by uA. A tan" in the Ar-
menian language Jeri0~iea.l Hairenik .Amsakir from the mid-twen-
ties until 1939 and by 11.A..A~" in the same publieatien after 
World War II are extremely valuable. Utilizing extensive re-
preduetions from the Seviet press and subjeeting the statis-
ties to eritieal analysis, the author (presumabl~ the same 
person) has, in effeet, establishe<il a seleetiTe file of Seyi-
et press informatien relating to pregress and administration 
in SGviet Armenia. Sinee the Soviet Armenian newspapers for 
mast ef the period eavereci are not themselYes to be found in 
Ameriean eolleetions, the Ata.n series must be eonsidered the 
major primary souree of information. Atan, however, does net 
have mere tha.n a sE~uree value, for he fails til) assemble his 
material and present it in a brGad. histerieal per~eetive ea-
pable cof answering the questill)ns ra.ised.. 
The only wark whieh has attempted to investigate the me-
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aern Armenian q~estion en a broad basis is that of Sarkis A· 
tamian (~ Armenian Cemmuni t;y). A brilliant work af analysis, 
Atamian's book eoneern's the development of a soeiolagieal 
split in the Armenian eommunities outside the Soviet Uni0n on 
the basis ef earlier class differentiatien in political atti-
tudes toward the Armenian revolutLonary movement. Utilizing 
soeiologieal teehniques and dealing primarily with the West• 
ern Armenians, Atamian has written little about the details 
of Soviet rule and their impaet en the Armenian people. He 
IZ. 
has negleete4 the Eastern Armenians, but, nan~heless, his in-
vestigation is an un~sually effeetive study of the baekgreund 
of current politiea.l attitucies in the expatriate eom.munity-. 
The present investigation is eencer.aed primarily with the 
Eastern Armenians, with the meaning of Soviet rule fer Cattea-
. . 
sian Armenia, a.nd with analyses of the histGriea.l situatians 
whieh prepared the ground fer the sevietization of Eastern 
Armenia.. There is li·ttle overJ.a.pping Gf material between the 
Atamian book and the present investigation. 
The eonelusiens of At~ia.n eoneerning pelitieal orienta-
tion and the diehotGmy in the expatriate Armenian eommunity, 
thaugh arrived. at thrGugh a <ii seiplitie anti material a ciiffer-
ent than those used here, are in basic harmony with the eon-
elusions I 4ra.w eeneerning events and situations. The impor-
tanee ef the Atamian beok is in a different area and field. 
His work and the present inveatigati0n appear to supplement 
each other~ and bGth are investigations in virgin fields. 
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VII. 
METHODS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The eandidate was fortunate to have had eertain advan-
tages of language and eontaets whieh aided greatly in assem-
bling the neeessary infGrmatien. ·At the end. of World War II, 
a lar,;e number of Armenian refugees from the Saviet Union ar-
rived in the United States under the Displaced Persons Aet.~ 
number of those refugees had held important positions in the 
liberation meyements sarried en during the war years and seme 
were from seetions of Armenian settlement about whieh there 
had been no information sinee the establishment of the Soviet 
regime. In their native language1 the refugees tela many in-
teresting details of life under the EolsheTik rule. 
When it eame time to begin formal research in eonneetion 
with this investigati~m, I had alreaciy established an exten-
sive eirele ef aequaintanees among the former displaeed perQ 
sons in New England, the Mid-West, ~nd Califarnia. Thus, it 
was a relatively simple task to make arrangements for a se-
ries of interviews whieh eeuld establish a foundation of unQ 
derstanding of the subjeet. It was neeesaary to make a speei-
al trip to Califernia in the spring of 1955 in eraer to in-
terview a number ef the more impartant refugees there; both 
in California and the East, I found a ready response and had 
detailed interviews en various aspeet~ of Soviet life with a 
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t~tal of ~ne hundred and eighty nine fermer displaced persons, 
originating from Seviet· Armenia, bordering areas, Ukraine,Sim 
beria, Russia, the Baltie states, and Central Asia. SUbjeet mat-
ter ranged from details ef life during the Independent Repub-
lic to village and tewn life before ana during the German in-
vasisn. 
The interviews served admirably to foeus attention en sa-
lient weaknesses long disguised by Soviet propaganda. A major 
part of the informatien seeured proved unusable beeause of the 
need to limit eubjeet matter in this investigation and the ne-
eessity for respeeting the seerets of real erigin-peints or 
identities w.hieh might endanger the families ef informants 
left behind. Beeause mueh information seeured eould net be 
attested. by written seurees, I have feund it better to uti-
lize little of the infer.mation I received in such interviews. 
No inf0rmation I have eitea as being based on interviews has 
been used unless at least twe eye-witnesses have agreed. Fur-
ther, no information was used, with few exeeptions, unless I 
eould find a parallel or substantiating written souree. 
A series of interviews with the seeretary af the Prela-
ey ef the Armenian Apostolie Chureh over a twe month period 
furnisheci a. great a.m.aunt (i)f aetailed inf'0rmati0n on Commu-
nist penetration of that Chureh throughout the world. In ge-
neral, the information· of the farmer displaeea persens agreed 
in detail with that previded by the Prelaey seeretary. 
During a three month periea, a searGh of newspaper ae-
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counts from 1915 to 1940 in ba.ek issues of Hairenik bratert, 
Eaika.r, and the New York Times turned up a vast number ef re-
--
ferenees and statisties. Numerous magazine artieles in~­
rent History, the National ,9-eographia Magazine, Hairenik ,!!!-
sakir, the New ~East, and other pub1ieations were also 
referred to. Several hundred beaks dealing with the World War 
I period, TUrkey, Armenia, Imperial Russia, Communism, and 
Soviet rule were )erused, but mueh ef the material ineluded 
in those publiaatiens was found to be repetitive, sketohy,er 
net direetly applieab1e to the Armenian area. 
Very little of the faets and figures and none of the o-
pinions expressed in the aecounts, artieles, and works refer-
red te in the )lrevious para.gra)lh were ine1uteli in the final 
material for this investigatien, for the diseovery of valuable 
primary sourees or more pertinent seec>ndary seurees al terea 
the entire eourse of the investigation. Translation of the A-
tan series of monthly summaries ana seleetions from the Sovi .. 
et press, espeeially its offieial statements and figures on 
agrieultural and industrial plans and eceurrenees, prove~ so 
vastly mere eomplete and valuable that the preeeding materials 
eould be used only for verifieation. Translation of Vratzian's 
semi-offieial history of the Armenian Independent Republie (he 
was a former Premier of that Republie). replete with doeuments 
and offieiaJ. statements, ·superseded materials previ0usly eol-
leeted far the War and Republie periods. Similarly, material 
a.ssemble<i G»n the N .E.P. period of the 1920's proved ssanty 
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and insuffieiently detailed when eompared with the offiaial 
propaganda book of Hovhaness hag~pian. 
In the final assembly ef materials, it was fGund that so 
mueh secondary doeumentati~n had been eolleeted that it was 
advisable to disea.rd ·the major :portiem. In this investigatien, 
nearly all information presented is from the primary sourees, 
or from eeeonaary soureee Whieh quote'the actual doeuments 
and :primary sourees extensively a.nd dire0tly. 
Deeision of the subjeet matter to be inelucied proved ve-
ry diffieult, for, if all those a.speats were ineluded whieh 
answer in part the questiens pesed by s0vietization and Sovi-
et rule, a monumental task beyond all reason w0uld have been 
undertaken. MUeh infermatien eolleeted on sueh t0pies as the 
organization an<ll eontent ef the eauea.tional system, eonfliet 
within the Communist Party ranks, the various 11repatriation" 
eampa.igns, inter-Republie relations, Russifieation policy and 
lingui sti e change, interna.ti Gmal ctipl.Gimaey and it a eentribution 
toward the se•ietizatian of Armenia, the JOlities of the expa-
triate Armenian eommunities, and other subjects was 4isearded. 
The final deeision on Gther aspects was left as a questie~n :p;f 
format organization~ The minimum basie material has been in-
eluded in this investigation; the questiGn Gf length led to 
the exelu-sion of treatment of Armenian resi sta.nee against the 
S(j)viet regime during 'WGrld War II, the purges, and present 
Armenian aetivity for inde~endenee, net eentral to deter.mining 
the answers S$Ught. 
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Sinae no adequate study had ever been made of Armenian 
population statisties and of the genoeide of the Ar.menians by 
Turkey and beaause the question of the number of the Armenians 
and their loeation is erueial for understanding their desires 
and attitudes, that beeame the first task. Logieal estimates 
were developed from earlier figures, and it was found that the 
extent of the genocide had been far larger than realized even 
by the Armenian political leaQ.ers. 'rhe Armenian people faced 
extinetion during World War I. The number of Armenians to4ay 
in the Soviet Union is approximately 3,?50,000, of wham only 
about 2,000,000 live in the part ef Historic Armenia termed 
11 Saviet Armenia 11 • Moat of the good agricultural land has been 
seized by Turkey. In Turkish Armenia, there are at least 
1, 300,000 ethnie Armenians ( Ghzel bashi, Yezidi, Armenian Mea-
l ems, Armenian Christians, eta.). It may be estimated that 
there are 1,661,000 Armenian Christians outside the Soviet 
Union. 
In studying the ealamity whieh befell the Armenian people 
in World War I, one must emphasize that American aid enabled 
the Independent Re~ublie to preserve the population from to-
tal extinction. Near East Relief aided in the reeanstruetion 
of the eauntry, in assembling the orphans, in providing medi-
eal relief, and in supplying elathing and food. Cantinued A..,.~ 
meriean aid after seizure of Armenia by the Soviets was a bles• 
sing far the Armenians, for Soviet rule added to the severity 
of conditions. DUring the 1920's, it was obvious that the 
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Near East Relief was a majer faetor in reeonstruetion ani the 
preservatien sf the Armenian people. 
During the massaeres of World War I, the border area of 
Van rebelled against Turkey and established a "Re:publie" • .A:f-
ter the Russian Revolution, Armenian interests slashed. with 
those of Georgia and Azerbaidjan. The breakup of the Trans-
~ oaueasian Republie during a new Turkish offensive laid. the 
gr0und. for a cleslaration of Armenian freedom in the Oaueasus. 
Both the Eastern and Western Armenians were now subjeeted ts 
raeial warfare initiated by the Turks. Ind.epend.enee was an 
outgrowth of Armenian desires and these events. 
The Armenian Natienal Oeuneil funetimned as the govern-
ment of the new Republic. The offieials made rapid strides in 
restoring order, though larges areas of Russian Armenia were 
prevented from eoming under Armen-ian rule. The Armeno-Georgian 
boundary issue caused much bitterness and prevented coopera-
tion. After the reoocupation of Kars, the Second Western Ar-
menian Assembly initiated the "Aet of Union" of ]nay 28,1919, 
whieh united Western and Eastern Armenia under the Republic. 
:Politi cal differences hindered the establishment of a stable 
government, despite an overwhelming mandate given in the e-
lection to the Dashnak Party. 
The Armenian Republis faced the Pan-Turk hostility ef 
its Moslem minority, and the ensuing massacres lea to commu-
nal war. Although Allied representatives had reached the Cau-
easus, they proved unfriendly to the Armenians, eausing mueh 
bitterness against the British in partieular. A Bolshevik re-
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bellion in May, 1920 destroyed the morale ef the Armenian ar-
my just as the state had begun to farce its Moslem minority 
to aaeept Armenian rule. The Republie's plans for rapid indus-
trialization and reeonstruotien were already underway when the 
alliance between Kemalist,TUrkey and Soviet Russia destroyed 
Armenian freedom. Though a popular rising temporarily drove 
out the Bolshevik authorities, the Red Army reimposed Soviet 
rule. 
After sovietization, the Bolsheviks strove to use A~e­
nia, espeeially the Armenian akl!t~eh. te spread Communist in-
fluenee among the expatriate eommunities. The ·Armenian Chureh 
had led the way in the independenee movement,· but ex'tensive 
Soviet infiltration soon made it an effective Soviet diploma-
tie weapon. At the same time, the Chureh within Soviet Arme-
nia was nearly destroyed, and the murder of catholieos Kheren 
in 1938 rendered the Ca.tholieate a puppet under soviet eon-
trel. The Soviet regime has exerted strenuous efforts in the 
United States and the Middle East te prevent the Armenian Church 
from eombatting Soviet control. 
While they seized the only link between the Soviet Ar-
menians and the expatriate eommunities and exerted great in-
fluence upon them, the Bolshevik administrators in Armenia 
faeed a serious agricultural problem. Agriculture recovered 
slowly, saareely reaching the pre-War level just before eol-
leetivization. In some lines of production, even that level 
was not aehieved. Armenian agrieulture eould not provide for 
the population augmented by the influx of hundreds of thou-
sands Of of refugees. Despite food shortages, the Soviet re-
gime tried to convert Armenian agrieulture from grain proaue-
tic:m tG ootten and "teehnieaJ. erli>ps" in order to keep Armenia 
politically dependent by oontrol of its food supply. The li• 
quidation of the kulaks and the eolleotivization eampaigns 
whieh e~oineiaed with the First Five Year Plan were a 11 revolu-
tion against the people by the government". Armenian agricul-
ture was thrown into ehaos, and the rural population resisted 
until 1934. Agricultural productivity did not reaoh the 1926 
figure again until the end of the 1930's, but animal husbana-
ry aid not reeover. Soviet agricultural pelieies in Armenia 
were those of celonial. exploi tatiom, and the Armenian people 
were kept in poverty by a. system of dues and obligations. D$'1!, .. 
spite land-hunger in Armeniat the Seviet authorities have net 
permitted Armenian settlement of vaeant nearby areas whieh 
were formerly part ef the Independent Republie. 
As in the ease of agriculture, reeonstruction of Armenian 
mining and industrial enterprises was slow during the 1920•s. 
Unemployment beeame an increasing probl.em. Building reeonstrue-
tien, urgently needed because of the influx of refugees and 
the war devastation, proeeeded very unsa.tisfa.etoril.y, and Ar-
menia soon had the worst housing situation in the entire So-
viet Union. The capital city of Erivan was an undevel.oped 
slum. Large irrigation and eleetrification projects planned 
during the Republie, vital. for the devel.opment of the coun-
try and the raising of living standards, progressed slowly 
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and at great expense. Taxation was heavy, but state ineome 
aid not per.mit extensive development. 
The First Five Year Plan provided for modest industrial 
expansion and reconstruction, but ineffieienoy caused chaos. 
Handicapped by.the the failure of other areas of the Union to 
send supplies and by frequent transportation breakdowns, Ar-
menia remained a neglected, baekward ~art of the Soviet Union. 
Despite use of industrial serfdom and a c~aign of terror du-
ring the 1930's, )regress in produetion and industrial deve-
lopement was slaw. construetien of residential housiDg prac-
tieally eeased. Chaos continued during the deeade, as both 
the Stakhanovite movement and the purges proved unable to 
overeome mismanagement. ~ring the war-years 1 Armenian indus-
try expanded eonsiderably beeause of government eneouragement 
to meet war needs. The newly-eonstruoted electrification fa-
oilities beoame available to aid industrial development. In 
the post-War peried, S<i>viet Armenia has made great strides 
in industrializati<i>n, but the industrial output is not used 
for the benefit of the Armenian people. Despite its new im-
portance as an industrial are&J.~ Armenia still d0es not re-
oeive the attention given Georgia or Azerbaidjan in the UniQn 
budget. The Armenian people remain poverty-strieken as the 
profit of Armenian enterprises goes to Russia. 
The Soviet nationalities poliey subordinates national 
areas suoh as Armenia te Russian interests. In Bolshevik 
theory, the Soviet nationalities are fated to merge with the 
Russian ~eople to form a new proletarian nation. There is lit-
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tle differenee between Tsarist and Soviet poliey toward the 
Armenian people, and both eneouraged the assimilation of Ar-
menian-populated areas in neighboring Republies. ~he purge 
has been used to further natienal liquidation, as have the 
squandering ef Armenian troops during World War II ana the 
sending of Armenians to ether parts of the Union. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I: Treaty sf agreement between the Seviet ss-
eialist Republic of Armenia and the Near East Relief 
1; This agreement is between the Soaialist soviet ReJublie ef 
Armenia, hereinafter referred to in this doeument as The Go-
vernment, ana the Near East Relief .. 
2. The Near East Relief is a purely humanitarian or~anizatien 
ineorporatei by special aet ef Congress ef the United States 
Gf America •••• 
3. The Near East Relief has no politieal objeetive, motive or 
J>Urpose, and neither represents nor J>romotes any }llarti eular 
form ef ]!Oli tieal, soeial er industrial organization. 
4. The Near East Relief has no eommereial or fina·ncia.l. objee-
tive. It does not J>romote, directly or indirectly, any private 
eommereial or trate enter})rise, and neither its trustees n0r 
its eontributers derive financial or commercial advantage from 
any of its aetivities. 
5. The Ameriean ~ersonnel ani workers with the Near East Relief 
derive no personal, financial, or commercial advantage frQm 
any ef its OJerations. 
6. The funds and feod SUJ>plies of the Near East Relief are 
contributed voluntarily by individuals as an expression of 
the spirit of human brotherhood aetuated solely by a disinter-
ested desire to help the dispossessed refugees, erphans, and 
other less fortunate peeple. 
7. Aeting under the above~mentioned congressional eharter and 
motive, the Near East Relief and assoeiated ageneies have ex-
pende<i more than twenty-five million dollars in the area and 
for the benefit of the people of the Federated ReJ>ublics of 
Tran so au easi a. 
8. The Near East Relief is willing to the full extent of its 
resources te eentinue this ministry of relief, desiring to ren-
der any serviee within its power toward the establishment of 
~rosperity and eeonomie advaneement in the area of the Soviet 
Repub1ie, with the full sympathy and so-operation of the Go-
vernment. 
~. Taking into eonsideratien the above declaration of ~rinei­
ples en the part of the Near East Relief, the Sosialist Soviet 
Government of Armenia announees its aesire to work in full ana 
unreserved ee-eperation with the Near East Re1ief. 
10. With the understanding that thi a paragra]llh does n0t moaify 
or ehange any existing written eontraets, the GoTernment here-
by eonfirms the tenaney anti unha.n'l]llered e>eeupanay ana use, auring 
the oc:~ntinuati0n of the Near East Relief aativities, of all 
houses, 1ands and other pro~erties new oecupied or used by the 
Near East Relief, or that may hereafter be allocated to the 
xxviii. 
Near East Relief. 
11. The Government promises to protest the Gperatiens sf the 
Near East Relief from interference on the ~art of unauthorized 
agents of lesal authorities an~ sn the ~art of any branch or 
department af the Gevernment that may not be represented by 
the signa;ares ef this doeument. 
12. All relief supplies, local products, machinery, equipment 
and property oecu~ied or used for relief purposes or by Ameri~ 
ean Near East Relief personnel shall be exempt from esnfisea-
tion, requisition, taxation or rent. 
13. All supplies imported fer relief purposes or for the use 
of American Near East Relief personnel shall be exempt from 
custom-house taxes or other duties. 
14. The Government agrees to provide without eost railway trans-
portation from Batum or other port of entry into Transeaueas±a 
of relief supplies and of sueh personnel as may be necessary 
for the efficient control and administration of relief opera-
tions, and will, fer the duratien of these relief o;peratiens, 
eonfirm to the Near East Relief for the sole use of its person-
nel and transport sueh railway earriages as the Near East Re-
lief is now operating. The tra.ns])ortation of relief supplies 
over the railway lines shall have priority over eommercial and 
and other shipments when in the judgement of the Near East Re-
lief such preferential treatment is requiredo 
15. The Government will grant to the Near East Relief without 
cost the use of existing telegra.J>h, tele!Jhone, :FJOst and courier 
service, and will secure for the Near East Relief the same pri-
ority in the expeditious transmission of messages as may be en-joyed by the Gevernment. The Government will provide for the 
Near East Relief the free use Of water and eleetrie light ser-
viee where it is available for use in hospitals, orphanages, 
and homes of American relief workers. 
16. The Government grants to the Near East Relief the right to 
eut and transport sueh amount of fire-wood and charcoal from 
the forests of Transoaueasia as are requirea for its relief 
work, from J?laees designated by the Government and easily ae-
eessible to the railroad. The Government will seoure for the 
Near East Relief an adequate su:pply ef fuel Gil, ],ubrieating 
oil, kerosene, benzine, and other oils necessary for relief 
and transportation. 
1?. The Government will acquaint the people of the Transcauea-
sian Republic with the aims and methods of the relief work of 
the Near East Relief in order to promote mutual understanding 
and eo-operation between the Kear East Relief and the people, 
and to seeure the maximum of effieieney in the relief o~era­
tions. 
18. The Government grants to all .American Near East Relief 
personnel engaged in relief work the right of free and unim-
peded residence and movement within the Transcaueasian Repub-
lics, and freedom from personal seareh,arrest and detention. 
19. To facilitate eo-operation between the Government and the 
Near East Relief there may be elected or appointed by the Go-
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vernment a person acceptable to the Near East Relief whose duty 
it shall be to promote mutual understanding and co-operation 
between the Near East ~elief ana the Government. This represen-
tative may be ehanged at any time u~on request ·of either the 
Government or the Near East Relief, a successor being appoint-
ed as ]!)revi tied E~tbeve. · · 
20. In view c::>f the faet that the Near East Relief is unique 
and distinct from all commercial and profit-making organizations 
in that (a) it is .engage<i exelusively in an effort to hel, 
people by giving employment to the unemployed, (b) the major 
portion of its resources are used for the benefit of o~haned 
and dependent ehilaren, and (e) there is no private profit de-
rived from any 0f its opera.tians; it is hereby agreed that the 
Near East Relief shall, fer the purposes of labor oontraets,be 
regarded as a Government erganizatien and shall have the same 
privileges that are aeeoraed to Government ageneies. 
21. For the receipt and forwarding of mail ef the Near East Re-
lief the following regulations are mutually acee]lted: 
OUtgoing ~.-Mail bags eontaining outgoing mail of the 
Near East Relief may be inspeeted and sealed with the Seviet 
diplomatie seals by the representative of the Government with 
the Near East Relief referred to in Paragraph 19, or by a per-
son authorized by him. The bags thus sealed are inviolate and 
are not subjeet to further inspeetion, and may be farwaraed 
promptly without aelay to their destination. 
Ineoming Mail.-Ineoming mail bags arriving from abroad are 
to be sealed at the point of entry by the representative of the 
.Near East Relief and the re]lresen tati ve ef the Government with-
out being o:pened 0r inspeeted. The mail thus sealed_.is inviolate 
and will be immediately fGrwarElea ta the Near Easl Relief, seals 
te remain unbraken until arrival at 4estination. ~ 
22. Representatives af the Near East Relief have the right of 
free aeeess to steamers arriving at Batum or other port of en-
try, as well as ta these leaving. Far this )Urpose proper cre-
dentials will, upon request Gf the Near East Relief, be issued 
by the Government. The GGvernment undertakes to secure fer the 
Near East ~elief suitable doeking and wareheuse facilities at 
Batum or other :port of entry for the handling ef relief sup-
:plie s. 
23. The present agreement it signed and reearded in English 
and Russian la.nguages.Beth texts have equal value. 
Signed for the Government: 
A. Mravian 
Viee President S.S.Republis 
of Armenia 
N. Tergazarian 
Government CGmmissioner far 
co-o~eration with N.E.R. 
Signed for the Near East Relief: 
c.V.Viekrey Jesse K.Mar<ien H.C.Jaquith 
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APPENDIX II: Partial Text of the Armistice Treaty of Batoum 
between the Re~resentatives of Turkey and Armenia 
Article 2: the Turkish-Armenian Border: From the summit of the 
Devedi~ Mountains the frontier to ehange direction toward the 
south, passing through the summits ef Aghrikar, Bashkeran, and 
Nour-Rahman mountains, and, continuing south; passing five ki-
lometers west of Aghboulagh Station on the Tiflis-Alexandrepol 
railroad, to continue over the summits to Khanvali Station and, 
by a straight line to eu t aero ss the Etehmiadz1n- Sardarabad road 
to a point seven kilometers west of Etehmiaazin, turning around 
Etehmiadzin at a distance of seven kilometers, and continuing 
in a vertieal line at approximately· six kilometers distance 
from the Alexandro:pol-Djoulfa railroad, and sixteen kilometers 
south-west of Bashkiaran Station to aut the road to the rail-
r~ad; thence, to turn toward the south-east,passing one kilo-
meter west of Ashaghi-Karabaghlar village, to continue past 
Shaghabl0u,Gharakhateh, Ashaghi-Dja.nakhchi stations till Elpin-
tehai and thense to Arpa station; following the Arpa River val-
ley, to reach to Kayalou station, then along the Kayi4 River 
to the summit of Aghdaban Mountain; by the summits of Gharatar-
na, Aladjin, and Ghara.nlik, to continue to the decline of Re-
lia.ntohai, and following the Relia.n Valley, to reach the for-
mer Persian-Russian border at the station of Alidj, south of 
Aza statian. 
Artiele 4: nThe Ottoman imperial government was obliged to 
send aid of armed force to the government of the Armenian Re-
publis when the latter requested it for the protection of or-
der and tranquillity." 
Artiele 6: established the questien of the theologieal and 
sO<llial eustoms rights tFJ.f the MQhannnedan pe)lulation in Armenia; 
the name of the sultan must be mentionea in the regular ]!lrayers 
ef the Mohammedans. 
Article ?: concerned the establishment tFJf diplomatie person-
nel exehange and the negotiating G>f commercial treaties. 
Artieles 8,9,10,respectivel¥, dealt with railroad,post-telegraph 
and border-erossing rights tthe latter for populations situa-
ted near the berder). 
Artiele 11: "The government ef the Armenian ReJ>Ublice was obliged 
to exert its .every effort, so that, immediately after signature 
Gf 'the conditions, the Armenian. forces feund there be withdrawn 
frsm Baku city and to ~arantee that that withdrawal shall oc-
easien no ou tbrea.ks of fighting. 11 
Artiele 12: eonoerned rights arising from the Breet-Litovsk 
Treaty. 
Article 13: the lands in occupation outside the borders stipu-
lated te be evaeuated immediately. 
The Three Appendiees: the Turks received the right to transpsrt 
:x:xxi. 
troops over the territory of Armenia in case of wa.r;the Tiflis-
Eriva.n-Djoulfa railroaa was to be subjeet to equally free tran-
sit for the Armenians and the Turks; Armenian prisoners of war 
were to have the right to return to Armenia; the Armenian re-
fugees from Kars and Batoum had the right for one month to re-
:ea~ ·to their hQmes; other Armenian refugees should have the 
right. to return to their :pla.ees after the signature of the 
treaty; the question of the return of the Turkish Armenian 
refugees was :postponed till after the end of the whole war. 
APPENDIX III: The Proclamation of Government of Premier Kachaz-
nouni on August 3, 1918 
Under exceptionally neavy circumstances the government 
L:iabine.:V I have organized kas gone ta work. It has been ealle<i 
upon to make an active reality of government in a land whish 
has just been born and which still has not emerged from its 
first stage of organization. T.he government has no support 
Lfre!Z within the past. It does not eontinue the aetivity ini-
tiatea by the former government •••• it is foreed to begin every~ 
thing from the beginning. From sh~~less ehaos and ruins, it 
must ereate a living and o:perating body. 
On the other han&, the government finds the country in 
sueh a· eondition that there is but one word to describe it --
"eatastro)hi e". 
The war lasting four years, the great revolution, the iis~ 
oraerly retreat of the Russian troops from our frontiers, the 
melting away of the Empire, the defeats undergone on the war 
fronts, the loss of territories, the s'litting of the Trans-
eaucaslis inta se)lara.te countries ... these deep disturbances 
coul·d not but leave behin<i terrible relics •••• 
This exceptional condition is, in itself, a predetermina-
tion ·of the nature of the government. It eannot aspire to mul-
tifarious or complete programs; it cannot have broad plans,and 
it must limit itself to the most essential and at the same time 
immediate matters. 
To halt the :proeess ef disintegration, to take the eoun-
try out of a eonditien of anarchy and to create conditions 
suitable for constructive government - thus does the present 
government understand its mandate. 
In keeping with that, the government puts forth the fol-
lowing matters for solution. 
A. Within the realm of internal affairs: 
1. To establish within the country security for ordinary 
administration, life,and property. 
2. To open the lines of communication for travel without 
eoDl]pli eations. 
3. To restore normal post-telegraph communications both 
within the country and with neighboring states. 
4. To apply active measures to reduce the crisis in food 
supplies as much as possible. 
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5. To regulate the condition of the immdgrants and refu~ 
gees, in part returning them to their places, in part settling 
them in new districts. 
6. To prepare as soon as possible the calling together 
of an Armenian constitutional convention. 
B. In the realm of finanee: 
To prepare the grounA for the establi~ent of a separate 
financial system. To initiate imperative measures to safeguard 
the currency of the country; to rehabilitate commercial life; 
to reinstitute foreign trade; and to ,repare a healthy system 
of Lftovernmenjf income by taxation. 
c. In the realm of justi0e: 
To adjust the law courts to the country's interpretation 
of law and to its. common law, at the same time making the cri-
minal eourts subjeet to the people's representatives (Parlia-
ment). 
D. In the realm of military affairs: 
To reorganize the country's military forces in order to 
create a strong army in discipline and morale, but not large 
in number. 
E. In the realm of foreign affairs: 
1. To strengthen the peace with the Ottoman gov-ernment, 
to found good neighborly relations with it, to fmlfill striet-
ly all the obligations we have undertaken the Ottoman E~ire 
and to insist that the Ottoman Empire likewise fulfill all 
its obligations toward us; especially, to conclude the issue 
of withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from our country a.nd the 
issue of the return of the refugees. 
2. By coming to agreement with the Azerbaidjan and Geor-
gian States, to conclude the issue of the borders of Armenia 
and the other other States, on the basis ef ethnogeography as 
the only foundation which is suitable to the spirit and aims 
of demooratie states. 
3. To liquidate, by coming to agreement with Azerbaidjan 
and Georgia, all the real estate and possessions which have 
been left· from the Transeaueasian Republic. 
---------------
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APPENDIX IV: Treaty of Sovietization between Soviet Russian 
plenipotentiary Legran and the Republic of Armenia, 
signed December 2, 1920 
1. Armenia is Jroelaimed a soeialistie, sovietie republie. 
2. Until the ealling of an assembly of the soviets of Armenia, 
a temporary WarwRevolutionary Committee is organized, to take 
over the entire administration in Armenia. 
3. The Soviet Government of Russia accepts the indisputable 
inclusion within the territory of the Armenian Socialistic 
Sovietie Republic of all the districts of the Province of Eri-
va.n, a part of the Province of Kars which will safeguard in a 
military way the control of the railroad from Zachour Station 
to the Arax Station, from Gandzak Province the Zanguezour dis-
triet and a part of the Ghazakh district within the boundaries 
of the August 10 agreement, and those parts of the Province of 
Tifli s which were under Armenia1 s rule on September 29,1920. 
4. The aommand of the Armenian army is not held responsible 
for those acts whiSh were committed within the ranks of the 
army before the Jroelamatian of Sovietie rule in Armenia. 
5. The members of the Dashnaktsagan and other socialistie par-
ties (S.R.,S.D.) will not be subject to any persecution be-
cause of their membership in those parties, and of their par-
ticipation in the fight against the Communist Party or for acts 
eommitted before the proclamation of Sovietio Armenia. 
6. There are five members of the War-Revolutionary Committee 
appointed by the Communist Party and two members of the Left 
Dashnaktsagan faction approved by the Communist Party. 
?. The Sovietic Government of Russia will take immediate steps 
to consolidate the necessary military forces for the defense 
of the Socialistic Sovietie Republie of Armenia. 
8. After the signing of this treaty, the Government of the Ar-
menian Republic will withdraw from reigning. The reign, on a 
temporary basis, until the arrival of the Revolutionary Com-
mittee, will pass to a military eommand, headed by Dro. On the 
part of the R.S.F.S.R., Comrade Silin is designated as eo-com-
missar of the military command. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the establishment of Soviet rule 
in Armenia and the meaning ef that rule for the Armenian :peo-
~le. The procedure follewed was-to deseribe the status of the 
Armenian peepie in World War I, events during the Independent 
Republie,and Soviet measures regarding the Armenian Churah,ag-
ri culture, and industry. 
The Armenian people fa~fi extinetion during World War I. 
The number of Armenians today in the Soviet Union is approxi-
mately 3,?50,000, of whom only about 2,000,000 live in the 
part of Historis Armenia termed ••soviet Armenia"• Most of the 
good agricultural lana has been seized by TUrkey. In Turkish 
Armenia, there are at least 1,300,000 ethnie Armenians {Ghzel-
bashi, Yezid.i, Armenian Me slems, Armenian Christians, etc. ) • It 
may be estimated that there are 1,661,000 Armenian Christians 
outside the Soviet Union. 
In studying the calamity whieh befell the Armenian peo-
ple in World War I, ~ne must emphasize that American ait en-
abled the Independent Republi e to pre serve the population from 
total extinetion. Near East Relief aided in the reconstruction --
of the country, in assembling the orphans, in providing medi· 
oal relief, and in supplying elojhing ana fooa. 
Continued American aid after seizure of Armenia by the 
Y.!iii. 
soviets was a. blassing for te Armenians, for Soviet rule ad• 
ded to the severity of conditions. During .the 1920's, it was 
obvious that the Near East Relief was a major factor in recon~ 
struoti on and the preservatien of the Armenian people. 
During the massacres of warld War I, the border area of 
Van rebelled against Turkey and established a "Rej;>Ublie '1 • .A:£-
ter the Russian Revolution, Armenian interests clashed with 
those of Georgia and Azerbaidjan. The breakup of the Transcau-
oasian Republie during a new TurkiSh offensive laid the greund 
for a declaratien of Armenian freedom in the Transeaueasua.Both 
the Eastern and Western Armenians were now subjeeted to racial 
warfare initiated by the Turks. IndeJendenee was an outgrowth 
of Armenian desires and these events. 
The Armenian National Council functioned as the govern-
ment of ~e new Republie. The officials made ra~id strides in 
restoring order, though large areas of Russian Armenia were 
~revented from coming under Armenian rule~ The Armene-Georgian 
boundary issue caused much bitterness and prevented eaopera-
tion. After the reoocupation of Kars, the Seeond Western Ar-
menian Assembly initiated the "Aet .of Union 11 sf May 28,1919i. 
which united Western and Eastern Armenia under the Republic. 
Political differences hindered establishment of a stable go-
vernment, despite an overwhelming mandate given in the alee-
tien to the Dashna.k Party. 
The Armenian Republic faced· the Pan"" Turk hostility of its 
Moslem minority, and the ensuing massacres led to communal war. 
Allied representatives ~roved unfriendly 1 oausing mueh Armenian 
bitterness against the British in particular. A Bolshevik re-
-
bellion in May, 1920 destroyed the morale of the Armenian ar-
my, just as the state had begun to foree its Moslem minority 
to accept Armenian rule. The Republic's plans for rapid recon-
struction and development were already underway when the alli-
an.ce between Kema.list Turkey and Soviet Russia destroyed Arme-
ni~n freedom. Though a popular uprising temporarily drove out 
the BolShevik authorities, the Red Army reimposed Soviet rule. 
After sovietization, the Bolsheviks strove to use Armenia, 
especially the Armenian Churoh, te s]i)read Communist influence 
among the expatriate communities. The Armenian Church had led 
the way in the independenee movement, but extensive Soviet in-
filtration soon made it an effective Soviet diplomatic weapon. 
At the same time, the Church within Soviet Armenia was nearly 
destroyed, and the murder of Catholicos Kharen in 1938 render-
ed the Catholieate a puppet under Soviet eoritrol. The Soviet 
regime has exerted strenuous efforts in the United States and 
the Middle East to prevent the Armenian churches from combat-
ting Soviet contrel. 
While they seized the only link between the Soviet and 
expatriate Armenian communities and exerted great influence 
upon them, the Bolshevik administrators in Armenia faced a se-
rious agricultural problem. Agricultural productivity recever-
ed slowly, scarcely reaching the pre-War level just before 
eollectivizatisn .. In some lines e'f preduction, even that level 
"" 
was not achieved. Armenian agricultural eeuld not :provi~e 'for 
the population augmented by the influx ~f hundreds of theusan~s 
af refugees. Despite 'food shortages, the Seviet regime tried 
to cenvert Arl!lenian agrieul ture from grain pro"duction to· eat-
ton and ''teehnical cro:ps" in erder t0 keep· Armenia political-
... 
ly dependent by eontrol of its food supply. 
The liquidation of the kulaks and the colleotivization 
eampaigns whieh ceineiQ.ed with the First Five rear Plan were 
a "revolution of the government against the people". Armenian 
agrieulture was thrown into ehaes, ana the rural poJulation 
resisted until 1934. Agrieul~ral productivity did not reach 
the 1926 figure again until the end ef the 1930's, but animal 
husbandry did not reeever. sov.iet agricultural palieies in Ar-
• 
menia. were those of colonial ex~leitation, and the Armenian 
:people were kept in poverty by a system of dues and obligations. 
Des~ite land-hunger in Armenia, the Soviet authorities have 
net :permitted Armenian settlement of vacant nearby areas whieh 
were formerly part ef the Independe•t Republic. 
As im the ease of agriculture, recen~truetion of Armenian 
mining and industria.l enterprises was slow during the 19201 s. 
Unemployment beeame an increasing problem. Buil4ing reeenstrue-
tion, urgently needed beeause of the influx ef the refugees 
and the war devastation, proceeded very unsatisfactorily, and 
Armenia soon had the worst housing situatien in the entire Sc-
xlvi. 
viet UniGn. The capital eity ef Erivan was an undeveloped slum. 
Large irrigation and eleatrif.ieation projects planned during 
the Republie, vital for the development of the country and the 
:raising of living standards, progressed slowly and at great ex-
pense. Taxa.tic;m was heavy, but state ineeme did. not permit ex~ 
tensive d.evelopment. 
The First Five Year Plan provided for modest industrial 
expansion and reconstruction. but ~inefficiency caused chaos. 
Handicapped by the failure of other areas of the Union to send 
supplies and by frequent transportation breakdown.s, Armenia re-
mained a neglected, baekwa.:rd part of the Soviet Union. Despite 
use of industrial serfdom and a campaign of terrer during the 
1930's, progress in production and industrial development was 
slow. canstructi<m of residential housing ·practically ceased. 
Chaos continued during the deaad.e, as both the Stakhanovite 
movement and the purges proved unable to overcome mismanage-
ment. During the war-years, Armenian industry expanded consi-
derably because of government encouragement to meet war needs. 
Newly-eonstructed electrification facilities baeame available 
to aid industrial develGpmen t. In the post .. we.r period, Soviet 
Armenia has made great strides in industrialization, but the 
industrial output is not used·for the benefit of the Ar.menia.n 
people. Despite its new importance as an industrial area,Arme-
nia still does not receive the attention given Georgia G:r Azer-
baidjan in the Union budget. The Armenian people remains po-
verty-stricken as the profit of Armenian enterprises goes tG 
~lvii. 
Russia.. 
~e Soviet nationalities poliQy subordinates national a-
reas sueh as Armenia to Russian interests. In Bolshevik theo-
ry, the Seviet nationalities are fated to merge with the Rus-
sian people to form a new proletarian nation. There is little 
real difference between Tsarist and soviet poliey toward the 
Armenian people, and both have encouraged the assimilation of 
Armenian-populated areas in neighboring Republics. The purge 
has been used to further national liquidation, as have the 
squan~ering of Armenian troops during World War II and the send-
ing of Armenians to other parts ef the Union.· • 
xl ix. 
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XII. 
PHOTOGRAPH OF THE CANDIDATE 
i 
1 
ARMENIAN POPULATION STATISTICS 
There has been much con~usion about the actual number o~ 
Armenians involved in the diplomatic warfare between the Turk-
ish and Russian Empires over rule in the Armenian - inhabited 
or historically Armenian lands. That both nations have grossly 
~alsi~ied statistics relating to Armenian population becomes 
obvious to even casual scientific scrutiny. The Turkish Em-
pire, weakening and in dread of the impending end of the im-
perial dream during the nineteenth century, consciously fol-
lowed a policy of lumping all Moslem and 1tfringen sect (such 
as the Yezidi) populations as nMoslem.n, while splitting Chris-
tian subjects into a number of categories in order to make 
the total of each particular group appear small. Further, 
the Porte reduced the Armenian population's importance by 
deportations to predominantly Moslem districts and by out-
right falsifications of figures, with the thought in mind as 
to how the European powers would view the numbers.lThat Rus-
sian imperial interests affected the numbers reported for 
each nationality in the Russian Empire is equally true, and 
many members of the so-called minorities were classified as 
Russian in areas where it was sought to make Russian inter-
ests overwhelming; in certain border districts, where the 
call of nationalism might prove stronger than imperial loyal-
1. Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community, p. 43. 
2 
ties in times o:f crisis, the Russian authorities :followed a 
studied policy o:f reporting 11 minorityrt numbers as less than 
the reality.2 Thus, :for both Russian and Turkish Armenia, we 
are :faced with the need o:f establishing correct population 
statistics. 
"Turkish Armenia" or nwestern Armenian Area 
ttTurkish Armenia" in international diplomacy has includ-
ed the six ottoman provinces o:f Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Mamouret-
el-Aziz (or Kharpert), Diyarbekir, and Sivas, while the histor-
ically Armenian region o:f Cilicia has generally been referred 
to by its own name. Thus, the Armenian ethnic areas o:f Turkey 
were considered to be the Six Provinces and Cilicia, with Ar-
menian political-aspirations centered primarily on the :former. 
Under the lead o:f the Constantinople Patriarchy, in the twen-
tieth century, more attention was directed toward Cilicia as a 
possible :focal point o:f Armenian national re-emergence. The 
sentimental viewpoint behind such a shi:ft in attention can be 
simply stated as a desire to begin again the national state in 
its last important center, :for the Armenian kingdom o:f Cilicia 
was the last internationally recognized and important Armenian 
state before imposition o:f Turkish rule. Political :factors 
were also involved, however, :for the growing strength o:f the 
Armenian revolutionary movement in the Armenian provinces had 
caused a conflict o:f authority and prestige within the Arman-
2. Vahe A. Sarafian, uThe Problem o:f Caucasian Population 
Statistics under Tsarist and Soviet Rule", ARMENIAN REVIEW, 
#23, 1953· 
3 
ian nation, and the Patriarchy had aligned itself with the 
conservative business interests of Constantinople which look-
ed on the increasingly popular revolutionary leaders with dis-
favor. Sarkis Atamian, an American Armenian scholar, has re-
cently performed a brilliant t~sk of scholarship in placing 
into perspective the class and clerical conflicts arising from 
the development of the revolutionary movement.3 The importance 
of such social conflict to Armenian statistics is that the fig-
ures of the Patriarchy, widely used as source material, must be 
considered too conservative for the provinces, and they were 
accurate for Cilicia alone. A further note of caution must be 
injected, for the Patriarchy figures were purposely kept low to 
impress the European nations with the insecure and devasted 
condition of Armenia. 
Early Estimates of Western Armenia 
The most important early estimate for the Armenians of 
Turkey is that of Ubicini, Who stated that there were 2,400, 
000 Armenians in Turkey about 1854; the early Patriarchy fig-
ures lend credence to this report, indicating approximately 
3,000,000 in 1878. The Patriarchy figures for 1882 show 2, 660, 
000, perhaps a too conservative figure, but credible and accep~­
able •. Marcel Leart's analysis of the 1882 figure gives 1, 630, 
000 for the Six Provinces, 380,000 for Cilicia, 455,000 for 
Turkey-in-Asia, and 50,000 in Adrianople Province, 135,000 in 
3. cf. Atamian, op. cit. 
4 
Constantinople, and 10,000 in Turkish Thrace. Going £urther 
into details, we estimate the Six Provinces to have had the 
£ollowing Armenian population: Van-4oo,ooo, Bitlis-250,000, 
Diarbekir-150,000, Erzerum-280,000, Kharpert-270,000, Sivas-
280,000 while Cilicia had 380,000 and Trebizond (nPontustt) 
had 12o,ooo.4 
In a handbook published in Ti£lis in 1895, £igures are 
given for all the Armenian communities, based on verified 
church information. Those parts of the revised Turkish pro-
vinces falling into the area of Turkish Armenia are .listed as 
follows: vilay~t of Erzerum-300,000; vilayet of Trebizond-4J., 
500;. district of Erzingan-30,000; vilayet of Sivas-161,420; vi-
layet of Van-154,000; district of Hekkiari-40,000; vilayet of 
Bitlis-115,000; district of Sert-75,000; district of Moush-118, 
000; vilayet of Diarbekir-120,000; vilayet of Kharpert-102,000; 
district of Dersim-6,ooo;; part of vilayet of Angora-95,000; part 
of vilayet of Adana-97,000; part of vilayet of Aleppo-110,000; 
various miscellaneous localities of Tur.kish Armenia-200,080. 
The total given for ttTurkish Armenian is 1,765,000, as against 
the 1882.Patriarchy rigure of 1,630,000. Turkey in Europe is 
4. Sarkis Atamian has a discussion of similar figures, but dif-
fers in attitude; PP. 43-44. See also M. A. Ubicini, Letters ££ 
Turkey, vol. 1, p. 19; Marcel Leart, La Question Armenienne ~ la 
Lumdere des Documents, page 59; and Freiherrn M. Kapri, Zwei: 
Vortrage uber Die historische und kulturelle Bedeutung des armen-
ischen Vo!FeS,-pige 59· It is interesting to note that Atamian 
curiously credits ttizmirn. with the 50,000 listed as in Adrian-
ople Province. 
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credited with 287,000, as against the Patriarchy's 1882 figure 
of 145,000. (It is interesting to note in connection with Euro-
pean Turkey that the figure for Constantinople was reported-dif-
ferently by various sound observers in 1895, probably in confu-
sion over what town or village areas were to be included in the 
metropolitan area, as well as that caused by the mass of tempor-
ary Armenian workers from the provinces. Ernest Chantre esti-
mates 250,-000 Armenians in the Constantinople are in 1895, while 
Lynch gives l8o,ooo.5) The listing continues with 12,000 in Me-
-
sopotamia, 244,000 in Cilicia proper, 9,200 in Egypt, 689,000 
in Turkey in Asia (against the 1882 figure of 455,000), 185,000 
in European Russia and Siberia, 1,380,000 in the Transcaucasus, 
174,000 in Persia, 48,000 in India and the rest of Asia, 14,50~ 
in Rumania and Bulgaria, 15,900 in Hungary and the rest of Eur~ 
ope, 12,750 in the Americas, and 9,200 in other lands. The to-
tal of Armenians in 1895 was 4,845,ooo, of whom 2,997,000 lived 
; 
in the Ottoman Empire, exclusive of Egypt.6 How tl;l.at figure 
stands up against the 1882 Patriarchy statistics becomes an im-
portant test of the validity of both. 
Using the 1882 figure of 2,660,000 and disregarding the 
reports of high reproduction rates we find the following Turkish 
5. H. F. B. Lynch, Armenia, v.rr, p.247; E. Chantre, Mission 
Scientifique ~ Transcaucasia, Asie Mineure, et Syrie; PP• ll-:12 
6. c:f'. Chantre, pp. 11-12, for a translation and reproduction 
of tEe information given by the Landbook. 
6 
Armenian population for various years on the basis of a one 
percent per annum increase, assuming that the higher Armenian 
reproduction rate; was off'set by emigration to Russian-ruled 
and other areas, murders, and abductions: 
1884.-2,713,460 
1886-2,767,999 
1888-2,823,634 
It is highly significant that the conservative figure of 
2,997~340 that we have established thus for the year 1894 is 
practically identical to the figure of 2,997,000 reported in 
the handbook; therefore, the 1894 handbook and the 1882 Patriar-
chy figures do support each other. Beginning in 1894, a series 
of massacres swept Turkish Armenia. No figures have ever ole:eea 
indicated accurately the extent of the genocide-practiced. It 
is possible only to state that between four and·five hundred 
thousand Armenians were killed outright or enslaved for a time. 
Jacques de Morgan reveals that more than 200,000 Armenians were 
put to death, 100,000 were made Moslems by force, and more than 
100,000 women and girls were ravished and sent into harems.7 A 
number of the Islamized and harem slaves in time did succeed in 
escaping back to the Armenian church fold. We must consider the 
Armenian church population to have lost 330,000 persons, and the 
entire population increase since 1882 lost. The population .fi-
gure reverted back to 2,660,000 in 1895. 
7. Jacques de Morgan, The History of the Armenian People. p.305 
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Western Armenia Before World War I 
Increasing again at a one percent per annum rate, the 
Armenians had, logically, a minimum population of 2,998,000 
in 1908. In 1909 massacres occured1 causing a loss or about 
35,000, in Cilicia which were to have set \off a new genocide. 
Strong foreign reaction caused the_Young Turk government to 
repudiate the actions and blame them on 11old reactionaries or 
Abdul Hamid". In a patently false guise or constitutional 
ttbrotherhood" and "equalityn, the Young Turks began to bide 
their time, while allaying the suspicions or the Armenian 
people by gestures or fraternity •. The Armenian population 
increased steadily during the pre-war years, at a raster rate 
now that a certain amount o:f security prevailed. In the per-
iod or 1908-1914 the Armenian ~eproduction rate apparently 
rose significantly; the.~rmenians or the Six Provinces must 
have seemed to the Turks to have an alarmfng number or child-
ren, for the average Armenian age was rapidly dropping, and 
Turkish Armenia had a high percentage of young children. Some 
or the error in the Patriarchate's 1912 :figures may be due to 
that· increase, since the Armenians were afraid of declaring 
their children lest their taxes be increased. 
The Armenian population in Turkey during.those years may 
be estimated as :follows~ 
1909 
1911 
1913 
1915 
The difference o:f about 1,060,000 between my figure for 
8 
. 1911 and the figure (total Armenians in Turkey, excluding 
sects-2,100,000) of the Patriarchy published in 1912 is not 
as startling as it appears. The'l912 Patriarchy figures, 
which fail to include. the 4oo,ooo Armenians settled in the 
Asia tic districts of Turkey outside Armenia and Cilieia, are 
as follows: 
Turkish Armenia 
Other districts of 
the Six Provinces 
Cilicia 
European Turkey 
1,018,000 
14.5,000 
407,000 
530,000 
2,100,000 8 
The Patriarchy statistics for Turkish Armenia do not give 
a true picture of the population. Again-st the Patriarchy's 
mere 1,163,000 for the Six Provinces, my figures show approx-
imately 2,153,000 in 1911, while a figure of 407,000 would be 
acceptable for Cilicia, 4oo,ooofor Turkey in Asia, and.20o,ooo 
for European Turkey. European and Western Turkey at that time 
had approximately 330,000 students and temporary workers, men 
and some women who would work for some months or years and then 
return with their earnings to their villages; I have included 
such persons in the figure for Turkish Armenia. It may be sig-
nificant that the 1912 Patriarc~y figures give 1,178,000 as the 
Moslem population of Turkish Armenia, together with 254,000 mis-
·cellaneous. non-Christian sectaries and 1231 000 Nestorians. 9 If 
those figures have validity, the corrected figure of 2,195,000 
Armenians in the Six Prpvinces represent about 58.5% of the to-
8. Kapri, page 62 
9· Ibid., PP• 60-61 
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tal population of Turkish Armenia; with that percentage rising 
somewhat until the middle of 1915. 
The External Armenians and World War I 
When the storm of the deportations and genocide swept 
Turkish Armenia from 19~5 to 1923, that settled and progres-
sive population, more advanced· than any other in the Middle 
East, was swept away. The number of Armenians under Russian 
administration at the start of World War I .will be discussed 
later. Armenian numbers in other lands were approximately: 
Egypt-40,000; Persia-230,000; India and Asia-35,000; Austria. 
and Hungary-20,000; Rumania and Bulgaria-28,000; America-100, 
000 ;: other lands-15, 000. Numbers of these served in the Allied 
or Central Powers armies, not a few losing their lives. After 
the Armistice, many thousands were lost as the young men in the 
expatriate communitie& hastened to the aid of their countrymen 
and served in the ill-fated Armenian Legion betrayed by the 
French commanders in Cilicia or in the army of the Independent 
Armenian Republic. Perhaps as many as 70,000 Armenians of Per-
sian-rules areas lost their lives in the World War I civil striTe 
and massacres which devasted Persian Armenia, or in the epidemics 
which followed in the wake of the population dislocation inthat 
land. Thus, the external Armenian communities must be considered 
to have numbered about 308,000 in 1924, with perhaps an addition-
al Persian Armenian refugee population of 60,000 surviving in 
the Transcaucasus. 
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Losses in We·stern Armenia During World War I 
The problem as to the actual losses of the Armenians 
in the Turkish Empire during the World War I genocide and in 
the devastating epidemics which followed· has never been satis-
factorily studied. Most of the figures given relate to 1915-, 
with little attention given to losses sustained during the 
worst year, 1916, and in subsequent years. The Tprkish offi-
cialdom purposely confused its records to camoUflage its poli- · 
' . 
cies and its criminality. Nevertheless, at least one major ev-
idence exists to indicate the official figures known to the 
Turkish government. In a table of losses. printed in Tasviri 
Eftcher on May ?.7, 1919, the Constantinople anti-Ittihadist 
government stated the following apparently ridiculous and 
meaningless statisti?s: 
Total I slams 
Destroyed 
Erzeroum 
Deported (those who 
await return) 
Deported (dispersed 
here and there) 
Erzinga 
Total Islams' 
Destroyed 
Deported (await return) 
Deported (dispersed) 
Bitlis 
Total Islams 
Destroyed 
Deported (await return) 
Deported (dispersed) 
.704,533 
207,105 
282,201 
448,227 
361,615 
108,h.81 
144,647 
253,131 
Total Islams 
Destroyed 
van 
Deported (await return) 
Deported (dispersed) 
Diarbekir 
308,000 
108,000 
114,683 
Total Islams 1,521,286 
Destroyed 477,926 
Deported (await return) 44o,848 
Deported (dispersed) 895,329 
Trebizond 
Total Islams 1,100,624 
Destroyed 223,143 
Deported (await return) 230,999· 
Deported (dispersed) 354,142 
Totals 
Total Islams . 4,143,770 . 
Destroyed · 1,178,995 
Deported (await return)l,l~),695 
Deported (dispersed)" 2, 144, 8ool0 
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While at first appearing to be contrary to logic and 
fact, these statistics are susceptible to clarifying analysis. 
There can be little question that the release of these figures 
by the Constantinople government was an honest attempt to dis-
sociate at least part of the Turkish people from the heinous e-
v~nts involved, for many of the leading circle of Turks were 
horrified at the degree of barbarity displayed by the Ittiha-
dist government of the war years. Why then the issuance of a 
10. As oi tied in James H. Tashjian, "American Military Mis-
sion to Armenia 11 , Part IX; Armenian Review, No. 13 (April, 1951), 
pp. 132-133· Figures given i'or 11 Diarbekirn approximate the re-
mainder of the Six Provinces, and this should read 11Diarbekir and 
Remainder of Turkish Armenian • Trebizond is outside 11Turkish 
Armenia 11 ; the listing refers mainly to Greeks. 
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document which appears to be wholly synthetic? A probable 
key to the mystery is found in the failure to cite a figure 
for the "Deported (await r~turn)u category for Van Province. 
It is known that the 250,000 A~menians who escaped from van 
to the Transcaucasus had already established themselves in 
the social and political life of that area; they were no long-
er considered as real subjects by the Turkish government, and, 
therefore, were not numbered among those who "await returnn. 
- -
The fact that 114,683 are listed as 11 dispersed here and there 11 
is equally indicative, for American consular and Armenian es-
timates placed the number of Armenians killed in the Van area 
at about 100,000. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the 
category of "await return" refers to the non-slain, while the 
. -
ndispersed here and there'' were Armenians permanently "dis-
persed" in accordance with the instructions of the government 
that the Armenians were to be deported to their deaths.ll 
Thus, on the basis of Turkish official secret figures, we can 
establish that the Turkish Armenians numbered, at the begin-
ning of 1915, as follows: 
Six Provinces 
Cilicia 
European Turkey 
Asiatic Turkey 
2,687,000 
457,000 
260,000 
425,000 
3,829~000 
Of that total, according to the above Turkish figures, 
at least 1,884,800 Armenians of Turkish Armenia were killed 
outright. Adding a .lower proportion of kille d for other are-as 
of Turkey, we can establiSh that in the massacres alone 2,335, 
000 Turkish Armenians were slain. Subtracting some 4oo,ooo 
11. For official ~urkish genocide documents and orders, cf. 
Andonian, Memoirs of Naim ~. 
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lost from the survivors by disease before 1923 and 100,000 
removed to the Armenian Independent Republic, we find that 
920,700 Turkish Armenians were still alive outside the Trans-
caucasus just before the expulsion of the Greeks and the loss 
of Smyrna in 1922. A probable 5o,ooo Armenians lost their 
lives during that "exchange of po.pulationstt, while_ a 75,000 
more were killed by the Kemalists during and after the occupa-
tion of Cilicia by the resurgent Turks. Thus, it is fair to 
state that about 795,000 Turkish Armenians were left alive out-
side Transcaucasia and 250,000 in Transcaucasia, for a total of 
1,045,000 in 1924. Adding the 308,000 survivors of the expatri-
ate communities and Persian Armenia and those 30,000 who fled 
Armenia after its sovietization, ~ find the Armenian papulation 
outside Soviet lands to have totalled 1,383,000 at the start of 
1925. 
Unredeemed Armenia 
A consciousness of the existence of such a large number of 
Armenians outside the truncated fragment termed ttsoviet Armenia 11 
as well as an awareness that Armenia cannot provide for her 
population as long as the richest Armenian lands are under Turldsh 
rule has constantly kept the Armenian people within the Soviet 
Union internationally-minded. The nationalism fostered by the 
national frustration of over-crowding and land~hunger while the 
Turkish Armenian lands remain nearly vacant has been a problem 
for the Soviet masters. To indicate the importance of Turkish 
Armenia, the following table is illuminating: 
Table I: Turkish Armenian Areas 
Province or District 
Trebizond (without Janik) 
Van (without.Rekkiari) 
Bitlis 
Kharpert 
Adana (without Itch Ili) 
Sivas (without Amasia and Tokat) 
Diarbekir (without Mardin) 
Erzerum 
ll/Iara.sh 
Caesaria 
Area in sq. J:rm;~ 
40,305 
16,868 
.34,409 
H-0,279 
47,688 
30,000 
24,ooo 
6o,ooo 
18,4o5 
8,355 
320,309 , or 
32,030,900 hectares. 
Of that 32,030,900 hectares of Turkish Armenian land, only 
.,.., 
3,000,000 were under cultivation; ll,OOo;ooo were capable or 
being cultivated, 1,000,000 were under rorest cover, and 
17,030,900 were mountain lands, uncultivated grazing land, and 
12 
other tracts largely capable of being put into forest. At 
the same time, Soviet Armenia had only 2,898,225 hectares of 
land area, or Vlhic·h a mere 1,791,900 hectares were usable in 
any way; 465,000 were cultivated or used ror pasture; uncared 
for grazing lands and uncultivated land totalled 973,600 hec-
tares and forest land encompassed 353,300 hectares.13 
Present Non-Soviet Armenian Colonies 
Between 1925 and,l955 the non-Soviet Armenian numbers 
sbirted as extensive emigrations occurred. The present number 
of Armenians in various lands may be estimated as follows: 
12. Kevork Mesrob, Haigaran, p. 18-19 
13. Hovhaness Hagopian, Khorhrtayin: Hs:.iasdan, p~ 57-58. 
Table II: Present Non-Soviet Armenian Colonies 
United States 
Canada 
Syria and Lebanon 
Turkey 
Iraq 
Iran 
Palestine-Jordan 
France and Western Europe 
Rumania 
Bulgaria 
Greece 
Egypt and Sudan 
Latin America 
Britain 
Oyprus 
India 
Far East 
Ethiopia 
Africa 
Australia 
Other lands 
329,000 
15,000 
285,000 
245,000 
29,000 
192,000 
23,000 
135,000 
82,000 
59,000 
18,000 
48,000 
95,000 
6,000 
12,000 
29,000 
3,000 
9,000 
10,000 
4,000 
33,000 
1,661,000 
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The number of Armenians outside the Soviet Union in vari-
ous years may be estimated as follows: 
1926 
1934 
1938 
1,,351,380 
1,4J.2,900 
1,470,812 
1946 
1950 
1956 
i,587,809 
1,556,155 
1,661,500 
The Ethnic Armenian Population of Turkey 
The question of the Armenian ethnic population is com-
plex; there are hundreds of thousands of so-called Turks, 
Persian'fs', Arabs, and Kurds who are in reality Armenian Moslems. 
The above figures show only the' Christian or publicly Armenian 
populations. Because the Turkish authorities had forcibly 
Islamized entire districts (such as the Hamamshen, or Hemshin, 
district of the Middle Djorokh Valley) and such Islamized 
Armenian populations still maintain a high degree o:f endogamy, 
14. Simon Vratzian, Armenia And The Armenian Question, 
p.~~2, gives ifidredib1y low figures for various colonies. 
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though in pUblic they allow themselves to be termed rrTurks;1 
we realize that the e:bllhlhaequest.ion contains many potential 
dangers to Turkish rule.15 During the genocide of 1894-1896, 
as pointed out earlier, 100,000 Armenians were Islamized by 
force, while about lOO,OQO more were forced into Turkish 
harems. At the same time that such forces were OP.erative in 
creating a "crypto-Armenia.n11 or semi-Armenian minority, a 
number of Armenians semi-voluntarily changed their religion; 
no accurate estimate cif such conversions can be made, but, 
ba.sea on the known experience of the Papert district of Upper 
Armenia~6that number must have been moderately significant, 
reachi.ng to perhaps 50,000 throughout Turkish Armenia. Letters 
which have reached relatives in America at various times in-
dicate that at least some of the ~enian Islamized persons 
are in fact ucrypto-Armenians,n in public completely loyal 
and nationalistic Turks, but privately waiting for the day 
when they can live as Armenians again, regardless of religious 
creed. 
15. Father Dashian, The Armenian Moslems Between Erzeroum 
and the Black Sea, discusses the earlier Islamized Armenians. 
16. Noted Armenian revolutionary leader and Armenian Inde-
pendent Republic General Sebouh, on his return to his birth-
place, found nearly all his living relatives and neighbors 
had become Moslem. His narration in his memoirs, Etcher 
Im Housheritz, is especially r.oignant ~en he realized his 
OWn. brothers were now nTurks. 1 
17 
During the genocide·program of the First World War, the 
Turks at various times attempted to make Turks of the Armenian 
17 younger children, with scant ·sueoess. It is likely, however, 
that some 5o, 000 orphans have been brought up as Kurds or Tu:rks; 
many of these retain some m~mory of their origin. During the 
genoci4e, between two and three hundred thousand Armenian 
women were forced into harems as· slaves or were married by 
local Turks; in many cases, it appears, the rrTUrks 11 who married 
Armenian girls and women were motivated by humanitarian spirit 
and some may have been Arme·riian Moslems. The great majority 
'. 
of the women were seized as.objects of lust, or even as ob-
jects of profit, and do not .fall into this category. Never-
< 
theless, it is a strong probability that at least 1,000,000 
of the present 11Turkishn population are offspring of Armenian 
women, either f;om the i894 or the 1914 massacres. The number 
who are aware of at least part Armenian origin must be rising 
rapidly as the offspring in turn establish families. What 
reaction such "mi.xed-bloodsn have nard the Armenian people 
will remain a mystery until Jtnternational conditions change 
drastically. 
That the Turkish government has been.aware of the threat 
of the Armenian Moslems is shown by the Kemalist treatment 
,..... 
of the Avshar~s (deported and reduced from over 50,000 to an 
• 
17. See Leon z. Surmelian, I ~You Ladies and Gentlemen, 
for an interesting personal account. Documents relating 
to Turkification of children in Andonian, op. cit. 
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estimated 15,000 in 19.31), the Baliki and other Armenian tribes 
18 
of 11 Kurdsn nearly exterminated in 1938. Despite all efforts 
of the Turkish Republic, however, it is a nearly impossible 
task to root out the Armenian Moslems, except where they live 
as separate tribes. When the Armenians were destroyed or ex-
pelled, the most progressive agricultural population of Tur-
key left were the ethnically Armenian Ghzelbashi nlVloslems," 
who numbered about 850,000 at the start of the genocide in 
March, 1915. The Ghzelbashi population maintained close and 
friendly relations with the Armenians of the Christian faith. 
Traditionally descendents of the Armenian Paulician sectarians 
of the ninth to eleventh centuries, who had sought the protec-
tion of the Arab emirs against persecution by the Byzantine 
. 
Orthodox Church, the Ghzelbashi populations guffered heavily 
during the chaos of 1915-1924.19 The Kemalist Turkish Re-
public feared their importance and subjected them to a series 
of persecutions, including the near annihilation of the popu~ 
lation of the Dersim District in 1938 in a massacre typically 
termed a nrevolt.u With a probable half million survivors in 
.. -
1924, the Ghzelgashi, despite losses sustained under the Tur-
kish Republic, probably numbered about as follows for the 
specified years: 
18. Kevork Mesrob, op.cit., p.25-26, discusses in moderate 
detail the destruction of the Avshars in Cilicia. 
19. Ibid., P•· 26-28. 
1925 
1931 
1937 
500,000 
535,000 
588,000 
1941 
1947 
1956 
565,000 6oo,ooo 
694,000 
Associated with the Gb.zelbashis are the Zaza-Tmbli-
19 
Tcharikli tribes, Moslems ~o are partially ethnic Armenians, 
partially former Kurdish Christians, who merged into new 
tribes when the Moslem occupation of Armenia assumed an Islami-
·' 
~ation fervor about the fourteenth and fif'teenth centuries. 
Estimated by the Armenian Patriarchy to number about 77,000 
in 1911, it is safe to assume that their actual number was 
nearly 75,000 in 1925. The 1938 massacre in Dersim is believed 
to have reduced the number of the Zaza-Tmbli-Tcharikli popu-
lation from about 92,,000 to around 35,000. The number of 
Zaza-Tmbli-Tcharikli in Turkey today may be estimated to be 
about 44,000, all presumably bitter enemies of Turkish rule. 
An important fragment of the old Armenian sects arecalled 
Yezidi; they are usually referred to as a Moslem sect, but 
their tradi tiona clearly show them to be ethnic Arman ians, 
for they are the followers of Smbat, who formed the Tondragetsi 
sect in the Lake Van area in the late Ninth Century. The 
Yezidi population maintains a feeling of solidarity with the 
Armenian nationality, having gone so far as to have asked 
the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin to begin a program of schools 
and p~blic education in their villages during the Constitu-
tional Period in pre-World War Turkish history. (The Turks, 
alarmed at the possibility of Yezidi union with the Armenian 
Qhurch and people, sent troops to burn and massacre Yezidi 
20 
villages.) Bitter enemies of Turkish rule, the Yezidi popu-
lation supported the Armenian revolutionary movement to the 
extent of joining the revolutionary bands. 
After the genocide of World War I, many Yezidi settled 
in the Armenian Republic rather than stay under Turkish rule, 
a minimum of 18 1 000 living in Soviet Armenia in 1926. The 
number of Yezidi in a given area is hard to determine accu-
rately, for they hide themselves under the name of Moslems 
in Moslem countries. The Patriarchy estimated that ·there were 
in 1911 about 37,000 Yezidi in Turkish Armenia; a document 
of the Harbord Military Mission to Armenia, lumping the 
Yezidi and Ghzelbashi together, gave 38,000 for Russian Ar-
menia and 433,200 for the Six Provinces of Turkish Armenia in 
20 1914, excluding Cilicia and districts adjacent to Turkish 
\ 
Armenia. 
We can estimate the following statistical picture for 
Turkish Armenia today, based on the assumption that the ~urkish 
census~of 1950 is reasonably accu~ate as regards the total 
population of each province. (In fact, the Turkish statis-
tics rouse some degree of ·suspicion, appearing to be too high 
for all the interior provinces, especially where it is feared 
Armenian claims;~ may one day again become an important dip-
lomatic issue. Such ttpaddingtt does not materially affect the 
figures of the ethnic Armenians and the Armenian Moslems, 
though the population of the various provinces may be less 
than stated.) 
20. See Mesrob, op.cit., p. 28; Xapri, op.cit., p. 60-61; 
Tashjian, op. cit., p. 126-130. 
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Table III: Present Populations Of TurkishArmenia 
Van Province 
Total populat·ion about 188,000: 
Yezidi 7,000 
Gypsies 3,000 
Armenian Moslems 9,000 
Armenians 2,500 
Kurds & Mixed 152,000 
Turks & Mixed 14,500 
Kars Province 
Total Population about 409,000: 
Yezidi 24,000 
Kzelbashi 13,000 
Circassians 13,000 
Armenians 1,500 
,Armenian Moslems 17,500 
Kurds.& Mixed 216,000 
Turks and Mixed 124,000 
Bitlis Province 
Total PopQlation about 376,000: 
Yezidi 1,000 
Kzelbashi ·51,000 
Circassians 10,000 
Armenian Moslems 53,000 
Armenians 2,000 
Kurds & Mixed 222,000 
Turks and Mixed ·37,000 
Erzerum Province 
Total Population ~bout 943,000: 
Yezidi 3,000 
Lazzes 32,000 
Kzelbashi 55,000 
Circassians 18~000 · 
Armenians 1,000 
Armenian Moslems 1~,000 
Kurds & Mixed 395,000 
Turks. & Mixed 270,000 
Total 
Total 
,. •! 
.... - ..... .:. - ._, 
Total 
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Remainder or Six Province Area in Turkish Armenia 
Population about 1,903,000: ---- --
Yezidi 2~ 1 000 
Kzelbashi 388,000 
Arabs & Syrians 41,000 
Circassians 73,000 
Assyrians 28,000 
Armenians 38,000 
Armenian Moslems 1~,000 
Zaza-Tmblf-Tcharikli ,000 
Kurds & Mixed 6 ,000 
Turks & Mixed 403,000 
C!cticia: exclucUng Ratay (the Sm d.iak .Q!. 
!:lexandretta) 
Population about 1,126,000: 
Takhtadji & Kzelbashi 90,000 
Greeks ~,ooo 
Armenians 8,000 
Gypsies 12,000 
uAfghans 11 3,000 
Circassians & Ohechens 61,000 
Arabs and Syrians 125,000 
Armenian Moslems & 
Avshar 
Kurds & Mixed 
Turks & Mixed 
All Turkish Armenia21 
115,000 
193,000 
5J.o,ooo 
Population about 4,945,000: 
Takhtadji-KzelbashH} 597,000 
Greeks 3,000 
Yezidi* 56,ooo 
Lazzes )~,000 
Zaza-Tmbli-TchariklH~ 44,000 
Gypsies . 15,.000 
Circassians & Chechens 175,000 
Assyrians 28,000 
Arabs & Syrians 166,000 
21. Official Turkish figureB in 1919, previously referred 
to, placed the. surviving nMoslemrt population or Turkish 
Ar.menia at about 2,100,000, with-losses amounting to 955,000 
(nearly entirely because of devastating epidemics). The 
•umber surviving in Oilicia would increase the Turkish 
Armenian 11Mo.Slemtt figure to about 2,450,000 •. 
.. 
* Ethnic Armenians. 
11A.fghans n * 
Armenians * 
Armenian Moslems & 
Avshars ~t:­
Kurds & Mixed 
Turks & Mixed 
3,000 
53,000 
562,000 
1,8L.6,ooo 
1,364,500 
The total number of Armenians in all Turkey is, of 
course, far higher than shown in the above tables, though 
true Armenian numbers are not given in the recent Turkish 
censuses. The total number of Armenian Christians in 
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Turkey may be estimated at 245,000 for 1955. Many of those 
Armenians are of the ttnon-noticeablen sort, having little or 
no knowledge of the Armenian language, Turki.fied names, and 
nofhing to set them apart .from the general Turki_sh populatio.m. 
On the part of many, this is a studied policy to avoid draw-
ing attention to themselves. It is impossible for the average 
civilized person to comprehend the actual life o.f the Turkish 
interior villages ·and towns. Even in Constantinople it is 
dangerous to be known as an ArmeniaA. Nevertheless, it 
appears that the Armenian in Turkey, whether Armenian-speaking 
or Turkish-speaking, is conscio~s of his parentage. To place 
the statistics given .for Turkish Armenia into perspective, it 
is worth noting that numbers o.f Armenians, some Armenian 
Moslems, Gb.zelbashi, Kurds, and other peoples of Turkish Ar-
menia are .found in Pontus, Anatolia, and Thrace; outside Tur-
kish Armenia in Tuttk$y'::.may be .found approximately 195,000 
Armenians, largely Turkish-speaking, probably at least 50,000 
Armenian Moslems, about 50,000 Ghzelbashi, and:~·- perhaps 800, 
000 or 900,000 Kurds. 
The Problem of uRussian Armenian" 
or 
"Transcaucasian Armeniann .Statistics 
The Turkish area statistics are not th:e only ones which 
must be used with great care. The Russian censuses tempting-
ly plainly states population statistics for the Armenians of 
the Transcaucasus, North Caucasus, Russia and Siberia, but a-
nalysis reveals that the figures are nearly meaningless, wheth-
er the census used is Tsarist or Soviet. No discussion of "na-
·-
tional minorities 11 , nrights of self-determinationn, national 
policy or administration can be based on fi~m ground without 
the possession of the complete statistical pictUre, both as 
it existed in the time of the Tsars, the Armenian Independent 
Republic, and no~ under the Soviet regime. Figures of a sort 
are available; in general, most writers on 11 Russian minorities" 
have tended to accept Russian census statistics at their face 
value, even when rejecting other statistics issued by the Rus-
sian regimes. 
Early Figures for Caucasian Armenia 
Early figures for the Caucasian populations are extremely 
unsatisfactory. Only to a limited degree d,o the reports of 
European travellers aid in establishing values for the nine-
teenth century. Schnitzler and von Erckert undertook the most 
' 
comprehensive Caucasian i~vestigations in mid-century~ but dif-
ficulties existed in the way of ascertaininz the realities. 
Russian authorities in the early nineteenth Century were pri-
marily interested in military conquest and counted mainly males 
___ .,.. .. __ _ 
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of military age. By mid-century, some sense could be dis-
covered in the figures for the Russian Caucasus, though the 
numbers given for the native populations aP,peared to be low-
er than was warranted. For the 1845-1855 period, Golovin re-
ported about 165,000 Armenians in Russian Armenia, although 
the total under Russian rule ttmay be estimated at 4-oo,ooon.22 
Schnitzler found the Armenian population to be steadily 
increasing, rising at the rate of about 9,000 per annum from 
1838 to 1847; mean births-16,548, mean deaths-7,796, yielding 
an approximately 2.2% natural rate or increase annually. The 
Armenian rate of increase was higher than any other in the 
Caucasus, in 1856 the total increase for the entire Caucasus 
averaging only 1.01{%. Thus,. he indicated that the demographic 
position or the Armenians, who numbered some 333,000 in the 
I 
Caucasus alone and 4oo,ooo in the Empire, was improving with 
time. A fact important in determining the basis of ethnic re-
covery from war losses was that the total population of the 
Caucasus had only 91 females per 100 males, with the non-Russians 
accounting for that male predominance; thus, the Armenians are 
seen to have a better basis for quick r.ecotery from war-time 
loss than local Russian settlers.23 
Von Erekert , who undertook a scientific survey of the en-
-----
22. Ivan Golovin, The Caucasus, p.88. 
23. M. J. H. Schnitzler, L'empire des tsars au point actual de 
la· science, PP• 128-130, 170,. 178, 230, 242 and 279. 
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tire Caucasus area and freely utilized the figures of von ·· 
Seidlitz for about 1875, presented the following informa-
tion on the Armenian population of the Caucasus, excluding 
those settled in other·areas of the Russian: Empire: in 1875, 
721,000; in 1881, 780,ooo.24 From 1860 to 1881, the number o:f 
th"e·o-Arm.enians settled in Transcaucasia rose by about 447,000, 
an increase o:f approximately 234% for the 21 year period, an 
average of 1.1% despite heavy emigration toi other part~ of the 
Russian Empire and Armenian military dead during the. Russo-
Turkish War. These. figures can be considered merely as approx-
imations. 
The carefully assembled handbook of Armenian information 
printed in Tiflis-in 1895, quoted in translation by Ernest 
Chantre, lists Armenian Church population as 1~380,000·in Trans-
caucasia and 185,000 in Russia of Europ~ and Siberia.25 These 
figures, for the Armenian Apostolic population only, may be con-
sidered accurate, for the Armenian Church in the Russian Empire 
maintained its identity firmly and kept close watch over the 
community. The figure stated for Russia and Siberia is lew, 
for many thousands of Armenians in Russia had become Russian 
Orthodox, Catholic, or even Protestant by the late nineteenth 
century; the attac.bment. of a considerable number of such con-
vert.s toward the parent Armenian people was: weak. Neverthe-
les.s, we must add some 5o,ooo ·to th,e Transcaucasian Armenian 
figure .and approximately an equal number to those in Russia. 
24. R. von Erckert, Der Kaukasus und seine Volker, PP•34J-5. 
25. of. Chantre, E£• cit., pp. 11-12. 
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The 1897 Imperial Census· 
The 1897 Imperial Census has been hailed as a land-
mark in Russian statistical history. The first scientifical-
ly-organized census for the Empire, it has much value. De-
spite .favorable aspects, the 1897 census, conducted ?Y a gov-
ernment in the midst of a general Russification policy, tend-
ed to minimize seriously the number of particular peoples; 
only a part of that depression of nminority11 statistics is as-
cribable to conf'usion caused by the inclusion as 11Russian't all 
persons fluent in the Russian tongue. In the generally unso~ 
phisticated political atmosphere of the times, however, the 
distortions went nearly unnoticed and unchallenged. 
Few writers hinted that the rigures o~ght to be used 
critically. The 1903 publication of The Jewish Encyclopedia;"'; 
did challenge the low listing of Jews in the Caucasu~,26 while 
Victor Berard, writing in 1905, stated acutely that nthe fig ... 
urea are not ••• exact in their smallest details •••• " and that 
the official statistics did not.surriciently distinguish the 
different races, languages, and nationalities .·27 
The: 1897 census listed 1,200,000 Armenians in the Empire,.· 
as against 1,400,000 Georgians.28 This figure conflicts witp 
26. The Jewish Encyclopaedia, v.3, p. 628. 
27. Victor Berard, The .Russian Empire an~ C;arism, p.32. 
28. Inorodet~, La Russie et les Peuples Allogenes, pp.5-6. 
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the official Imperial estimate of 1,400,000 Armenians in 
1896, which h~d stated that the Armenians formed 50% of the 
population of Erivan Province, 35% of Elizavetpol Province, 
24.2% of Tiflis Province, 31 • .3% of Kars District, 8% of Baku 
Province, lo% of the Black Sea District, 2% of Kutais Province 
1%-·or Daghestan District, and had over 100,:000 population in 
RC~Jstov, Nakhi tchevan-on-the-Don, Astrakhan,; Bessarabia, Crimea, 
and North Caucasus. 29 The 1897 census list,ed the Armenians as 
totalling 52,233 of 826,716 in Baku Province, 1,636 or 571,154 
in Daghestan District; 292,188 of 878,415 in Elizavetpol Prov-
ine~; 73,406 o:r 290,654-.in Kara District; 13,926 of 1,918,881 
in the Kuban District; 24,o44 of 1,058,241 in Kutais Province; 
5,385 of 873,301 in Stavropol Province; 11,803 of 933,936 in 
Terek District; 196,189 of 1,051,032 in Tif'lis Province; 6,285 
or 57,478 in the Black Sea District (Tchernomorsk); and 441,000 
of 829,556 in Erivan Province.30 The total for all Caucasia 
thus was 1,128,095, or Whom 1,055,016 were [in Russian Armenia 
and Tiflis city. This eompaFes unfavorably with the more ac-
curately determined figure of 1,380,000 for Transcaucasia 
stated in the 1895 handbook referred to ea~lier. It !! prob-
able that ! fair estimate for 1897" would list the Armenians of 
Transcaucasia ~ numbering about 1,4-75,000, with 225,000 in the 
remainder of the Empire, for a total of about 1,700,000 under 
Russian rule. 
..., __ _ 
---115 ----
29. Census of 1896, various pages. 
30. Census of 1897, vari·ous pages 
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The Caucasian Armenians and World War I 
In the census estimate of January 1, 1913, the Tsarist 
government's Central Statistical Committee raised the popu-
lation total of the Empire .from the 1897 figure of 128 mil-
lions to 170 millions, an average annual increase of 2.1%. 
In the same period, despite immigration from Turkish and 
Persian Armenia, as well as a reproduction rate in excess 
of the Empire, as earlier shown, the figure for the Arme-
nians was raised to only l,5oo,ooo,3l which.showed an an-
nual increase of about 1.5%. During those. years, Russian 
Arm~nia underwent civil chaos in the seizure of the Church 
and school properties by the Tsarist government and the im-
perially-fomented Armeno-Tatar riots; nevertheless, the 
marked increase in public health and the moderate
1
industrial-
ization and commereiali~ation of the period were favorable to 
expanded reproduction rates. From this, it becomes apparent 
that the Russian government, having inaugurated an actively 
anti-Armenian policy during the Nineties, deliberately at-
tempted to show the Armenians as low inpopulation in order 
to forestall demands by the Armenian revolutionnaries for 
autonomy in Caucasian Armenia, as they were already demanding 
for Turkish Armenia. 
Using a reproduction rate of 2% per annum, conservative 
for the period, and 1,700,000 in 1897, and adjusting for emi-
31. Inorodetz, op. cit., pp. 6-7· 
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gration and for the steady trickle of immigration from Turk-
ish Armenia, we cane stablish realistic Armenian population 
estimates for the Russian Empire in the pre-World War period 
and the war years: 
1898 1,7~~,000 1916 2,696,000 
1904 1,9 ,000 1918 2,691,000 
1910 2,194,000 1920 2,555,000 
1914 2,371,000 .1922 2,380,000 
There is substantial evidence that these figures, which 
include the war-time refugee immigration, losses in epidemics 
and massacres in the. Transcaucasus, and starvation losses un-
der the Soviet regime when it was first established are a 
sound estimate. The fact that some 200,900 Armenians of the 
Russian empire took up arms as regulars in the Russian armies 
on the outbreak of World War I, and that 20,000 others joined 
in the Armenian volunteer battalions to fight Turkey as irre-
gulars is an indication that the actual Armenian population of 
the Caucasus was in excess of two million in 1913, for no peo-
ple can give up to warfare more than 1Q% of the population; in 
the last extremities, perhaps, the figure under arms can be 
temporarily raised to 14%. The Russian Empire mobilized. dur-
ing the entire period of the war its manpower in r-atio to the 
total population of 9.5%, as calculated by Kohn and Meyendorff. 
(Approximately 10.5% of those mobilized suffered fatal casual-
ties, while approximately the same percent suffered disable-
ment to some degree.32 
---e ~---
32. H. Kohn and Meyendor.ff, The Cost .£f the War to Russtl.a. 
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It is interesting to note that the leaders of the Armen-
ian people were beginning to be aware of the unreliability of 
the Russian census, for Dr. Garo Pasdermadjian, the Minister 
of the -Independent Republic of Armenia to the United States of 
Ame~ca, wrote that when the Russian armies disbanded, the 
"2,000,"000 Armenian inhabitants of the Caucasus remained alone 
to face.:.-.the Turkish regular army of 100,000 men •••• u The 
same official personage, in telling of' the Turkish Armenian 
:refugees, states: 
Toward the latter part of' 1916, even among Rus.sian 
governmental circles there was talk of' transferring 
to Siberia nearly 250,000 Turkish Armenian immigrants 
who bad sought refuge in thC? Caucasus.~ • .33· 
At tha~ time, there were more than 250,000.Armenian soldiers 
fighting in the Allied armies .34 It appears that, that plan 
of' foreign resettlement of' the Armenian refugees was not be-
cause no lands were available in the Caucasus, but high po-
l.icy, that is, the desire of' the Russian government to pre-
.. vent the Armenians .from achieving a large, compact popula-
tion dominant over a large section of the Russian-ruled 
Transcaucasus. It is significant that lands were- still being 
~llocated to Russian settlers ~n the Caucasus35 and that 
Russian population in the Caucasus showed a steady increase 
in the Russian census estimates. 
_.,. __ 
---~ 
33· Pasdermadjian, pp. 31 and 36 • 
. 34. Rouben, Haiasdan mioh-tsamakain oughinerou ~, p.21. 
35. Wm. Eleroy Curtis, Around the Black Sea; PP• 231-2 
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During the withdrawal of the Russian armies from the 
oc.cupied parts of Turkey in January and February 1918, a large 
part of the Armenians who had surv~ved or had drifted back 
to their homes ther~withdrew to Russian Armenia; probably 
36 . 100,000 of the 150,000 Armenians in this new. refugee with-
drawal were additional to the 300,000 Armenians wno had fled 
to Russian Armenia in 1915 and 1916. The totaL number of 
Armenian refugees who succeeded in reaching Russian Armenia 
from 1915 to 1920 has been estimated by American consular 
and relief authoritie~ at nearly 500,00o, 37 but that figure 
must be reduced to approximately 450,000 by.eliminating 
the estimated 50,000 refugees who had returned to their homes 
during the Russian occupation only to flee again when the 
Russian armies withdrew. 
Armenian Population ~ the Independent Republic 
With the end of the war, new governments based on the 
ethnic principle had been established in the Transcaucasus~ 
Armenia declared its independence on May 28! 1918, after de-
feating the Turkish offensive which followed Russian military 
dissolution. The Armenian Republic was to include an inter-
nationally delineated part of Turkish Armenia and all the 
' 
36. G. Sassouni, Dadjgahaisadane Rousagan Dirabedoutyan Dag 
(1914-1918); P• 167. 
37• James L. Barton, Story .. of Near East Relief (1915-,1930), 
p. 123, quotes a report of Howard Heinz to Herbert Hoover in 
parts, as an official of A •. R. A. who had just concluded an 
inspection of Transcaucasia. 
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Armenian-majo:t>ity inhabited areas of Transcaucasia, thatis, 
part of Turkish Armenia (the area now referred to as nwilsonian 
Armenian) and RussianArmenia; 38 the city of Tiflis, though 
inhabited by an Armenian majority, was to be left to the 
Georgians as their national capital. In the areas encompassed 
in nRussian Armeniatt, inclusive of the entirety of Erivan 
Province, parts of Elizavetpol Province, and the Akhalkalak-
Akhaltzikhe areas of Tiflis Province, the 1917 Russian census 
estimates, greatly depressed, as we have seen, showed: 
Armenians 
Tatar, Turk, etc. 
Kurds 
Yezidees 
Russ, Greek Georgian 
Gypsies 
1,293,000 
588,000 
82,000 
50,000 
l2J,OOO 
2!!:,000 
2,160,000 
59.87% 
27.22 . 
3·79 
2.31 
5. 70 
1.11 
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The American Military Mission (Harbord Commission) to 
Armenia gives approximately the same figures for Russian Ar-
menia, but dates them for 1914, as follows: 
Armenians 1,296,000 
598,000 
65,000 
38,000 
Turks, Tadjiks, etc. 
Russ, Georgian, Greek 
Yezids, Gzelbash, Fillah 
62.5% 
aB·.B 
3.1 
2. 40 
As for the disputed territories of Gharabagh, Sharour-
Nakhitchevan, Borchalou (Lori), Akhalkalak-Dzalga, and Ka~s 
Province, the Military Mission asserted the following:41 
38. Armenian ~ational Committee document, The Frontier Between 
Armenia and Turkey, p. 5-22. 
39· Mesrob, p. 85. 
40. Tashjian, p. 123-126. 
41· Ibidem. 
Table IV; Population of Disputed Territories of 
Russian Armenia 
Armenians 
Ka:rabagb.: 
Russians, Georgians, Greeks 
Turks, Tadjiks 
317,000 
1,000 
120,000 
438,000 
Armenians 
Turks, Tadjiks 
Sharour-Nakhitchevan: 
60,000 
120,000 
180,000 
Bortchalou 
Armenians 
Russ, Georgians, Greeks 
Turks, Tadjiks 
(Lori): 
70,000 
10,000 
~,000 
8,000 
72.5% 
Akhalkalak, 
Armenians 
with Dzalga: 
90,000 76% 
Russians, Georgians, Greeks 
T.urks, Tadjiks 20,000 8,000 
118,000 
Armenians 
Russians, Georgians, 
Turks, Tadjiks 
Kurds 
Yezids 
Province: 
98,000 
Greeks 28,000 
62,000 
l.jl '000 
21,000 
250,000 
Soviet Armenian Numbers in 1:.2£2: 
39% 
Simon Vratzian, a former Pr~mier of the Armenian Inde-
pendent Republic, has posed many intriguing'qlestions relative 
to Armenian statistics as shown by the Russi~ ·authorities. 
Brushing aside the cp. estion of the accuracy of t)te .1897 cen-
.,., .}'••\. 
sus, he states that the 1916 Russian statistics reveal that, 
on January 1, 1916, there were about 2,000,000 Armenians un-
der Russian rule. Regarding the f-igures released by the Sovi-
et authorities, he says: ttsoviet statistics present such 
35 
strange figures that it is not possible to lend credence to 
them. Thus, the Transcaucasian Statistical Central Com-
mission has published ~igures for January 1, 1925 revealing 
the following ethnographic picture: 
Table V: Population of Transcaucasia In ~ 
Azerbai~an Armenia Geor~ig; All Transcauo. 
Azerbaidjanis 89,200 1,300,150 1,129,1 0 81, 00 
Armenians 272,200 782,600 
. 2~7 ,550 1,352,250 
Georgians 14,150 in misc. 1,6 8,750 l, 702,900 
Russians 14i,l50 21,800 89 '400 252,250 Miscellaneous 459,750 16,4oo 322, 00 798,550 
---------
-------
--------- --------- 1.j2 Total 2,016,400 910,000 2,479, BOO 5,406,100 
These figures cannot be accepted for many reasons. For 
example, the Transcaucasus could not have had less than the 
very conserviative American minimal estimate of 6,202,000 
43 
given for 1919 by the Harbord Commission., As against the 
1916 Tsarist listing of 1,786,794 Armenians in the Trans-
caucasus, Vratzian points out, the new Soviet masters of Ar-
menia thus listed only 1,352, 250; he olaims there to be no 
logical explanation for the discrepancy of more than 4oo,ooo, 
though his estimates of the Armenians massacred in Azerbaidjan, 
Georgia, Kars, Sharour-Nakhitchevan, and Erivan Province 
might conceivably account for 160,000, leaving an unexplained 
275,000 loss in the government figures. Assuming that only 
150,000 of the Turkish Armenian refugees r~ained in the 
42. S. Vratzian, nHaieri Tivn ou Vidjage 11 , Hairenik Amsakir, 
v.4, no. 2; Dec., 1925; p. 91-2. 
43· James H. Tashjian, nAmerican Military Missionn; Part VIII; 
Armenian Review, No. 12;_ Jan., 1951; p. 82. -
Caucasus and that the natural increase was only equal to the 
number dead or ttpurgedu, this would give a f'igure of' Ar-
menians in the Transcaucasus of' 1,776,000, of' Whom a probable 
million were resident in Soviet Armenia itself'; adding the 
Soviet estimate of' 439,000 Armenians in the rest of' the Soviet 
Union, the total of' Armenians under Russian rule on January 1, 
1925 would thus total 2,215,ooo.44 This contrasts with the 
estimate which I have prepared on a conservative basis, 
(taking the f'ar more accurate church f'igure f'or 1859 as a 
starting point, and adjusting caref'ully f'or every known rae-
tor, such as emigration to other lands, immigration f'rom Tur-
kish and Persian Armenia, the ref'ugee inf'lux of' 1915-1916, 
the ref'ugees f'rom Turkish Armenia in 1918-1919,, resettlement 
or orphans and ref'ugees in the Armenian Republic bef'ore Sovi-
etizations, the numbers killed in communal warf'are and massacres 
in mixed population areas of the Transcaucasus and in Kars 
and Alexandropol by the Turkish army, the numbers dead of the 
terrible epidemics following the uprooting of the Turkish 
Armenian population·, and the numbers dead of' starvation during 
the Independent Republic years and the f'irst few years of' 
Soviet rule), which shows an Armenian population under Soviet 
rule of' 2,380,000 in 1922; raising that f'igure to~' ~ 
~establish that there w~ about 2,485,080 O£ January 1,1925, 
with the increase being from official Soviet f'igures for births 
44. Vratzian, (Haieri Tivn), p. 92-94 
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deaths in Soviet Armenia and an equivalent figure estimated 
for Armenian population outside the Soviet Armenian Republic. 
Again using the official increase figures, we can establish 
that by 1926 the Armenian population numbered 2,563,000, and 
~the start of~~ 2,658,000. 
Soviet Statistics and the Census of ~· 1lL 1926 
A prominent Soviet Armenian propagandist, Hovhaness 
Hagopian, found himself in a q1andary when he dscussed the 
Soviet official figures. He reported that the December 17, 
1926 census revealed a total of 880,464 inhabitants in 
Soviet Armenia, divided as follows: 
Armenians 
Turks, Persians, Karapapakhs 
Russians 
Yezidi, Kurds, Greeks, Assuri 
etc. 
743,5741 88,22 
23,153 
25,516 
880,464 
Admitting that this was not an accurate census count 
"for various seasonal reasons 11 , the Armenian Central Stati-
stical Commission gave the figure of 927,000 for April, 1925 
as correct. 
In a chart comparing the December, 1926, census with 
-
the figures for 1914, 
Armenians 
Turks· 
Others 
Hagopian showed 
. 1914 
7443353 
o5,ooo 
111,282 
1,359,588 880,464 
Continuing, he stated: the 1,536,948 Armenians of the 
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Soviet Union were dispersed, according to the 1926 census, 
as follows: 
In Armenia 
In Georgia 
In Azerbaidjan 
In other Soviet areas 
7436,5716 30 ,37 . 
281,281 4.5 
204,720 
Giving the natural increase for each year in Soviet 
Armenia from 1923 to 1927, Hagopian gives some valuable in-
formation, which aids in establishing rational values for 
the var~ous years. He states that from 1891 to 1915, the 
birth rate was 3.5%, increasing in 1923 to 3.8%; in 1924, 
to 4.3%; and in 1925, to 4.6%. In my earlier estimates of 
increase under the Tsarist rule, I used an average yearly 
increase of 2% in establishing my estimates. In the five 
year period 1923-1927, the natural increase in Soviet Ar-
menia was 140,543, giving a mean annual reproduction rate of 
2.8%, as contrasted with the 1.7% rate for the whole Soviet 
Union.46 
As he unfolds the Soviet statistics, Hagopian finds him-
self in a dilemma, for if there were 1,800,000 Armenians 
' . . 
under Russian rule before the World War and if the natural 
increase were only an unbelievable 1% (as he calcuiates), 
and if there were only 200,000 immigrant re~ugees from Tur-
kish and Persian Armenia (instead of the 450,00@), and to 
45. H. Hagopian, Kb.orhrta'iin Haiasdan, p. 32~36 
46. Hagopian, p. 36-37• In regard to the census of 1926, 
there appears to be some confusion as to what actual fig~re was 
given for the Armenians; Hans Kohn (Der Nationalismus in~ 
Sowjetunion, p. 147) listed 1,567,56~rmenians, of whom 92.4% 
spoke the mother tongue. Avraham Yarmolinsky (The Jews and 
Other Minor Nationalities under the Soviets_, p.lE3=18b) states 
that the Soviet Armenian Republic,had a population of 879,900. 
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these are added the 23,700 immigrants from the date of Sovi-
etization of Armenia until the beginning of 1927, then the 
Armenian population of the Soviet Union must total 2,217,700, 
as he calculated: 
Russian Armenians before the War 
Natural increase at a 1% rate 
Turkish Armenian refugees 
Immigration from abroad 
1,800,000 
194,000 
200,000 
23,700 
2,217,700 
This is an amazing bit of calculation, for the figures 
are not accurate, and it conflicts sharply with the repro-
duction rates he had just given for the years of Soviet Ad-
ministration. The natural increase of 1,800,000 persons at 
a 1% per annum rate over a period of 12 years would total 
228,280, rather than the 194,000 he shows. Furthermore, 
he has completely neglected the natural increase of the 
n2pp,pppn refugees from Turkish Armenia; if we increase these 
at a 1% rate also, we must add another 25,362 to the total. 
Correcting his arithmetical error, and adding the natural in-
crease of the Turkfsh Armenians, we must increase his figure 
by the addition of 59,600 persons, yielding, still on his own 
assumptions and figures, a corrected total of 2,277,300. 
Hagopian then states that the actual 1,536,948 of the 1926 
census shows a 580,752 loss from his conservatively calculated 
47 figure of ~,217,700. Again, he has made an arithmetical er-
ror, for the actual difference between these two figures is 
47• Ibid., P• 37-39 
LJ.O 
680,752; that is, 100,000 more than he reveals. Utilizing 
the corrections just made, ~ ~ that these figures actually 
~~discrepancy Qt 740,394 between·~ minimal estimate 
and the census. Estimating conservatively, utilizing more 
accurately determined figures and factors we have earlier 
established that the actual number of Armenians under So-
viet rule at the start of 1927 was about 2,658,900. 
The Soviet Armenians Before World 
Between 1927 and 1939, when the third and last census 
was taken in the Soviet Union, the population of the Soviet 
Armenian Republic gained 45% according to the official figures, 
. 48 
as stated in nearly every recent study of the Soviet Union. 
In that period, the Armenian reproduction rate was at an av-
~rage of 4%, while the claimed reproduction rate for the en-
tire Soviet Union was 1.14%.49 Whether this is true is open 
to some question, for it is possible that the increases were 
registered as a simple propaganda tool to sway the allegiance 
of the large Armenian colonies overseas and in nearby foreign 
countries. 
Estimating ~t 4% annual increase on the basis of the of-
ficial December, 1926 figure of 1,567,568, and deducting some 
420,000 estimated dead from purges and famines in various 
yearSI, we secure a 1939 figure of 2,032, 075. Not deducting 
48. cf., G.P. Rice, ttArmenians in Russia", Slavonic~ 
cyclopaedia (edited by Rovcek), p. 35. 
49· Vratzian (Armenian.Q.uestion), p. 103. 
___ ...., 
the anti-Soviet estimates of dead from purges and famines, 
but accepting the official Soviet claims as to population 
in 1926 and to annual birth rate excess over death rate, we 
should have a 1939 census figure of about 2,649,600, if the 
4% rate of increase were valid. The actual figure given in 
the 1939 Soviet census is 2,151,884, some 500,000~hort of 
a 4% annual increase rate; significantly, that figure ap-
proaches the earlier calculated figure above, thereby, one 
may assume, indicating that the estimate of 426,000 dead in 
purges and massacres is generally correct, though possibly 
closer to 450,000 or 500,000. That a high number of such 
dead must be deducted is apparent in the fact that the Sovi-
et Union as a whole claimed 18,700,000 increase from 1926 to 
1932, with a sharp drop in reproduction rate in the next six 
years, only 4,700,000 increase being re.gis"!iered. The fa-
mine o.:f 1933-34 and the nheavy burdens of the five-year plan 
and of agrarian collectivizationtt are stated as the major 
causes for that failure to advance at a steady rate. The 
tot~ increase in this period was 15.9% for the whole Union. 
The percent of increase in the population of Azerbaidjan was 
supposed to have been 38.7; of Georgia, 32.3; and of Soviet 
Armenia, 45.4; the R.S.F.S.R. increased only 16.9%; the 
Ukraine, 6.6%; and Byelorussia, 11.7%.5° The population of 
Soviet Armenia presumably ~ncreased from 881,290 in 1926 to 
1,~81,599 in 1939; the Armenians were approximately 85% of 
5o; 10 Eventful Years (publ. by Encyclopedia Brittanica 
v. 4, P• 381. 
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the population of the state. 
It is interesting to note that in interviews held with 
refugees from Soviet Armenia and other parts of the Soviet 
Union, persons Who had been assigned to work as census-takers 
revealed that the census in Soviet Armenia was handled so 
poorly, or the results were so much against the desire of 
the Soviet authorities, that in 1939 Soviet Armenia had a 
double census, that is, the entire census had to be taken 
over again; in some areas of Soviet Armenia, the census takers 
were sent into the villages three times. Presumably, as 
Hagopiants earlier quoted evidence would also show, the same 
difficulties beset the Soviet authorities during the taking 
of the 1926 census. At any rate, the fact that in the 
Transcaucasus, a large section had serious difficulties in 
wensus-taking, serves to cast serious doubt on the worth of 
the Soviet figures, apart from independent preparation of 
logical estimates which take into consideration all informa-
tion available. 
Continuing my listing of estimated figures for the Ar-
menian population in the Soviet Union i.n various years, I 
have established the following, which take into account im-
migration gains, purges, and famine losses in the various 
years: 
51. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia; column 1913; cf. also 
Vratzian (Armenian Question), p. 103; Rice, P• 35; and Dr. 
Gerhard Teich and Dr. Heinz Rubel, Volker, Volksgruppen und 
Volksstamme auf dem ehelingen Gebiet der Ud SSR. 
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Table VI: Pre-World War II Soviet Armenian Population 
.January 1, 1927 2,658,000 1937 2,851,000 
1931 2,669,000 19~9 2,922,000 
1935 2,7 1,000 19 0 2,969, 000 
The January 1, 1940 figure represents an increase of 
about 11.7% in the Armenian popumation in the Soviet Union 
during the period approximately between the census of. 1926 
a~d that of 1939· That figure is quite similar to the per-
centag~:::.gi vep. for Byelorussia, vh ich suffered severely, but 
less so than the Ukraine, during the thirties; the Byelo-
russian percentage indicates that my estimates are dose to 
the mark, for the Armenian-inhabited areas of the Trans-
caucasus suffered more heavily than nearby areas, but fa-
' mines were not as severe as in the Ukraine. If my esti-
mates have value, then~ B!gh reproduction rates reported 
for the Soviet Armenian~a~inflated propaganda, and the 
official figures continue to show ~ unexplained lowering 
of about 1,000,000 from the true Armenian numbers. 
Post-War Soviet Statistics 
Since the publishing of the results of the 1939 census, 
there has been no move to hold another. From year to year, 
various semi-official estimates appear, but they must be dis-
regarded as not based on solid foundations, for no actual 
census-taking is behind them. In all official matters, the 
Soviet authorities hold to the results, whether distorted or 
not, or that census, whether it is in international matters52 
52. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook: 1951, as evidence. 
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or in internal writings and affairs. The suspicion has 
grown that the Soviet regime, relying to a large degree up-
on Russian arms for its support, even though the Russians as 
citizens, but not as a nation, have suffered equally under 
Soviet rule, has been thrown into near-panic as the so-called 
minorities clamor for liberation.54 In the demographic race, 
the Russian, per~' is at a disadvantage. Despite Russi-
fication policies, police terror, and purges, the border 
areas, especially the vulnerable south, have become more 
national rather than Russian in population. This is appa-
rent from the efforts of the Soviet Union to present the Rus-
sian people as far larger in proportion to the other peoples 
than the facts apparently warrant; even news writers are be-
ginning to state that 54% of the Soviet population is non-
Russian,55 an unquruified and unsatisfactory figure, but in-
dicative of a great change. Formerly it was readily stated 
that the non-Russians were 11minoritiestt and Soviet figures 
were generally accepted uncritically. 
53. Bolshaya; •• , op. cit., as evidence of this. 
54. Reuben Darbinian, nThe Nationalities Problem in Rus-
sia11; Armenian Review #16, (Dec., 1951); p. 30-39· 
55. Drew Pearson, 11Merry-Go-Roundn; Boston Traveler: 
March 10, 1953. 
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Es-timates of Post-Waz. Sov:tet Armenian Populat:tons 
Though the Armenian Populat:ton of Moscow alone has been 
stated to have been about 85,000 at the end of the war56 and 
othe:It laz.ge cit:tes of the Un:ton have numbers of Armenians, it 
is safe to assume that about three-quartez.s of the total Ar-
menian popuJ.at:ton were resident :tn the Transcaucasus, that is, 
about 2,250,000 of the 2,969,000 estimated for January 1, 1940. 
My estimates for the war-time years and after are as follows, 
considei"ing all ascertainable factors (resettlement in Turke-
stan and Siberia, emigration to Russ1a, immigration under the 
"repatriationu program for foreign Armenians, economic factors, 
demographic factors, and 275,000 deducted as war lost: 
Table VII: :Post-World War II Soviet Ar.menian Populat1on 
Jan. 1, 1940 
1944 
1948 
1952 
1956 
2,969,000 
2,970,000 
3,135,000 
3,488,000 
3,758,000 
The present 3,758,000 Armenians undez. Soviet rule appear to 
be divided appi"ox~tely as follows: 
56. Information given by post-war Armenian ViSitOI"S to the 
Soviet Union from the United States. Vei"ified by reports of 
the Soviet press that 50,000 attended an Armenian art festi-
val in Moscov, of .Ha.ik Sarkisian, nTb.e Number of .AJ:tmenians 
in the u. ·S. ·s.Ir.", Armeni.an Rev:tew; #27, (Sept., 1954) P.1ll. 
~6. 
Table VIII: PRESENT ARMENIAN DISTR;rBUTION 
Eriva.n Metropolitan Area 
Rest of Soviet Armenia 
Total Armenians of Soviet 
.Armenia 
~oviet Azerbaidjan 
Soviet Georgia 
Total Armenians of Trans-
caucus 
Russia. in Europe~ Byelorussia~ 
Baltic States 
U'kra.ine 
Central Asia (Uzbek.~ Turkestan, 
etc.) 
Siberia 
Total non-Tra.nsca.uc. 
Armenians 
Total Soviet Armenians 
585~000 
l 450 000 l J 
2,035,000 
sss,ooo 
520,000 
3,140,000 
350,000 
78,000 
120,000 
70,000 
618,000 
3~758,000 
A Different Estimate for Soviet Armenia. 
Projecting the Soviet election figures in order to 
determ±ne population statistics, Baik Sarkisian believed 
that the electoral figure could be doubled to find the num-
ber' of persons resident in Soviet Armenia~ On that basis, 
he stated that the March, 1954 population of Soviet A~enia 
' . . 
numbered 1,724~658, of whom about 1,552,000 were Armenians, 
· 4,154~000 in Soviet Georgia, and 3,575~000 in Soviet Azer-
ba.idja.n.57 Corliss Lamont gave the Ar.menia.ns as forming 
-
11.6% of the population of Soviet.Georgia in 1~39 and 12.4% 
of the popula.t:1on· or· Soviet Azerba.idja.n;58 if those percent-
ages still bold true, Sarkisian's estimates of total popula-
57· Sarkisian, op.cit., pp. 111-112. 
58. Corliss Lamont, "National and Racial Minor~ties". 
USSR:A Concise Handbook (edited by E. J. Simmonsj pp._6-7 
I 
~ 
-. 
tion would yield 481;864 in Soviet Georgia. and 443.,300 in 
Soviet Azerbaidja.n. 
~ Post-War Demographic Picture 
Many factors are working together to cause a. dynamic 
growth. The harsh condi tiona of life ·under the Stalinia.n 
dictatorship of the Thirties are no longer as important. 
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The greater industrialization of the Transcaucasus, especial-
.. - . 
li following the official and unofficial "reparations" :from 
occupied areas of Europe, have served to encourage populatiDn 
growth as the potential o:f the sta.nda:rd of living improves. 
The wartime losses of population were nearly entirely adults, 
unfortunately many yourig adults Y.he had not yet established 
:f~ly life of their own; neverthele§s, the Armenian popula-
tion at the start of the war vas a young_population, capable 
of quick recovery from such losses. Of the 300,000 Armehia.ns 
who served in the Soviet armies, a possible 155,000 were lost 
in combat or died in German prison ca.m:.P:S.\~:_.,another- 35, 0~0 were 
probably slain or imprisoned by the Soviet authori~ies on their 
recapture from the pr-ison camps or in action against their for-
mer Soviet masters. Of the civilian population in the war 
.zones, a probable 55,000 were killed_, or escaped to Europe and 
disappeared. Total Armellian war losses thus numbered about 
245,000; this figure has been used in p~epa.ring my estimates 
of the population of Armenians for the various years. The loss 
in new births was very heavy during the war years proper, for a 
48 
high percentage of the young men were in ~litary service. 
Despite this, a sharp increase in the reproduction rate 3 in 
the post-war period was .brought·about by the relatively less 
. ' 
onerous political attitude which prevailed in Stalin's last 
few years, and the introduction of a·large number of foreign 
Armenians, vi th better knowledge of modern hygiene and modern 
living. 
The position of the Armenian population in regards to 
Russian population cannot have been unfavorable, despite the 
war losses, for, though Armenian contingents 1n the aEmy were 
squandered lavishly,59 the Russian population must have sus-
tained heavy losses as well. Some 7,000,000 persons are re-
ported to have died on the Soviet side·because·of ene:my ac-
tion. 6o We do. not know vhat that figure includes, but we do 
·know that about one-fourth of European Russia was invaded by 
the Germans; it has been estimated that the population loss 
in those areas was 45%, 61 an estimate of which we have no 
means of ascertaining the credibility. Armenia and the Trans-
caucasus escaped German occupation and war activity; it must 
be assumed that the Ar.menian proportion in the Soviet Union is 
now markedly higher than in pre-war years. Soviet statistics, 
and estimates based on them, are dangerous tools for under-
standing the realities; whether inability to apply scientific 
59· 
60. 
61. 
. 
H. lfova.'ll, nstory of a Soviet Soldier 11 , Armehia.n Review; 
#17, March, 1952; pp. lOl-9. _ 
Ellsw.orth L. Raymond, Sovi·et_;Anierican Comparative Statis-
tios ;· USSR 'Wa.~ Losses,. pp. 4-5. 
War Ldsses, .P .12. 
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methods taken for granted in most of the free world or gov-
ernmental policies are involved} we do not know for a cer-
tainty, but we can state categorically tha~ Soviet figures 
conflict with each other when carefully analyzed, and do not 
stand up under careful scrutiny. 
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AMERICAN RELIEF FOR THE ARMENIANS 
All Armenia had been east into turmoil by World War I 
activ~ties on the Russian-Turkish Frontier~ ~th food supply 
and other basic comm.octl.ties disrupted. The inter-racial 
civil fights whieh had broken out in various centers of the 
Transoaueasus complicated the civil scene, while militarily 
organized massacres of Armenians in Georgian and Azeri-ruled 
di.striets added to the national districts added to the na-
tional disaster caused by the organized~ massive genocide 
program of the Turkish government. The latter program, un-
exampled in human knowledge before that t~e in barbarity 
and seope, had uprooted the entire population of Turkish 
Armenia, causing the death of some 15% of the .Al'menian popu-
lation. During the war years, because of heroic resistance 
fights in Van and Sassoon, approximately 300,000 Ar.menian 
rerugees had managed to reach relative safety in the Trans-
caucasus, though d1sease and starvation then began to take 
a heavy toll of lives. In the first half of the decade of 
the Twenties, the number of refugees who had· reached tlae 
. l. 
Transoaucasus rose to about 4-50,000, of whom perhaps 150,600 
were no longer alive by 1926. 
With agriculture and transportation completely dis-
1ooated during the years of war and independence, it was an 
_____ .. 
1.. Simon Vratzian, Ha1asdani Hanrabedoutzoun, p. 168 
~possible additional burden imposed on the economy of the 
region to feed and succor the refugees. The period of 
Armenian independence was not sufficiently organized or 
prosperous to undertake the support or integration of the 
former Turkish citizens. Even the Transcaucasian Armenian 
population was in danger of extinction, for great crop fail-
ures and wart~e slaughter of livestock had caused region-
wide famine. ~he ehauv+aistie nationalism of Azerbaijan, 
and in lesser degree Georgia, had already led t(i) massacres 
of Ar-menian refugees and inhabitants in several districts of 
these neighbors. The rising tide of Kemalist nationalism ~ 
Turkey, the deadly enemy of all Armenian rights and terri-
torial claims, created the impression that the Armenian 
people were about to be engulfed forever. 
At such a eritieal.jun.eture in the history of·tn.e 
Armenian people appeared an unlooked-for helping·nand, the 
spontaneous help of A;meriean and British private.chJ.rity. 
The Origins of American Relief for the .Armenians , 
Christian humanitarianism had been first roused to the 
increasingly desperate plight of the Armenian pepple, <;luring 
the initial stages of the deportations and massacres in Tur-
key. American Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau, was 
the first to inform officially of the Turkish crime of gen-
ocide. He wired the State Department that "the destruction 
of the Arm.eniansl'!B.i~~ ~s.. rapi--day progressing," and he asked 
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d 2 for ~e iate steps to effect its rescue, urging the col-
~ection of funds for this purpose by the. organization of a 
rescue committee. This message was ~ediate1y transmitted 
to James L. Barton, Foreign Secretary of the American Board 
of commissioners for Foreign M1ssions, who began efforts to 
organize such a committee on September 1~, 1915.3 
With the who~e-hearted cooperation of O~eveland H. 
Dodge in Ne:w York, Barton succeeded in assembling a group of 
prominent people on September 16, at which t~e Ambassador 
Morgenthau's plea was heeded by the organization of a com-
mittee. The initial. executive committee included Charles R. 
Crane as treasurer, Samuel T. Dutton as secretary, and James 
L. Barton as chairman; the name by which the new committee 
was known was the uAr.m.enian and_ Syrian Relief Committee. 11 
The largest sum mentioned was agreed on as the gpal, namely 
· $100,000; one-half that sum was immediately subscribed be-
fore the meeting adjourned. Charles Orane and James Barton 
were instructed to contact the State Department to secure 
all available information from the government's files. The 
State Department proved eomplete~y cooperative, granting the 
-
3• For details of the organization and operation of the 
Near East Relief, see James L. Barton: Stog of Near East 
Relief. 
I 
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two emissaries permission •to read and use any and all di~­
patches and documents bearing upon the religious, social and 
physical conditions in the disturb~d areas."4 
A perusal of available documents revealed to the com-
mittee representatives that the condition of the Chris~i.an 
populations of the Ottoman Empire exceeded their worst 
imaginings, though .Americans in the Ottoman :Empire and- their 
institutions did not appear to be in danger •. The Ar.menians 
appeared to be singled,o~:t; :fGr special Turkish attention, 
with "depertations" rapidly depopulating Turkish Ar.menia. 
United States Govermnent records revealed there were mere 
than two hundred thousand Armenian, Assyrian, and· Nestorian 
re:fugees in abject desti.tution in the Russian Caucasus, and, 
therefore• accessible to immediate relief' because they were 
now Ullder a friendly gove:rmnent. At the same time,··. tens o:f 
thOU,:Jands of Annenians in Eastern Turkey. and North Persia·· 
were reported trekking toward Russian-administered areas in 
alarm over recent. developments. 
That such alarm' was justiried was evident in the mass 
o:f r&ports already at hand. The committee delegation, im-
pressed deeply by the depth of hllma.n suffering and the ex-
tent of need, brought a number of documents to the attention 
of the whole committee. Much of the-material within those 
4• Ibid., PP• 9-10. 
reports was disseminated by means of the American press and 
created a stir o:f sympathy thpoughou.t the Christian world, 
whether Allied or neutral. To adequately ~derstand the 
enthusiamn and devotion with which the Near East Relief con-
dueted its operations, the greatly expanded nature o:r its 
charity, and the semi"':"o:f!'icial status it soon had, one must 
be familiar with the documents on which it based its plans, 
campaigns, and tunctionLng. 
A report, written by an American o:f:fieial in early Sep-
tember, 1.915, after a personal inspection trip, stated: 
All personal property which (the refugees) could not 
take with them had to be le:ft behind •••• I realized, o:r 
course, that I was powerless, even.uno:f:f'ieially, to inter-
i'ere with these proceedings •••• Unl.ess the whole movement be 
stopped· at once, there is, I am fir.mly convinced, nqt the 
slightest ehanee o:r any of the exiles surviving this coming 
winter, except possibly the very wealthiest among them, nor 
.do the authorities make any secret o:r the :fact that their 
main object is the extermination of the ·whole Armenian race. 
The Vall (prov~cial governor-general) admitted quite :fra~ 
"we are deter.mined to get rid, once and tor a~l, o:r this 
cancer in our country. It has been our greatest political 
danger, only we never realized it as mueh as we d.o ttow. It 
is true that many innocent are suffering with the ~~lty but 
we have no time to make any distinction. We know it means 
an economic loss to us, but it is nothing compareQ.. with the 
danger we are hereby escapiag." · · 
Withoat commenting upon the truth or :falsity o:f these 
remarks, the fact remains that the Turks are rapidly depleting 
the country o:r some of the thriftie.st, most intelligent, and 
in many respects, the most valuable element of their popula-
tion. One has only to walk through the streets of any town 
in the interior to realize how this deportation has wrought 
havoc with the life of the community. Nearly all doctors, 
dentists, tailors and carpenters are gone, in short, every 
profession or trade requiring the least skill has been stop-
ped, not to mention5the complete stagnation o:r all business of .. _ any consequence. 
-----
5;. Q.uestion,'pp. Bll.-5; Barton, p. 11. 
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Verified reports to the State Depar~ent from al1 parts 
of the Turkish Empire gave details concerning the deporta-
tions, indicating that the Armenians had been ousted from 
their homes in Bardizag, the Ada Bazar region, Konia, Marzo-
van, Sivas, Kharpe~t, Diarbekir, and many parts of Cilicia. 
By early October, 1915, the committee had also received in-
for-mation that German missionaries had protested to the Ger-
man ambassadar, giving details of the situation of the de-
portees based·on personal ~vestigations. In general, it 
can be stated that many reports had been made in the summer 
of 1915, but these were not made known until October. Ameri• 
can missionaries had also protested to the German authorities. 
The committee took into consideration only reports con-
cerning the living, that is, reports about the present con-
dition and numbers of the survivors of the deportations, 
almost entirely women and children. In October, following 
the initial release of ~bassador Morgenthau's information, 
the press througnout the world began to report extensively 
about the occurrences in Turkey. Much additional information 
reached the committee from that date on, despite the attempts 
of the TUrkish government to suppress news of the genocide. 
The files of the State Department contained the personal ab-
servations of American consular and diplomatic agents, and 
of American missionaries, doctors and edueate~s residemt 
within the country. Barton has stated that he and Samuel 
~tton persona11r st~died every document made availab1e in 
Washington, carefully si£ted the evidence, evaluated the 
witnesses' reliability, and only then, satis£ied that the 
facts were un~peaehable, released their information to the 
press.. "As more evi.dence o-f an indisputable character came 
to the Committee, it was evident that the £irst reports were 
wholly inadequate and the seriousness of the eve~ts has been 
greatly underestimated.u6 
The first reports issued by the committee ·to the press 
were used to infor,m the public and to rouse sympathetic' gen-
erosity, for Ambassador Morgenthau had given assurances that 
hundreds of thousands of the survivors coul.d be saved if suf-
ficient funds were made availabl.e and ~ediatel.y transmitted 
, to volunteer committees of Americans in the various sections. 
The most important ea~ly rel.ease was through the Associated 
Press on October 4, 1915, a news story which covered eleven 
full eol.tmmS. Barton quotes several. sections of that re-
I 
lease aa follows: 
I 
Reports through Constantinop1e, 1915: 
Persecution o:r .Armenians a~sumes unprecedented propor-
tions. Reports from widely scattered regions indicate sys-
tematic attempt to uproot peaceful Armenian population and 
through arbitrary a:t"rests, wholesale expulsions and deporta-
tion, f~m one end of the Empire to the other, accompanied 
by frequent instances of rape, pillage and murder, turning 
into massacre, to bring destitution and destruction upon 
them. This is not in response to fanatical ·or popular de-
mand, but is purely arbitrary and directed fr~m Constantin-
ople. Unto1d misery, disease, starvation and loss of life 
will go on unchecked. 
' 
_ ... ., ... 
6. Barton, P• 39· 
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I ~ informed that the Turkish authorities have, since 
May 1st~ deported over 40,000 Otto.man Greeks from the islands 
and the coast of Marmora to interior Turkish Moslem villages. 
Deportation or and excesses against peaceful Armenians 
is increas~g and from harrowing reports of eye-witnesses· it 
appears that a campaign of race extermination is in progress. 
Protests and threats are unavailing. 
From Cilicia: 
June 30.- The deportation began some six weeks ago with 
1-80 families from Zeytun. Since that time all the i:ahabi ... 
tants of that place and its neighboring villages have been 
deported, also most of the Christians from Hadjin, Albistan, 
Sis, Kars, Hassan, and Dortyol. The numbers involved are 
approximately 26,500 to date. o:r these about 5, 000 have been 
sent to the Kania region, 5,500 are in Aleppo and surround-
ing towns and villages and the remainder are in Deir-ez-Zor 
and other places in Me$opotamia, even as far as the neighbor-
hood of Baghdad. The prQcess is still going on. The order 
already is sued will bring the number in this region up to 
32,000. The government o:r~er under whieh these deportations 
took plaee is as follows: "The Commanders of the Army, of 
independent army corps and of divisions may, in ease of mili-
tary necessity and in ease they suspeet espionage or treason; 
send away, either in groups or en masse, the inhabitants of 
villages or towns and install them in other places~u If the 
means is not found to aid these refugees through the next few 
months, unti~ they get established in their new surroundings, 
two-thirds or three-quarters of them will die o:r starvation 
and disease. 
From Erzerwru 
July 31.- Armenians, mostly women and children deported 
from Erzerum district. 
From Marsovan: 
On July ~th orders were issued that women and children· · 
should be ready to leave in two or three days. This order 
was carried out on the 5th of July. A vigorous protest was 
made to the Governor. Informed that the order had not orig ... 
blated there but was from higher authority, and that not a 
single Armenian should be left in the eity. All tb.e morning 
ox-carts creaked out of town laden with women and children, 
with here and there a man who had escaped. The people felt 
that the government was deter.mined to exterminate the Ar.men-
ian_raee and they were powerless.to resist. The deportation 
continued at intervals for about two weeks. It is est~ated 
t~at out o£ 12,000 Armenians in the city only a few were 1~ 
Even those who o~fered to accept Islam were sent away. 
From Kb.arput: 
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June 26.- The proclamation regarding the deportation o£ 
all Armenians was posted in the streets. On Thursday all the. 
streets were ~arded with gendarmes. with ~ixed bayonets and 
the work o£ driving the Armenians ~rom their homes began. 
G~oups o£ men6 women, and children with loads and bundles on 
their backs were collected and driven past the consulate on 
the road by gendarmes with fixed bayonets. They were held 
outside the city until a. group of about 2,000 were collected 
and then sent on. Three such groups, making about 6,000, 
were sent from here during the ~irst three days and smaller 
groups f'r~m other pl.aees, amo~ting to about 4-,000 more. 
Some of these pe9ple were f'r9m wealthy and.re~~ed surround-
ings; some were accustGmed ~o luxury and ease. There were. 
clergymen, merchants, tailors and men from every walk o£ life. 
From ~arsus: 
J)lly 13.- Aft-er we bad seen thousands of' people start 
out, we cwne to the conclusion that if anything could be done 
to stop this terrible cr~e, which ~pressed us as ten times 
worse than any massacre, it would be done in Constantinople •. 
In Constantinople we found that the whole plan o~ deporta-
tion is one of the central government and that no pressure 
from the embassies had been able to do anything. There is 
tmminent danger of' many o~ these people from the Sivas, 
Erzercm and Kharput villages, whom we estim.a te to be 600,000, 
starving to. death on the road. They took food for only a 
few days, but could not take money with them. 
I am ~~o~ed that the cities of Bitlis, Mardin, Mosul, 
Malatya, etc., have been depopulated of Armenians. The Gov-
ernor of Die;r-ez-Zor, on. the Et:lphrates river, who is now 
here, says there are ~lready 15,000 A~enian re~ugees in that 
eity.7 · 
Initial Efforts and Uni~ieation of Relief' 
On sueh scanty, ~complete knowledge, deficient espec-
ially in regard to the numbers of Ar-menians involved, the 
American Committee f'or Ar-menian Relief solicited £unds to 
complete its initial campaign 0~ $100,000 and to provide 
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further amounts. It was apparent to the committee that a 
task had been undertaken far beyond anything eontemplatea. 
at the_t~e of organization. The Committee of Merey8at 
onee had offered its aid in fUnd rais~g. At the same t~e, 
. 
in response to the neecis created among the Assyrian, Nes~ 
torian, and Armenian refugees of the Urmia District of Persia 
by the devast~g Turkish-Kurdish incursion of early 1915, a 
Persian Relief Committee had been t'lmetioning. By October~ 
1915, the latter had raised $70,000 and sent that Stml. to aid 
the refugees. The Palestine - Syrian Relief Cammittee form-. 
ed in December, 1914 to seeure fun.ds to alleviate ei vilian 
distress and famine during that winter had forwarded a con-
siderable sum to Pal.estine and Syria for general relief. 
lfhese other organizations devoted to relief in the Near 
East watched with. interest as the Armenian Relief Committee 
swiftly raised its goal of $l.OO,OOO, forwarding that sum to 
Ambassador Morgenthau within a month of. its founding. The 
ambassador organized an American committee in constantinople 
to allocate the .f'lmds where the need was greatest 1n the in-
terior; members Gf that committee were Ambassador Morgenthau, 
President Gates of Robert Ool~ege, Lewis Heck o£ the A,m.e~i­
can Embassy staff, Willimn w .. Peet of the American Board of 
8. Under the honorary presidency of El.~u Root; v. presi-
dents-Charles w. Eliot of Harvara. Univ., Mayor Mitchell 
of New Yark, Kather~e Davis of New York, Mrs. J. Borden 
Harriman; Treasurer-August -Belmont; Exec. ·Secretary-Karl.. 
Davis Robinson. 
9· Barton, p.14 
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Foreign Missions, Mrs. George Huntington, and Luther Fow1e. 
Smal.l though 1 t was, especially in comparison with the ex-
tent of need, the American aid undoubtedly helped save the 
lives of a number of Armenians. 
The Armenian Relief C&.mmittee was joined by the Pa1es-
tine-Syrian Relief Committee and the Persian Relief comm-
ittee in November, 1915,_becomi1il.g now the Amel:'ican Committee 
for Armenian and Syrian Re1ief.10 
Using the Ambassador's committee as its Turkish distri-
buting branch, the new union establiShed a committee of mea-
bers of the staff of Beirut University and of the Presbyter• 
ian Mission as its Syrian distributing body, while funds for 
Persia were channelled through a committee of American dip-
lomatic, educational., and missionary residents at !abriz and 
Teheran. In the Russian-ruled Transeaueasus, al.though it 
was known that the need was acute, with. over two hundred 
thousand refugees, mostly su£fering from disease and famine, 
there was 1itt1e Anterican organization at this time. Oonsu1 
F. Willoughby Smith and his staff at T1f1is had appealed for 
relief :funds and workers; in response, the Reckef'e11er Follll.-
dation had made a ttsubstantial appropriation". The consula-r 
' 
staff at first handled all American relief there, in coop-
....... -... 
-----
10. Ibidem, page ~. 
11. Subsequent1y, it contributed generous1y·to Near East 
Relief. 
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eration with Lord Bcyoe's British Committee for Relief. 
Thus. the distributors of relief were admirably suited per-
sons. aware of local la~guages and conditions. and located 
in strategic spots. At no time was part of the relief funds 
utilized for salaries of gueh persons, as they continued to 
be me.intained by the organizations whieh had ini. tially sent 
them. 
Detailed Information Becomes Available 
After the consolidation of the various relief commit-
tees, more detailed informatio.n of the extent of the calam-
ity which had befallen the Armenians _became known.. As 
evidence had accumulated, the American ambassador had la~ 
the situation before German ambassador von Wangenheim and 
asked his cooperation inmaktng representations to the Otto-
man government. Von wangenheim not only refused, but, when 
German missionaries called upon their gover:cment to have the 
atrocities and deportations stopped, he took a categorical 
stand on the side o:f the Turkish g&vernment, stating: "I do 
not blame the TUrks for what they are domg to the Armenians. 
Th.ey::·are entirely justified. n1 2:seth Turkish Minister of War 
Enver and German ambassador von Wangenheim aceused the Am-
ericans of interfering in the internal a.ft'airs of 'l'urkey •.. 
12. Barton, p.~. 
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Desp~te the official relations between Turkey and German~ 
the German government put into the record a protest~ by a 
despatch dated August 9~ 1915, which read: 
The German Empire regrets to realize that, according 
to ~ormation received from impartial and reliable sonrces~ 
acts of violence such as massacre and plunder, which can-
not be justified by the aim that the Imperial Government· 
was pursuing~ instead·of being checked by the local auth-
orities, regularly followed the expulsion of Armenians so 
that most of them perished before reaching their destina-
tion. It is chiefly from the provinces of Trebizond, Diar-
bekr, and Erzerum that these facts are repoi>ted. In some -
places, as in Mai>din, it is repoi>ted that all Christians, 
without distinction of race or I>eligion, had the same fate; 
At the same time the Imperial Government has thought it · 
right to extend the measul:"e of expatriation to the other 
·provinces of Asia Minor, and very recently the Armenian 
villages of the district .of Iz~t, near the capital, have 
been evacuated under similar conditions. Under such cir-
cumstances the German embassy, by order of its Government, 
is obliged to remonstrate once more against these acts of 
horror. 
In June and ~uly, 1915, the Baghdad railway had been 
requistioned for the transportation of refugees to the de-
sert. Forced to march from the incompleted section in the 
Taurus mountains., without food., proper clothing., or shelter, 
many thousands dided. In early October, a report was re-
ceived that: 
As· for the deportations from Anatolia and Armenia, th~y 
are being continued systematically. The whole Armenian popu-
lation of Konia and Angora is on the road and is at present 
concentrated along the line o:f the Baghdad railway, in the 
last. extremity of' misery. They are being sent to Tarsus and 
Aleppo, to be :forwarded in due course to the desert •••• The 
situation o:f the exiles in Syria is lamentable. The despatch 
o:f relief is urgently required in order at least to save the 
survivors. 
Another report, from Aleppo, stated that: 
All along the road I met t~ousa.nds of these unfortunate 
exiles coming -into the city. The sights I witnessed ve~e -mere 
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pitiful than those I had previous~y witnessed. There seems 
to be no end to the convoys which move over the Taurus Moun-
tain range from Bozanti, south. Throughout the day, trom 
sunrise to sunset, the roa.d"f' as far as the eye can see, is 
crowded with these exiles.l/ 
Although the Turkish government opposed relief measures,· 
the military commander of the Syrian provinces, Djemal Pasha, 
was not completely in agreement with Constantinople, permdt-
ting thousands o~ Armenians to halt at Aleppo instead of con_. 
tinuing their forced udeath marohn to Deir-ez-Zor. Other thou-
sands were diverted to Damas?us and its environs through his 
inf'luence. American emergency relief was allowed to be dis-
tributed under various camouflages, though forbidden official-
ly; what proportion of the 500,000 refugees reported at this 
time as being in Aleppo, Damascus, and Deir-ez-Zor by the A-
merican Counsul at Aleppo owed their lives to such surreptitious 
aid is unknown. A large number of letters began to be receiv-
ed frOm. Americans in the area. to supplement the early cables; 
each letter made the magnitude of the crisis appear greater. 
A number of temporary relief committees were for.med.by the 
American residents; these pleaded for aid to be rushed to the 
survivors before no one was left to be helped. · 
On February 22, 1916, Ambassador Morgenthau returned to 
the,United States, and at once met with.the committee~ In his 
report to them on the conditions, he gave detailed information 
on the actual needs in each area. Bart.on reports, as follows: 
13. Quotations from Barton, pp. 44-46 
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He reported that the~e were a mdllion or more 
Armeni~s who had survived in the Near· East, a large 
part of whom were women,. boys~ and girls •. They were 
destitute, without sufficient clothing, without be-
longings of any kind and without food. He stated 
that they must be given help until they could recover 
their physical strength, find new homes and harvest 
new crops • The immediate need was for clothing, food., 
and medicine. He declared that when he left Turkey, 
.the way had been opened for relief work, unhindered by 
the authorities, and that thousands of lives could be 
saved if immediate action were taken. He estimated 
that $5,000,000 would be required to relieve-the suf-
fering of the Armenians, Nestorians, Greeks and Syr:ta.ns 
in Turkey, Persia, Syria and Palestine, and to aid them 
:tn t~mporary settlement. This seemed a staggering sum 
to the Committee, but without hesitation they voted to 
make a public appeal for the full amount.l4 
-The situation he was reporting on aJ>peared to be grow-
ing more hopeful where Turkey was concerned, for late in 1915 
the attitude of the government appeared to relax somewhat, 
probably because of the p~aetical success of the policy of 
. . 
making ~~~urkey for the Turksn. Attacks against Armenian re-
fugees lessened·somewhat, while Turkish officials seemed will-
ling to let nature finish the task they had. started; some re-
li~ act:tvity was apparently to be pe~tted, since the situa-
tion of the Armenians had now become so critical that only .a 
. . 
tremendous effor.t could save more than an unimportant segment. 
During the latter part of 1915, the major efforts of :he com-
mittee were directed· toward assuring the continued existence 
of at least part of the refugees who had·reached Syria. In-
creasing amounts of money followed the amalgamation of the 
14. Ibid., PP• 47-48. 
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Syrian Relief with the A:rmenian.Rel:tef Connnittee. Though the 
Turkish orders against feeding ~e:fugees were still ~ effect 
legally, authoriti~s 1n Syria began to ignore inconspicious 
. . 
relief activities. The northwestern part of' Persia, on the 
other h~d, displayed worsening condition, as did Transcauca--
sia. With most of the Christian homes in the Urmia and ad-
. . jacent regi0ns destroyed, disease took a heavy . toll. .. of the 
. 
·thousands of' Christian refugees huddled under the p~otection 
of foreign missions in mission buildiilg. The retn:rn of' Rus-
sian troops in the summer of 1915 had given the Christians a 
respite, but the second withdrawal of' the Russians from Urmia 
, 
in August caused the entire Christian population to flee; the 
return of the Russians a month later could not undo the losses· 
suffered, nor the wrecking of property and destruction of crops. 
The S~tuation in Tx-a.nscaucas:ia and Persia 
- - - --------
The retreat of the Russian army frofu Van in AUgust 1915, 
caused a chaotic exodus of the entire Armenian population in 
the occupied area; many of' these Armenians were persons who 
' had escaped Turkish deportation by a he~oic self-defense in 
the c:J..ty of Van, 'Which had lasted until- the Amenian volunteer 
forces of the Russian armies could appear. A !"aport from Et~ 
cbmdadz~, dated August 12, 1915, was made available to the 
committee in September. It stated: 
. The road from Igdyr, near the Turkish frontier, to 
Etchmdadzin is choked with groups of sick and destitute 
li'efugees •••• The whole countli'yside· is f.ull to overflonng. 
At igdyr, .the fi~st arrival depot, a mass of 20,000 is ao• · 
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cumulated and another of 45~000 at Echmia.dzin. Ft-om 
these two eente~s they are being distributed in groups· 
to other districts. At Ecbmia.dzin a. hospital has been 
installed. Between Igdyr and the Turkish frontier the:r:te 
are patrols of hors~en search~ for children~ the.siek 
and other stragglers and see~ to remove the corpses. 
About fifty orpha.ns·a.rrive every day at Igdyr; part of 
them are kept there; others are sent on to Eehmiadzin ••• 
The stream flows without ceasing and it is impossible to 
estimate the number without any exactitude. Oonferring 
with representatives of the refugees~ we fixed upon ap-
proximately the following fig~es. From Van district 
200~000; from other districts, 6ojoooJ not including 
those who reached here at an earlier date. The average 
mortality amounts to fifteen deaths a day at Igdyr and 
forty at Echln:t~in •••• The refugees need food~ medical 
aid and clothing:; They are being distributed to other 
towns as rapidly as shelters can be found for them. 
There see~ •o end to ~hese solid columns moving for-
ward in a olou.d of dust. The majo!'ity are women and 
eh:tldren, barefoot, exhausted and staztving. 
A second message, dated August 21; 19~5j supplemente~ 
tbis information: 
The stzteam of refugees still flows, but with a 
slacker current •••• The situation is extraordinarily 
harrowing •••• There is a shortage of brea.d •••• The ma-jor:tty of the ztefugees are ill •••• In the Echmia.dzin 
Schoo1~.3~500 children·who have lost their parents 
a.zte huddled together •••• Yesteztda.y evening I visited 
a building sad in the big hall I counted 110 ba.'b;~s 
lying naked on the floozt .15 ·· 
'Whlle more than a quartel:' million Armenian refugees 
entered Tra.nscaucasia.n Armenia. from the Turkish border at 
this t~ej another stream of refugees entered from the 
Persian border, in flight from the barbarities perpetrated 
by Kurds and Tu:r-ks in the Ur.mia·-Northwestern Persia dis-
. 16 
tricts • The first arrivals numbered about 30,000 Nes.:;.-
torians and Armenians, with larger groups following. 
15. Quotations from Barton, PP• 81-82. 
16. Barton quotes various observers as placing the total 
of such refugees at 500,000J this number being in the 
Transcaueasus at the end of the war. 
. American Consul in !Pi:f'lis, F • Willoghby Sm1 th, reported that 
the Tsarist government was doing all in its power to help 
the refugees. Russia distributed emergency supplies from 
its army sto.cks, as well as combatting the epidemics by as-· 
signing doctors to work among the re:f'ugees. In response to 
his urgent request that AmeFican funds supplement the aid 
given by the Russian government to help feed,· clothe, and 
shelter the more than 300,009 Armenian refugees,the co~t­
tee .despatched $40,000 in October, 1915, a month after its 
founding. 
Relief in Turkey.a.nd Syria in 19~6 
As ther American relief e:f'fort became o~erative, :f'ull 
use of the American college buil<tings and staffs 1n various 
centers o:f' Turkey, as well as of American hospitals, occured. 
The American College at.Aintab, Euphrates College at Kharpert, 
Anatolia College at Ma.rzovan, schools.at Caesaria, Marash, 
Mardin, and Sivas were turned into relief centers and orphan-. 
·ages; American hospitals at Aintab, Caesa:t>ia, Kharpert, Kon:ta 4 
Ma:t>ash, Mardin, Marzovan, and Si vas became important parts of 
the relief program. Many of the American personnel remained, 
nov serving as agents of the Constantinople committee of the 
Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief. 
During 1916, funds were sent to Turkey in. growing amount 
as the campaigns in America struck a deep response. The larg-
est part were spent in Aleppo, under the direction of United 
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States Consul J. B. Jackson. Supplies could not be sent, 
and the American relie~ groups had to purchase locally the 
needed food andclothing, often at exorbitant prices. Re-
duced thus in effectiveness, nevertheless, there is little 
doubt that most of the surviving refugees in that area owed 
their lives in some measure to American charity. At this 
same time, the American Relief Clearing House in Paris att-
~pted to send aid to the Christian refugees in Lebanon and 
Syria; the obdurate official position of the Turks rendered 
17 
this attempt useless. Nevertheless, between November 26, 
1914 and Deo~ber 16, 1918, the accounts of the Ameri~an 
Clearing House reveal that 3,001.21 francs were spent on re-
18 
lief for Armenians and 1,520.20 francs for Syrians. In a 
final statement of bperations, the accounts show $4,641.84 
expended for relief to Armenia, presumably during this per-19 . 
iod, for the Clearing House ceased as a separate body on 
20. 
its mergerwith the American Red Cross 1n June, 1917. 
During the crucial years of 1916 and 1917, the American.Red 
Cross gave large. donations to the Committee for Armenian and 
Syrian Relief. :Public support of fund-raising e~paigns was 
gratifying. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
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Percy Mitchell, The American Relief' Clearing House, Page 94• 
Ibid., page 157. 
Ibid., page 163. 
~., page 96. 
In the fall of 19161 the committee prepared a Christ-
mas gift ship from Ameriea for relief in Syria and Palestine, 
chartering the s.s. Caesar for that purpose. At first, ~t 
appeared that all gover.ments. involved would prove coopera-
tive; Djemal Pasha, however, demanded that it land at Jaffa 
~stead of Beirut, and that distribution be solely up to 
him.. The refugees had heard of its eoming, and they were 
grievhusly disappointed when it was found ~possible to com-
ply with Ujemal Pasha• s demands, for the food supply at this 
time was crucial in the question of survival. The s.s. 
Caesar was diverted to Alexandria and its contents sold to 
the Red Cross for use in Sa~onika; the proceeds were trans• 
mitted to Beirut for relief work, but thousands died of 
starvation because of the impossible conditions of the "bene-
21 
volent" military ruler in Syria. American efforts succeed-
ed, however, in maintaining a number of soup kitchens, supp-
ly of food to a number of villages, in assembling orphans in-
to orphanages, and gathering a number of refugee women inte 
workshops to earn a meager living wage. 
1916-1918 1n Transcaucasia and Persia 
The candition in Persia showed a marked improvment, as 
the frontier area was again under Russian occupation; and se-
curity became more general. Many of the ·Christian farmers 
-~---
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21. For the s. s. Caesar incident, see Henry P. Davison, 
The American Red Cress in the Great War, pp. 252-253; 
irso, Barton,P. 7Ij:. -- -
had returned to their ruined villages • and, despite crop ··· 
failures in many parts of Persia, they sowed their fields 
and maintained a .;fairly adequate food supply. Meanwhile tools, 
seed, and animals were loaned them by the Ame,riean and Bri-
tish relief organizations ·in the area, while medical and 
some food supply was also provided. The swift recovery of 
Ur.mia from the desolation of the massacres it had witness-
ed shewed the effectiveness Gf Christian charity efforts in· 
areas under governmental security. 
Personnel remained a serious problem in .. the Trans caucasus 
during 1916, a crucial year fer the bulk of the refugees. 
Starva tien had been controlled to ·a degree by dint of much.·· 
Russian, British, and American relief, but the greatest fac-
tor had been the population of Russian Armenia, which had 
shared what it had to keep the lilationality alive. Villagers · 
and t0wns£olk shared their hom$s with refugees from Turkish · 
Armenia. Shelter was scarce, with-great overcrowding. Food 
supply was inadequate to feed the greatly increased popula-
tion; disease was rampant, several epidemics breaking out 
nearly concurrently because of the unhealthy sanitary condi-
tions and the weakened physical condition of the population. 
With the second Russian advance into the Turkish Armenian 
provinces, some of the refugees returned to their home towns, 
where it was necessary to reestablish their econ.omic lives--
in-e>rder to re:ader them self-suffieient again. -In face of 
the great.extent of :aeed- little could be done beyond palli -
___ ,_,_ 
I 
I 
I 
12 
ative measures. A small nmmber of settler~ were aided in 
establishing new lives in tb.evvillages, where it was re-
latively easy to become self-supporting. Wheat and barley 
seed -were provided for the first harvest; draft animals 
were provided on the basis of one per three fwnilies, some 
3,000 water buffaloes, oxen, and other a~als being pro-
22 
vided before January, 1917. 
The work progr~ in the Transcaucasus proved especially 
I 
valuable, providing employment for many and valuable relief 
supplies at low cost to the committee for distribution to 
other refugees in Armenia. From mid-1916 to May, 1918, "more 
than 2,500 women were employed spinning cotton and wool, in 
knitting 25,000 pairs of S'tocki~gs f'or distribution, and in 
making 6,000 quilts f'or the utterly destitute. The spinning 
wheels and looms were made by refugee carpenters,· giving em-
ployment to 200 men. For two years all the clothing and bed-
d~ng, which were given in large quant-ities to the refugees, 
23 
were made by other refugee women in the industrial workshops. 
A survey af the Grphaned :J,.n the Transcaucasus was taken 
in early 1917, indicating about 15,000 to 20,000 such child-
ren in Russian Armenia• It was decided to aid such child-
ren by a monthly grant of $2.00~ four thousand to be eared 
for. This sum was soon raised to $3.00 per ehild, and by 
,22. ,Barton, .212.• ..2.ll.· ,. page 84 
23. ~., pages 8~-85 
-----
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December, ~9~7, over ~5,000 such children, in 4-50 villages, 
were being aided with monthly grants and clothing from the 
. 24 
refugeest industrial workshops. Oonsul F. Willoughby 
Smith in Tiflis appears to have been the main force in eon~ 
eentrating attention on the children. Two cables from hi~ 
poignantly expressed the plight of the children especially. 
The first, dated July, 1917, reads: 
General condition of refugees hllUi reached the critio.al 
stage. Nearly two years exiled from their homes. Only neg-
ligible proportion have been able to find work in their new 
environment. What little money or possessions they were able· 
to bring with them now exhausted. Great distress from hung-
er. In many districts signs of exhaustion appearing. Large 
numbers of old, siok, or weak men with families to support. 
Appalling number of widows with dependent children •. Majority 
will not be able to return to old homes. Estimate 4-0,000 
orphans here. Need for aid at this time greater than ever 
before. Urge and implore that New York Oo.mmittee co~tinue 
its efforts with renewed vigor if the mahy thousands it has 
helped are to be saved. ·We need million dollars for next 
twelve months. 
The second, sent in September, reads: 
Have had conference with members of provisional govern-
ment here regard to relief need, pa?ticula~ly great care for 
orphans. Orphanages should be established immediately; es-
timate about forty thousand orphans here. Eve~ possible ef-
fort should be made to take care of at least 10,000. Prov-
isional govemm.ent appreciates committee's work and promises 
all facilities. Immense need calls for-greater extension on 
lines of relief already established. Committee unanimously 
feels that number of orphan children now taken eare of should 
be increased enormously. 25 
The response to particular stress on the needs of orphans 
_..., __ 
24.· ~·, PP• 84--85 
25. ~., page 85, 
was an immediate wave of sympathy, expressed in part throu~ 
a Sunday School drive :for .funds :for the children in nBiblo 
Lands"; in the first year, nearly $1,000,000 was raised by 
26 
the Sunday school children. Religious and church bodies eon-
tinued a close associationwith the Near East Relief, as it 
was now generally known. Though the Near East Relief was . 
still to face great problems, and to act on various :fronts, 
increasingly its attention focussed an the care and educa-
tion of the war orphans. 
American Entry into the War and Relief 
The breaking of diplomatic relations with Turkey on 
America 1 s entry ~to the war had no effect on the relief work 
of the· Near East Relief.. By that time, the chaotic war con-
ditions had made it nearly ~perative for the Turkish pop-
ulation as well that there be no interruption of relief ad-
ministration, for Turks in need were also receiving aid from 
Z{ 
Am.eri.oan administraters. 
26. 
27. 
------
Ibid., page 386 
Ibid., -p. 54-. Ambassador Elku.s, whe replaced Morgenthau 
rn-!916, in an interview published in the New York T~es, 
July 18, 1917, stated, in part: "r have no-reason to 
doubt but that the Turkish Government will continue to 
permit the proper distribution of relief moneys and food, 
as heretofore; ~ fact, in conversation with some of the 
Ministers they assured me there was no objueotion to it 
if it was properly carried on. Naturally, they would 
prefer to have it done through the Red crescent Society, 
which is the Turkish organization corresponding to the 
International Red Cross, but I explained to them that 
these runds were raised with the understanding that they 
should be distributed through the Relief Committee and 
its agents and that seemed to be entirely satisfactory." 
15 
During 1917, the Near East Relief maintained in Turkey ex-
tensive activities, though its workers had to function teeh-
28 
nioally as attaches of the Swedish Legation. By means of 
soup kitchens and industrial workshops, large numbers re-
ceived relief, the figure reaching to about 300,000 Armenians, 
together with some 2001 000 Turks and Greeks, according to a 
report of Dr •. Peet, treasurer of the Constantinople committ -
29 
ee. The attitude of the Turkish government depended in 
part on the wh~ of loeal officials; in general, it cannot 
be said that there was a real change. Marked hostility was 
met nearly everywhere toward efforts to reseur Armenian child-
ren from Turkish homes, yet numbers of such orphans did app~ 
ear at various American centers for refu~e. Need cC:>ntinued 
so great that, in 1917, the Relief Committee maintained~ 
Constantinople alone three orphanages, a hospital, and elev -
en soup kitchens, in a six-month period distributing 1,400,250 
30 
rations of rood. 
During the eighteen months preceding American partici--
pation in the war, theCommittee for Armenian and Syrian Re-
. 31 
lief had ·total receipts o.f $2,895,326, a sum :far exceeding 
the most extravagant dream o:f the original eonnnittee, but 
....... 
28. Barton, p. 64. 
29. Ibid., P• 65. 
30. !!?_g., P• 69 
31. Ibid., page 410. 
---.-- ---... 
76 
dwar:fed when. compared to the need it strove to alleviate. 
That entire sum had. been spent in Persia, Transcaucasia, 
Syria, and Turkey to s ave at least a part o:f.', 1; he refugee 
populations; that over half' of it was spent for Armenian re-
lief is apparent, but to have saved half the suryivors ~f 
the deportations would ~ave cost many times that amount. 
That the amo~ts co+.lected had little to .do with need, but 
rat~er indicated the degree of awareness of the general 
American public, is shown in the :following table. of income, 
which indicates a deeper expression of public sympathy as know-
ledge of the plight of the Ar.meniah and other Christian re-
fugees became more widespread: 
1915 - $ 
1916 
. 1917 -
1918 
176 929 2,4-ol4-,ooo 
about $k,ooo,ooo (est.) 
7,092,060 ,lg 
In 1918, there""was a ehangein the'atmosphere of relief 
operations. A greatly expanded financial base permitted more 
. 
adequate direct stop-gap measures, and relief began to reach 
to far greater numbers. The condition o:f the Armenian sur-
vivers in Turkey was bad and was growing worse as time passed. 
Orphan collection stations helped save-many thousands o:f the 
h0meless, disease-ridden children, and many soup-kitchens pro-
longed li:fe in the midst o:f an increasing death rate :from mal-
and disease. A' few workshops suceeded in maintaining opera-
32. ~·, PP• 4-08-4-09 • 
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tiona, but ~urkish hostility ~ the provinces l~ited re~ 
lief measures where it was perhaps most needed. With in-
creased funds available, service began to expand markedly; 
in June, 1918, 161,000 persons were fed in the city of non--
33 . 
stantinople alone, nearly all refugees from the interior, 
who had succeeded in reaching the capital. The gravity.of 
the condition of the refugees in Syria was equally apparent. 
A report from Syria i~ 1918 stated: 
I suppose you knew the desperate conditions in the v il-
lages and the methods being adopted. Though we cannot deny 
its necessity and wisdom, it is none the less tragic. They 
tell me that they had to adopt the principle' of the survival 
of the fittest in many villa~s and actually required mothers 
to select from their children those ~o are to be.granted 
the opportunity to live, while the rest of the family were 
inevitably condemned to death. 3~ 
Palestine 
' . 
In April, 1918, the Red Cross War 6ouneil received from 
.I 
the Near East Relief information concern~g the Armenian and 
Syrian refugees in Palestine. By this time, the Allied 
armies, composed of British, Indian, French, and Ar.menian(the 
famed uAr.menian Legion~ attached to the French Army) troops, 
. . 
had liberated much of Palestine and a small p~t of Syria. 
Fifteen hundred Armenian survivors of the many thousands de-
rug.,. P• 69. 
Letter of James H. Niool, in Barton, page 75. He fur-
ther stated: "We are also conducting the work in the 
Armenian ophanage at Antoura, where the 650 childr.en 
. remain of the 2,000 whom the Turks tried to. 2urkify." 
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ported from Adana, Kharne, Marash, Aintab, and Our:ra-Kesaab 
had tound near JeriCho; five hundred more, all that were 
left from an original ten thousand, had been found at Taw-
file near the Dead, Sea, and were being moved to Port Said. 
Though the British Relief Fund for Palestine and Syria was 
now operating in the area, it was felt that the Red Cross 
ought to take over the burden of the American charity in 
Palestine and the Suez area; where thousands of Armenian 
refugees were being concentrated at Port Said. 
In March, 1918, a special Red Cross Commission for 
Palestine had set sail from New York with much travel and camp 
equipment and hundreds ef tons of supplies; it arrived in 
Beirut in June. It found the British military occupation 
forces a factor of mueh benefit to the area, for they had 
rapidly organized sanitation and emerge~ey relief programs. 
The Red Cross concentrated on finding shel~er for the home-
less refugees, .and established several workshops to provide 
employment for the distressed women. The Red Cross main-
tained ten refugee centers, took over the'fer.mer German-run 
orphanage, later established two more orphanages, opened a 
hospital, and established a series of clinics in Jerusalem. 
At Ram Allah and Wadi Surar, Jaffa, Mejel, Nazareth, Remleh, 
and at Port Said, the Red Cross established or aided tent 
cities, established hospitals and clinics, and distributed 
relief supplies. Though much o:f the Red Cross relief activ-
ity wa~ direeted toward non-Armenians, probai:1ly fifteen thou-
------
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sand Armenians owed their. lives to this progr~, carried on 
in conjunction with the committee for Armenian and Syrian 
Relief and the British Relief Fund for Palestine and Syria. 
By Octoberl, 1918, the War Council or the Red cross had app-
ropriated $558,479, in additi<:>n to a monthly contribution 
of. $50,000 to the Near East Relief, for .feod, medical, sur-
- 35 gical, and sanita~ supplies, salaries and expenses. 
Post-Revolutionary Transcaucasia 
With the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Transcaueasus 
had been placed in a precarious position militarily. Though 
Armenian troops were organized and held back the Tur~ish 
Armies froib. Ro.ssian Armenia, the Armenians were rapidly app-
roaching exhaus~on, The Bolshevik Revolution had added to 
the troubles o.f the area, as an Independent Transcaucasian 
Republic was established in April, 1918. Inabili t;y_o;t'- the, 
Georgians, Ar.m.enians, and Azeris ta establish a common po-
licy toward the Turko-Ger-man danger and a series o.f disagree-
ments over ethnic rule in certain a~eas weakened the new Re-
public, which soon broke into its constituent parts.· The 
Turkis~ o.f.fensive against Ar.menia in particular had been re-
sumed on May 15. The Georgians, looking to their own safe~y, 
placed their country under German prG>tection, and establish-
ed a separate republic on May 26, 1918. Though the Turkish 
ar.my had taken Alexandropol after .fierce resistance by the 
Ar.menian army, it was .fought to a standstill and then severe• 
ly beaten in the triple battle of Sardarabad, Bash Abaran, 
__ .,....., 
----.-. 
Davison, pp. 259-264. 
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and Karakilisse from May 23 to May 30. When the victory was 
already definite, the Armenian state, deserted in the Tran-
scaueasian Leagu& by both the Georgians and Azeris, declared 
its independence on May 28, 1918. By October 30, 1918, Tur-
key was :forced to capitulate to the victorious Allies. 
During the critical period ef tur.moil, when Turkish ad-
vances had again set in flight the re~gees from Turkey, as 
well as many thousands of Caucasian Armenians, the foreign re• 
lief' foundations were no longer on the scene. In March, 1918, 
the American gpvernment had ordered American eitize~s to leave 
because of the threatening danger. The Swedish consul as-
sumed responsibility for American property and interests, and 
the country was left without the aiq Which had been ameli-
orating its lot. John Elder, a Y.M.C.A. worker with ~he Rus -
sian ar.my, and his companion James Arroll alone remained; 
through their efforts several thousand orphans survived.36 
The Committee continued to appropriate money for the Caucasus, 
but cou.:Ld not know when it would arrive there. 1918: proved a 
catastrophic year for the Armenian people; a series-of ty-
phus epidemics swept the country, while starvation was a stark 
reality for the majority of the population. It has been es-
timated by the Near East Relief that over 250,000 persons 
died in the Transeaucasus in the winter of 1918-1919, nearly 
all Ar.meniana.37 
.. -~-- Clilf10iiii$"W-GII; . 
36. Barton, p. 86-87. 
37. Ibid., P• 88. 
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The new Armenian Republic, with no administrative struc-
ture, no economic system of her own, no productive resources, 
and no national revenue, and little transport, faced impossible 
problems. The food supplies were exhaus&ed, even seed-grain 
being consumed. Much of the population was feeding on grass 
and bark. Medical supplies were lacking. The normal popu-
lation of the area had been increased by a great number or re-
fugees. Epidemics and starvation were daily killing hundreds• 
and the most extreme emergency measures of the government were 
not sufficient to control the situation. Though Armenian ex -
patriate eomm'Wll.ities hastened what f'unds they could, without 
foreign aid the Armenians were doomed. When British troops 
f~m Persia entered the Transoaucasus, they proved a stabi-
lizing tafluence for a time. British relief organization used 
both p~blic and private funds to rush supplies arid aid to ~-
38 . 
men1a, but as the emergency continued during 1919,. ,it was 
American charity whieh played a saving role. 
1919 Relief i! Armenia 
With the Turkish surrender, the American Committee tor 
Armenian and Syrian Relief .had scheduled a great. fl:lnd drive,. 
with a goal of $30,000,000. The committee at the same time 
despatched a commission to survey the needs of the Near East; 
three shiploads of supplies accompanied the s ommission, ar-
riving in Cons~antinople in early l919. Fragmentary reports 
from Armenia caused a part of the supplies and thirty relief 
____ _._ 
38. J. Missakian, A Searehltgh~on the Armenian Qu6stion, P• 73 
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39 workers to be diverted te Batum. Ge~eral Beach, head o~ 
British Intelligence in Tiflis, had reported that the~e were 
500,000 refugees, of whom 200,000 were on the point of starva-
tion, and it would require $12,500,000 during the next s~ months 
to meet relief needs; these facts were affirmed by Dr. Main, 
sent in charge of the exped.ttion • 
. Herbert Hoover, the American Foed Administrator and head 
of the American Relief Administration (cre~ted February 24, 
1919 and active until the summer of 1919), was aware of the 
general condition of Armenia. He felt that private relief' 
could handle the task better, for tfThe United States Gove:rn-
ment can of course furnish no finance ••• " He would, however, 
establish food stocks in the 'Eastern Mediterranean which could 
Ito be supplied to the Near East Relief. He was, furthennore, 
willing to take over the financial burden from the Near East 
Relief when its funds should have been exhausted, after pas-
sage of the $100,000,000 relief appropriation by Congress.41 
When it appeared that the Near East Relief campaign for 
$30,GOO,OOO which was to start on January 12, 1919 would fail, 
he gave his earnest public support and reported that Armenia 
was already star~ing.42 At the news of the passage of the 
------
39• Bart,on, p. 1.20 and P• 108. 
40. Suda Lorena Bane and Ralph Haswell Lutz, Or~anization ~ 
. American Relief' ~ Europe 1918-1919, P• 113,2~- • 
41· Ibid., p. a 6 .. 
42• Ibid., P• llj.8-:tlf9 
$100~000,000 relief bill on February 1, 1919, HoQver stated 
in a press eo~erenee in Paris that Near East Relief had 7,000 
tons of food en route tor the Armenians and Syrians; 10,000 
tons would be placed in reserve tor the Near East Relief :1m 
Constantinople by the Food Administration.43 
' 
While Herbert Hoover was beginnin_g to concern himself with 
the question of Armen;tan relief', the Near East Relie.f 1 s in-
vestigating ~ommission was surveying conditions. On its re-
turn to the United States, the commission dedicated a good 
part o.f its report to the needs of the orphans, stating: 
The hope o.f the future o.f the Armenian nation is wrapped 
up in a large measure with the orphan and woman problem. which 
we are attempting to solve. '.rhe children Who have-survived. 
the. terrible ordeal o:f ·the past .five years have matured pre-
maturely and reveal unexpected recuperative capacity. Thou-
sands o:f the weaker children have perished; we deal with the 
survivors. · · 
At the present time we have between 50,000 and 60,000 
of these children partly or wholly under our care and dependent 
upon us, with vast n~"bers still waiting to be taken on. The 
most reliable in:f'ormationobtainable indicates that there are 
many more whom we have not yet· 'been able to reaeh and tor whom 
we must make provision. 
The buildings which we now occupy 'are mostly temporary 
and make-shift, not suited to or available for continued oc-
cupation. In most places, buildings must be purchased or new-
ly constructed and equipped. In parts o.f the Oau~asu~, as at 
Kars and Alexandropol, military barracks, when repaired, are 
available and well-suited to the purpose. It is evident that 
we shoul.d be prepared to provide p~lie:f' tor at leas't 120,000 
children be:fo~e the end of' 1920. 44 
With the cooperation o:f personnel :f'rom the Laymen's 
Missionary Movement, the campaign tor .funds produced an amount 
---.--- -~-..... 
4-3• Ibid.~ P• 220-221. · 
44-• Barton, op. cit., P• 119 
~; 
ef $19,485,000 in 1919.45 The A.R.A. ability to supply the 
need of Armenia had been assessed as 5,000 metric tons of 
breadstuffs per month for the six months of February through 
July, 1919; an estimated calory value of 93,380 millions. 
500 tons of mild were to be sent in February and 200 tons in 
46 . May, these stocks to be supplied by the Relief Administra-
tion from the $100,000,000 fund.. This came close to the mini-
mum need estimate of at least 6,000 tons of breadstuffs per 
month, so~e 30-40,000 tons needed before the 1919 harvest.47 
· In February, 1919, to cope with the ~ediate need; 
Hoover's representative in the Near East, Howard Heinz, Turned 
over to the Near East Relief the flour cargo of the Ss. West 
Mount;, thougb..he felt that there would be no f'urther-need for 
A.R.A. operation among the Armenians except to provide seed 
grains.48 Shortly later, ~May, Howard Heinz visited the 
Caucasus and reported to Hqover: 
I found a most .dis~~essing situation throughout this 
country, where starvatiea.and misery actually beggar des-
cription. It is thwugh~ true that the people are literally 
. .dving :f'rom lack o:f' :f'eod and f'rom diseases caused by malnutri ... ~'bion ••• ~he lack of food d:s.:~so' serious that the women aetuelly 
~g~ into the fields and obtain grass roots which they cook in -
~-.... --·-- te a kind of broth and serve as boiled g!'eens, occasionally 
-
getting a bit of rice to mix with it; and this constitutes 
the principal diet o·:r many. The little children naturally 
get the worst of this situation because they cannot eat such 
material and it is among the children that the death rate is 
45• Ibid., page ·409. 
46~ ·Frank M. Surface and Rymond L. Bland, American Food· in-
the World War and Reconstruction Period, p. 32-33· 
~1· Ibid., p. 149· 
48• · Bane and Lutz, P• 283 •. 
~ 
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highest. 
Tjphus has been epidemie during the winter and has taken 
away thousands, but with the moderation of the weather it 
is now decreasing, but cholera is making its appearance and the 
outlook is threatening •••• Very tew crops have been planted 
in· t~e district, partly because of lack of seed. Unquestionably 
most of these people will haye to be fed for another year • 
. As to orphanages, the Near East Committee, in the di's-
tricts of Eriv~~' Alexandropol, Sad Kars,·have been conducting 
orphanages whi~h have saved the lives of thousands of chil-
dren. WGile ~ was there they decided to take over all the 
orphanages in operation by the Armenian government, which had 
ne~-x;_the personnel, rood nor medical supplies to pl'operly 
run such institutions. · ~9 
Relief activities for Armenia during 1919 by the A.R.A. 
totalLed some 50,559 metric tons of food sent, with a value 
of $10, 630,.872.19·. . This amount was paid for by notes from 
the Armenian Republic's government,5° which proved itse·lf 
completely cooperative in every way. The 1919 harvest was 
poor; it was apparent that the 1920 harvest would be even more 
inadequate because of the lack of seed. Seed grain from the 
Koubanwas brought, on the basis of barter of American supplies?]. 
~9· Barton,. P• 123-124. 
50. Surface and Bland, p. 150,h.08-9. Hoover says 52,367 
metric tons, value $1.2,576,928 (Bane and Lutz, p. 7J.4,662, 65o·,651, 
6o6,607,568,395,392, for details on supply; ibid., P• 6f1330, 
396,443,o00 on finance matters. Hoover stated [p. 6): •or 
course it was not expected that these credits would ever be It . 
repaid ••••. 
51. On this "Kiekapoo11 project, see Bane and Lutz, p. 287. 
Also, Surface.and Bland, P• 4-08-l.j-09, 242, 150. 
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During this same period, the Near East Relief sent 7,612 met-
ric tons of flour, 1,253 tons of milk, 6,585 tons of mis-
> 
cellaneous foodstuffs, and 15,207 tons of clothing and sup-
. 52 
plies, with a total value of $8,711,472. The American Red 
Cross, with the freight charge paid by American Relief Ad-
mi:aistr~tion, sent 754- tons of' clothing and supplies, with 
a value of $258,6oo. Thus, in the period preceding August, 
1919, a total of 4-3,4-30 tons of flour, 8,000 of grain,. 1,022 
or rice, 2,662 of beans and peas, 4-5 of pork products, 
4-,716 of mild, 187 of cocoa, 813 of sugar, 6,585 classified 
as miscellaneous :t'ood, 4-31.,5 of s.oap, and 16,069 af clothing 
and supplies was sent to Armenia, with a total valuation (in-
eluding charges) of $20,231,45,5.53 The British military forces 
in the Transeaucasus reportedly spent hetween $30,000 and 
$4-0,000 p.er. month for the relief of Armenian sufferers, al-
th0ugh the British government· ·died not directly oontribu-t-e-.. ..?4-
In the ~~oe of the tremendous suffering, the Near East 
Relief sent a constant- stream of workers to Armenia. Co-
- . 
operation between the American Relief Administrat.ion and tb.e 
. . . - ·. . ·'r: 
Near East Relief improved asthe two groups agreed to operate 
under Colonel William N. Haskell as joint relief administrator 
. ' . 
and allied high commissioner for Ar.menia, with the pr~ary aim 
of rehabilitating the economy of Armenia. Appointed July $, 
.-c.---· 
52. Surface and Gland, P• 150-151, 4-08-4-09. 
53• Ibid., P• 1,50-151, 327, 4-08-4-ll. 
54-· Ibid., p. 1,51. 
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1919 by the Supreme Counci1 of the A111ed and Associated 
Powers, Co1ane1 Haske11 was to ha~e eemp1ete authority over 
a11 relie~ personnel and measures in Armenia. The Near 
East Relief, now reorganized Gf~icia1ly under that name and 
incorporated by Congress, was to be' responsible for payment 
~or 1oea1 purchases, salaries o~ personne1, and the administra-
tive and operating expenses of the relie~ in Armenia after 
August.l, 1919, estimated at $500,000 per month. · 
!a! Raske11 Mission 
The Commonwealth Fund, a New York charitable foundation, 
appropriated $750,000 ~a~ the feeding of Armenian orphans during 
the winter of 1919~20; $746, 107 of that appropriation was 
actually used, paying for ~our cargoes of foodstuffs shipped 
' . 55 
from New York in 1919 and early 1920. That Fund supp1ied to 
Commissioner Haskel1 by those shipments. the following: 2,679 
metric tons of flour, 103 tons of condensed m11k, 96.5 tons 
of sugar, 61 tons of cocoa, 405 tons of beans, 367 tons of 
rice, and 51 tons of fats. 
Other funds and c1othing were contributed by the A.R.A., 
the Red Cross, the Canadian Fund C$50,000 used ~0 purchase 
oxen to facilitate the planting of crops), the Manchester 
(Engl.and) Clathing Fund (which sent several eGnsignmentlr of 
e1othing), the Lord Mayor's Fund (J5,000), a~d the English 
soeiEtty known as Friends o:f Armenia ($5,000). These funds 
were expended through the Near East Re1ie:f, in Whose accounts 
---~ -----
55. Barton, p. 125; Surface and Bland, p. 96-9, 151, 152, 
408-4J.l. 
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they are carried. 56 Commissioner Haskell's Mission withdrew 
~rom Ar.menia on July 1, 1920, leaving all ~urther relie~ in 
the area in the hands of the Near East Relie~. Its last ~ew 
months were spent in d_istribution o~ 4-0,633.7 metria tons o~ 
flour (value $4-,813,7~) sent under the Congressional Act of 
March, 1920 which authorized the U.S. Grai~ Corporation to 
sell up to 5,000,000 barrels o~ ~lour to relieve famine condi-
tions in Europe and the Near East.57 During the period of 
the Haskell Mission, 4-7,818 tons o~ ~our, 1,4-05 of rice, 
4-04- of beans and peas, 291 o~ pork products, 281 o~ milk, 
169 of cocoa, 580 o~ sugar, 2 of miscellaneous foods, 301 
of soap, 2 o~ medical and hospital supplies, and 546 of cloth-
ing and miscellaneous supplies, worth $8,563, 971 delivered, 
were sent to Ar-menia. 58 
While the relief recorded under Haskell's direction is 
~pressive, it does not tell the full story. The Near East 
Relief continued to finance and carry on much separate acti-
vity. During 1920, its fund drive raised $13,052,000. From 
September o~ 1919 until April, 1920, 338 viDages were suppl~ed 
with ~lour and a daily average o~ 332,716 persons fed. With 
the constant cooperation o~ the authorities o~ the Armenian 
Republic, bakeries in: the cities had been requisitioned, and 
daily rations were not in bread instead of flour. In April 
alone, 75,000 persons were receiving food and medical relief' 
-------
56. Barton, p. 125; Surface and Bland P• 152, 4080-412. 
5'1: ···Barton, p. 125; Surface and Gland P• 113-115,152,408-413. 
,58.. Surface and Bland, p. 408-409. 
59 ~If 
daily from Near East orphanages, soup kitchens, mild stations, 
hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries. Medical service in 
Armenia became an American undertaking, with some 39 hospi talsm 
with bad capacity of 5,609, operating under American doctors 
and nurses, but with Armenian staf.fs. Clinics and dispensaries 
maintained by the Near East Relief provided medical service 
and drugs without charge, averaging 4,066 case treatments 
59 daily. 
The American Women•s Hospitals, a private American 
organization, selected and equipped a number of women physi-
cians for service with the Near East Relief. Two of the eight 
doctors had been sent to Erivan during the worst of the ty-
phus epidemic La 1919. A doctor and a nurse from that organi-
zation organized the important children's hospital at Et-
chlniadzin, seeing important service in treating as well 800 
Armenian orphans ousted from Igdir during the Kurdish attack 
of 1920. 60 
During the period of existence of the Armenian Republic, 
the question ef the orphans had been·aeute. ·conversations be -
tween members of the government and Near East Relief per-
aonnel haa led that government to turn over more and more or -
phanages and buildings suitable :for orphan eollectbn centers 
to the Near East Relief. Especially, the large barracks of 
the Russian army which still stood in Kars, Alexandropol (the 
_ .. _.. ---~ 
59· Barton, op. cit.,. pages 126-7. 
60. Esther Pobl Lovejoy, Certain Samaritans, p. 73-81. 
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Seversky, Kazachi, and Polygon Barracks), and the small mil-
itary station at Djalal Oghli were renovated during 1919 
and 1920 by erder of the Republic authorities and turned over 
to the Near East Relief for use as orphanages. Much of the 
work of the Near East staff was henceforth dedicated te work 
among the orphans, ever 30,000 being housed, f'ed, and taught 
in these centers, a a well as receiving the best medi-Cal care 
61 
available in the Republic. 
~ End of' the Armenian Independent Republic 
When the Turkish army launched an unprovoked general att-
ack against Armenia in November, 1920, much concern was caus-
ed for the 10,000 orphans in Kars, but the American workers, 
who had remained after Kars fell, though cut off' fram the 
. 62 
supply warehouses at AlexandrGpol, saved . them; the general 
Armenian population in that area fared worse, however, "Dis-
appearing" as Turkish rule was reestablished and Ameriean aid 
was eut off. Nearly all the 9,000 Armenian prisoners take-
en at Kars had died within a:few months of starvation and 
63 
overwork in Turkish prisons. At the same time that Turk-
ey attacked from the west, the Soviets attacked from the east, 
--q= 
61. Barton, pp. 127-128. 
62. Ibid., page 129. 
63. A. Rawlinson, Adventures in ~ ~ ~~ page 316. 
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and to preserve the Armenian population the Armenian Re-
public accepted Soviet rule. With 20 1 000 epphans to :feed 
in !lexandrepol, the Near EastRelie:f workers :found the sit• 
uation rapidly worsening; the warehouses were completely 
exhausted by April 22, 1921, when two aarloads were brought 
by the Bolshevik troops who were taking over from the Turk-
. 6L,_. 
ish military occupation of the Alexandropol district. As 
relations between the new.Bolshe:Vik ad:ttinistraters of n.orth-
er.m Armenia and the East Relief' personnel ~TOved, it was 
:found possible to arrange the trans:fer o:f the Kars orphan-
age to Alexandropo1, now renamed Leninakan; Leninakan re-
mained the administrative headquarters of the orphanage work, 
with branches at Erivan, Dilijan, Stepanavan (as Djalal Oghli 65 
was now renmmed}, Karakala, and Karakilisse. After several 
months o:f uncertainty and broken communications, it was :round 
possible to bring in relief supplies again through the port 
of Batum, now under Bolshevik rule also. It must be stated 
ta their credit that, though philosophically hostile to the 
efforts and presence of the. foreign relief workers, the gov• 
er.ning authority did not seriously interfere with the relief' 
·operation, though the for.mer cooperation with the Repablican 
authorities. was- a thing of the past. With the Bolshevik Oe-
eupation the "ingath-ering" o:f Armenian refugees and orphans 
64-. Barton, PP• 129-130. 
65. Ibid., PP• 131-132 
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from Turkey and Syria ceased; there had been a steady mig-
ration of such re~~ees into the Armenian state during the 
Armenian Republic. 
1921-1922 Relief in Ar.menia 
After the sovietization of Ar.menia, the Near East Re= 
lief ·continued 1 ts work primarily as an orphanage and med- . 
ical relief program. The American Women's Hospitals cont~­
ued to contribute workers. In August, 1921, Dr. Mabel Ell- .. 
67 
iott was sent to take over the medical work of the district. 
The Near East Relief had raised $7,270,000 in 1921; some ot 
that amount was used to send food and clething to Armenia~ 
again nearly desperate, for much of the 1920 harvest had bee~ 
68 
l0st to the Turks in the war. The Nea:r- East workers felt 
that they had an unofficial protectorate over the eeuntry, 
going as far as to state that: 
• • • the country was under two :f'lags, the American flag 
and the Communist flag. The first flag meant food,and the 
second meant peace. Word had gone out regarding the en-
ormous food and clothing supplies of the Near East Relief', 
and the people came streaming from every direction like starv-
ing cattle on the plains to feeding places •••• destiture hu-
man beings brought large numbers of little children to the ._ 
orphanages, and if there was ne room for them on the inside, 
they were left crying at the doors. This was their best chance 
of survival. 22. 
---... -----
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StarvatiCl.ln and disease '!'ere widespread still in 1.921-. 
As winter approached, it wa~ apparent that again many were 
about to die. Parents and relatives in increasing numbers 
left children at the orphanages and hospitals in the hope 
they would be saved. A letterfrrom Dr~ Elliott in Nov~ber, 
1921 stated: 
All day long we can hear the greans and wail of little 
children sutside our of:tice building in hopes we can and will. 
pick then up. I:r the sun shines a little while they quiet 
down" and when it rains they begin again. One day the rain 
turned to snow, and it was a~ul to·l1sten.to them. The 
note o:r terror that came into the generalwwail was distinct-
ly perceptible, although my office is upstairs and r had the 
window closed. They well knew what a night out in the snow 
would mean to them. We are picking them up as f.ast as pO$S-
ible. You aan see by my report how many more patients we 
have than beds, and the same holds good in the orphanages •••• 
We have a bread line for those we cannot take in on accaunt 
o:r lack of buildings. 
Again, in December, she wrote: 
In my last letter r told you that I was about ready to 
move into two new buildings, that is, new to us. I just 
had them cleaned and looking ovely when ~,000 new (Soviet} 
troops came in and they were obliged to billet their soldiers 
in tJaem. You can't imagine what they look like now. They 
have promised to turn them over ta me soon, in fact one to-
night and one in two days. Meanwhile I am about to put 31~ 
easea of trachoma that we found in the orphanages inte an-
ether building, arid we have opened a hospital at Etcbmiadzin 
for ohil dren who have been picked up off the streets in a , 
:trightf'ul condition. It is rather a hit and miss af:tair, 
but it is better than having them die on the streets and in 
every corner. 1.Q 
~hus, it is apparent that conditions had deteriorated 
again, and the_laudable recovery and rehabilitationwitnessed 
during the lifeof the Armenian Independent Republic were lost 
-.--·C;;;;;; 
70• ~., PP• 101-103. 
in the disruption er national life b'y the eombined.TurkisQ.-
Soviet attaeks. By rebruary, 1922. Caucasian Am.eE.ia had 
been subject.to some rive years of nearly continuous dis-
aster, with ramine and starvation, epidemics, and war. Dur-
ing m.ueh ef that ti~ , a part of the <Caucasian Armenian pop-:' 
Ul.ation had .been f'orced into t-emporary re_fuge in Georgia, 
Azerbaidjan, North Cau,easus, Constantinaple (under Allied 
rule), and Russia. The calamity which had struck the Turk-
ish Armenian population, causing their near extinction, had 
thu·s been reflected in part in the Transeaueasus, causing 
. . 
heavy loss to the A:r;menians there •. 
The major.Amerioan efrorts ~ the Oaucasas continued 
to be for the benefit of the refugee orphans from Turkish 
Armenia. During 1922, approximately 25,000 to 4.0,000 (as 
variously reported) orphans were maintained in American 
. . 
-
supported orphanages by the Near East Relief. The Soviet 
. .. ~ ~ 
authqrities, arter same initial harasmnent, seemed yilling 
to cooperate, even to the.point of signing a formal agree-
71 
ment with the :tfear East Relief'.. The Russian military bar-
racks which had been made available to the Near East Rel~ef 
by the Ar.menian Independent Republic,. including about 250 
substantial stone buildings with a value of at least f'ive 
million dellars, were not interfered with. 36,000 acres of 
.... 
land plus 16,000 acres of' pasture land at Djalal Oghli (now 
----·- ------
71.. (See Atta.ched) 
71· Barton~ pp. 132-136. Of text o:r agreement in Appendix-
o:f Documents, this manuscript. 
. . 
That this "treaty tt was, based on continual exaspera-
tions caused by the application o:f Soviet bureaucratic sus-
picion is evident in the statement o:f Esther Pohl Lovejoy~ 
the head of the American Women's Hospitals, (in Certain Sa-· 
maritans,. P• 106) that she was.forced to wait in Canstant-
inople while en route to the Transcaucasus because " ••• de-
lay was due to a recent ruling o:f the Soviet Federation of 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in accordance wth which all 
the American personnel of relief organizations:should be sub-
ject to search on entering and leaving Soviet territory. 
The Near East Relief was resisting this ruling, which can-
celled the privilege of coming and going without wearch which 
American workers enjoyed •••• Just as we had decided not to 
wait any longer, but to.take thr first ship corssing the Black 
Sea, a telegram announcing a favorable decision regarding 
the controversy was received, and everybody embarded for Bat-
num." She continues, h0wever, on page 109-110 as to the 
So.viet respect for the "treaty" reported by Barton, in the 
:following :fashion: " ••• they had agreed to continue the ex-
~ption of American personnel from search, and had signed 
articles to that effect, but they had changed their minds~ 
According to our standards this was outrageous, but our 
standards do not apply to Eastern peoples •••• At Batoum we 
learned.that everybody was to be thoroughly searched. In 
order to avoid complications, it was suggested that all wri-
tten communications which might be interpreted as having a 
political bearing, and anything that could be considered 
contraband should be left on the ship and se~t back to Con-
stantinople. tt 
A very significant fact has been touched on, but over-
looked by ther Americans involved at the time namely a pre--
bably contradictory of the Bolshevist reg~e in Soviet Ar-
menia and that of the Bolshevist regime for all Transcauca-
sia. The "treaty11 was Armenian, but the regulations were 
applied by the Federation government. 
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renamed Stepanavan), -granted rent-tree tor the purpose of 
develeping agricultural colonies capable of self-support 
tor the orphans, were continued under Near East Relief con-
trol. Some twenty-two American farm tractors, together with 
other American agricultural machinery, was sent during-1922, 
and tour farm experts were sent. from America to supervise 
and teach better methods of farming; through use of American 
deep-plowing methods, the orph~age agri~tural colonies 
succeeded in doubling the usual harvest in 1922. The Step-
anavan pasture acreage, a te~tile tract of some 16,000 acres-
previously owned by a relative of the Tsar, was converted in-
to a model dairy and beef farm by the Near East Relief; from 
it they hoped to secure all the milk, butter, and cheese 
needed to supply the orphanages, as well as to teed the 5_,000 
head of cattle required annually tor a. twice a week meat ra-
72 
tion to the orphans. Good cattle were imported from Switz-
-
erland, tractors ~d other farm machinery from the United 
States, and modern dairy equipment was in p~ocess of being 
brough; a power plant to supply the needs of·the station was 
in course of construction by the Near East Relief in the can-
73 
yon of the Big Demon River there. The pregram of orphan em-
72. ~ ~ Relief Report to Congress tor 1922, PP• 6·9· 
13· Lovejoy, P• 123. Elliott, P• 234, states: "···Mr. 
Bowers of Pennsylvania is building, with refugee labor, 
an electric-lighting and power plant tor the village of 
Djalal-Oghly. 
ployment and training carried en by the Near East Relief, 
. -
meanwhile, taught trades to a large number; agriculture, 
carpentry, mill work, irrigation planning, machine operation 
and care were all. a part of the program. During 1922, a 
large part of the elothes, shoes, and dormitGry supplies of 
the orphanages were supplied by such work progr~s. So suc-
cessful. was the work of the Near East Relief among the orphans 
that the Soviet regime, .faced with a desperate agricultural 
and rehabilitation problem, desired to turn over another 
10,000 orphans to the Near East Relief; though these were de-
clared in danger o.f starvation during the coming winter, the 
Near East Relie.f re.fused admission because its resources did 
74 
not justify the expense of further responsibility. 
General Relief in 1922 
Though the Near East Relie.f, by 1922, had ~ged to 
c 
conoentr.ate its efforts mainly 0t1. a large, but limited, num-
ber of orphans, the necessity for continuation of general 
relief became obvious during the year, especially in the wake 
of a catastrophic locust plague in the Zugu..ezour district &n 
the summert~e, which completely destroyed the harvest. In 
the course of administering general relief in 1922, the Near 
East Relie.f established a work program, which contributed 
greatly to the general welfare o.f Armenia; that program ex-
changed food and used clGthing for labor on irrigation ditches 
---- ... 
74• 1922 Report, op. cit., P• 10. 
being rebuilt or for new road constructien, much UPban. clean-
up work being accomplished at the same time, especially ~ 
.. 
Erivan. Some $61,000 worth of seed grain was loaned, as well, 
against the 1923 harve·st. 2,565 ears of American-supplied 
corn grits were distributed in return far labor, su6h' as re-
construction of ruined :V'illages, and were the di.fferenee 
between survival. and starvation .for a large part of the popu-
75 
lation. American relief workers in the Caucasus during·l922 
totalled .five doctors, nine nurses, and seventy-eight other 
re21ef personnel, acting mainly as supervisors to very large 
. 76 
numbers of Armenian medical, nursing and relief assistants. 
~he expectations behind the work program of the Near 
East Relief' are apparent in the :f'ol.lowing selections from an 
article at the time: 
..• r have seen the first dirt turned which will mean 
American reclamation of 120,000 acres of cotton, rice 
and grain land •••• 
The Near East Relief, which is baeking this irr1gat1c:na 
project, proposes not enl.y to provide work fer refugees 
wi~h the construction, but has obtained government con-
sent to the permanent partition later of the reclaimed 
land ~ong the boys (of the orphanages) who are contem-
plating marriage and settling down to the agricultural. 
development of the eGUD.try ••••• By rebuilding old irri-
gation canals and cutting some new life-giving streams, 
America will restore scores of abandoned fields. In 
additisn she will reelaLm vi~gtn_seil that~ fa~ want of 
water, is fast tending toward the same kind of desert 
which new separates Armenia and the Holy Land, once a 
populous, productive region. Refugees will do the work 
for ten cents• worth of grits, American dehydrated cora, 
a day, and a few American old clothes from time to tDne. 11 
---. ... 
75. 1922 Report, PP• 10-12. 7o. Ibid., P• ~0 
77. William A. Biby, "Repopulatiag the Garden sf Eden"; New 
~ East, November, 1922. 
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Relief' ,!!! 1923 
During the remainder of the 1920's~ the Near East Relief 
continued to withdraw gradually f'rom .the general life ef' 
Armenia, concentrating more amd more on the orphanage pro-
grams. Work programs in. Armenia, especially irrigation and · 
construction~ contined f'er s~e-time to be paid for by Ameri-
can f'oed and eloth.ing supplies. Used clothing, supplied by 
the Near East Relief, in fact, was a major medium of exchange 
in Soviet Armenia during the entire decade- To ·the end of' 
192.3, the Near East Relief had appropriated a total ef' 
. . . 78 
$18,288,876.92 for relief' work in the Caucasus; diminished·· 
expenditures contined annual~7 for arphan education and care. 
f .·; 
A cash f'and of' $35,000was maintained regularly at .Al.exandro-
. 79 
pcf'J. (renamed Lenim.akan in mid-decade). ·The American import-
and in Soviet Armenian education is shown by the typical Sov-
iet f'igure f'or 1923; 19,350 orphan students were under Ameri-
74 
can care, 513 under English, and 2,896 under state care. Near 
East Relief' figures f'or 1923 show that 28,7~8 orphans received 
aid in the Armenian area, this f'igare dropping very gnadually 
. 81· . . . 
during the rest of the decade. About three or four thousand 
of'. th.e orphan~ had graduated into S$lf-supp19rt, but 82% were 
still under 14 7ears of age. .Wll.e nuree train~g scheo~ estab-
... 
lished by Near East Reiief among the orphans had already graa-
----q-- ---..;.-
-----
78. Near !!!! Re~ief Report !2, Oo~ress fer ~923, p. ~6 
79. Ibid, p. 17; also, s~ilar 19 repert, p. 19 
80. 8711asourian, "Hayastani GeBdividjvari Hradaragouty-
owmersn; ,Rairenik Am.sakir, #38, Nov. 1.925; PP• l4-0-J.4l. 
81.. 1923 }Report, P• 22. 
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uated two classes, and continued to meet. the heavy demand in 
part during the decade. A bacteriological laboratory was 
. ' 
established for the production of vaccines, serums, and other 
laboratory products in 1923; this was the first sueh labora-
tory in the Trans caucasus, and pl·ayed an im.pertant role in 
83 
diminishing the effect of epidemic diseases. 
Summarizing Near East Relief work in 1923 in Armenia, we 
see the following picture. An· average orphanage enrollment of 
20,672 were eared for, with a death ~~te ot· only 8.64 per 
thousand. ~our American workers supervised schools with 417 
Armenian teachers and 16,911 pupils, while ~36 students re-
ceived special wor~. About 6,000 orphans were placed with 
refUgee families during the year, as the refugees brought in 
their first gaod harvest. 2,162 aeres"at Alexandropol, 3,850 
at Erivan, and 16,412 at Stepanavan were farmed, yielding 
57,600 lbs. ef rice, 198,000 lbs. of cotton, 10,200 bushels of 
vegetables, 23,760 bushels of barley and wheat, and 3,600 tons 
of hay under or~han labor; 7,690 .head of sheep, 1,200 beet 
cattle, 24-0 hogs, 86 dall'>y cattle, .6 Berkshire boars, and 8 
high-grade bulls were kept, yielding 126,000 pounds of meat, 
2,300 sheep skins for eats, 800 cow hides.for shoes, and 
1,260 lbs. of mutton fat. Farm equipment included 22 tractors, 
8 binders, 1.3 seed drUls, 2 threshing machines, 12 mowing 
--
--..... -- ----
82. Ibid., PP• 25-30. 
83. 1923 Report, P• 30. 
machines, and 117 plows, harrows, ete. The example or the 
orphanage ~ar.ms in greatly increasing yields by modern too~s 
and metheds served as a convincing example to the ~ar popula-
tion, while the ~petus given to cotton farming was beginning 
to revive that crop's impo~tance. 40% of the general relief 
work given during the year in Armenia was in indnstrial rarm 
help. Observers during the year were ~pressed by the .high 
standards er sanitation, the industrial trainil!lg program 
(including rug-weaving, shoemaking, carpentry, blacksmithing, 
sewing, pottery, lace and.embroidery, baking, canning, etc.), 
and the reclamation of farm land. Educational and medical 84-
work showed good progress. Armenia had now passed the worst 
part o~ its crisis years; reeonstruction and rapid moderniza-
tion should have followed in the natural course of events. 
A~ter 192,2 
During the remainder of the decade, the Near East Relief 
continued to edueate large numbers of orphans, pay for agri-
cultural and urban building and r0ad improvements by means of 
used clothing and some food, supply high-grade seed on loan, 
and conduct large-scale medical.work. Personal hygiene and pub-
lic sanitation ~provements were a strengly stressed part of 
the education in orphanages, and outplaced graduates dispersed 
that information throughout the general population. The 
extremely J.ow death rate of 2.48 per thousand. in the orphanages 
in 1926 indicates.. how thoroughly hygiene and sanitation pro-
...... - ------
84. !£!!., PP• 38-57. 
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grams were succeeding, combiAed with the continua~ medical oare 
avai1ab~e; Near East Relief provided the first X-ray apparatus 
available in Armenia ~ 19~, as well as large amounts of medi-
cines. A start was made a~ drainage of malarial swamps, and oil 
application to mosquitG-breedirig_.poe1s became increasing~y 
common. The annual feeding of about 25,000 orphans in the Cau-
casus required large amounts of varied :food., only partially 
available locally. Mass cooking and serving.necessary was per-
formed by the orphans thems.el ves, under supervision. Clothing 
was made by the orphans with cloth brought from America an~ 
sewing-, thread-, and knitting-machines sent by the Near East 
Relief. Orphan-run shoe shops made all the shoes needed for 
the chi~dren stil~ under care. The vocational and agrioultura~ 
training progr~ taught practical, modern methods which cQuld 
not but a:f:feot the methods pursued in Armenian economic life. 
School methods were revised in line with modem methods, and 
large numbers were enrolled in the higher grades. By 1925, -· 
~61 students were studying abeve the sixth grade level in the 
orphanages, representing 23.6! of the orphanage school enroll-
ment, as compared with 197 and 9·2% in 1922. Some 2,300 orphans 
in Greeee and Turkey had their transportation to Soviet Armenia 
paid by the Near East Relief in 1925. At Lenfnakan, a normal 
school was opened, graduating twenty-sevea older Grphans as 
teachers in 1925; these new teachers secured immediate employ-
ment in government sehools, and the commissariat of education 
requested several hundred mere. A number of orphans received 
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education training during the remainder o:r the decade. Two 
hundred orphan boys were trained to operate and maintain Ameri-
can made tractors; by 1925 ail these were employed by the 
government, and numbers more secured such training in the next 
three years. 2,700 boys and. girls had been trained :for crafts 
leadership in metal work, mechanics, woodwork, electrical work, 
machinery, plumbing, shoem.aking, printing,. bookbinding, ·home 
economies, needle~work, and rug-weaving by 1925~· The govern-
ment requested 15 graduate nurses :for a malaria·prevention pro-
gram around Erivan; immediately, the required number were given 
special training in tropical mediclne in the Near East Relief's 
nurses* training schools in Armenia. In. 1925, some 79 orphan 
girls received nurses training in the school at Le~nakan. Read-
ing rooms were established; in one ease, at least, averaging 
10,000 attendance per month. During the 1925 year, the govern-
ment requested Near East Relief to continue its work in Arme~a 
:for three years more, and showed an increasingly'cordial spirit 
o:f cooperation. By 1926, the Near East Relief had published a 
number o:f manuals in Armenian, including: 
Methods o:f Teaching Armenian 
Practical Gardening Manual 
Practical Nursing · 
Hygiene (Printed by the Dept. &:f Education in Russia) 
Soi1s and Plant Li:fe 
Farm Traetors 
Farm Maehineey 
Field Operations 
How to Teach Field Crops 
Lessons In Practical Poultry 
Bee Keeping 
At Polygon Orphanage (Leninakan), two new buildings were 
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-
constructed and made available for industrial work, far the 
purpose of training its five thousand boys. The Seversky 
Orphanage (Leninakan), with three thousand girls in its indus-
trial school, cooperated with Polygon in a model village pro-
gram, with the boys doing all the construction work, and the 
model homes and model gardens arousing great interest on the 
part of the general population. The government was indueed to 
buy 100 American tractors by the example of the Near East Re-
lief success with agricultural modernization. Near East Relief 
blooded stock and new seeds were distributed as surplus occurred. 
Orphanage children were encouraged to have meatless days and to 
undertake other sacrifices in orde~ to help ~ildren outside 
the orphanages, thus creating a willingness to sa.crit:ice ~or 
the good ot the nationality; Musical and cultural life were 
encouraged, with far-reaching effect. Beeause the food and 
health conditions outside the orphanages were so poor, clinics 
continued to provide service for outplaoed orphans. Orphan 
out-placement nhad been :t'oreed to undesirable extremes because 
oi' the serious 'lack of funds and the inability oi' the organiza-
tion to train fully all the orphans· within the institutions", 
so a post-orphanage training program oi' vocational agriculture 
was instituted as an extension school; each village being 
allowed one or two students at a time. Over one hundred 8l'ld 
seventy-i'ive girls rec~ived i'ull training as nurses,. 'and most 
served as community nurses in an extensive rural health pro-
gram set up by the government. (The nurses' tratning school 
10q_ 
of the Nea~ East Relief was absorbed by the state Armenian 
Red Gross and the government hospital in Erivan late in the 
85 
decade.) 
The reaction of the 4r.menian population to the graduates 
of the American orpb.a.nages was one of warm welcome. With a 
spirit of cooperation and dedication, despite the refusal of the 
government to permit religious training of any kind in the or-
phanages, the graduates showed themselves vitally concerned with 
society and possessed of a feeling of social responsibility. 
The Soviet government quickly found a large leadership potential 
among the American-trained, and began to make use of them in 
national life. The governmentally-organized textile industry 
of Lenimakan in particular used the skills of the orphans, with 
even "master" workers being orphanage graduates; so~e 436 boys 
and girls from the orphanages were employed in that industry. 
or these, 3~ took an active part in public life either ~ the 
variGus official commissions for education or in welfare work. 
Mayors of certain villages were already, still in the pre-1930 
decade, graduates of the American orphanages. Attempts to ere-
ate a social and recreational life.for the villages were, to 
good degree, the outgrowth of efforts by American-educated or-
phans. Several hundred orph~s were sent to college by the 
8?• Near East Relief Report to Congress for !.ill, entire; ibid. 
f'9r 1926, entire; Barton, PP• 194-5, 198-201,~-218, 228-232, 
235-24-7, 258-260, 276, 288-290, 295-299, 301. . . 
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Near East Relie~ from 1925-1930, producing professors, engi-
neers, doctors, hospita~ superintendants, artists, musicians, 
sculptors, and agricultural_leaders. ·Eighteen successfUl 
orchestra leaders in the Transcaucasus by 1930 were prphanage 
graduates. Six o~ the ohie£ nurses o~ the city hospital of 
Erivan in the same year were girls fraa the American orphanages. 
Following the devastating earthquake of 1926 in the Leninakan 
district, much of the reconstruction work had been performed by 
orphanage-trained graduates, and even older boys in the orphan-
S6 
age at the time. 
Though it is impossible to express the total impact of 
Near East Relief efforts in Armenia in so brief a study, it is 
possible to glean from the above illustrations some understand-
ing o~ ·the great returns in potential of material advance 
brought about by the Am~rican investment of $28,017,000 prior 
87 ~ 
to July 1, 1929 through the Near East Relief and its associated 
bodies. How well that potential has been developed, and the 
relations of the Soviet government with the Armenian people in 
the face of the spirit of dedication for the advance of the 
Ar.menian nationality taught by the American relief personnel, 
must remain a sharp question to all who study Soviet rule in 
the Transcaueasus. 
86. Barton, pp. 306-318. 
87. ~., P• 411.· 
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TBE .ARMENIAN REPUBLIC: FORMATION 
1 (;.M - :n_ .. 
.J\.. -1: -t:J 
Supporters of the Soviet and uninformed scholars often 
assume that the Armenian Republic was born out of a vaouum, 
had no popular foundation, was not a logical development of 
preceding events, and was a tyranny of one party (the 
Dashnak Party~ Dashnaktzoutyoun, or Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation). .Some olaim that the Soviet regime "liberated" 
Armenia and brought the stability and opportunity the 
Armenian people desired.. On the other handt if the ~men1an 
people, by their own efforts and with the support of the 
great part of the population, did create the. independent 
republic as an expression of national desire, .then Soviet-
ization represented imperial conquest and a denial of self-
determination. The background and eXistence of the Republic 
and the method ot its destruction are conclusive. 
The War and the Armenian People 
While this is not the proper place for a full stady ot 
the Turkish genocide of the Armenians during World War I, it 
is worth stressing that the entire Armenian people, whether 
under Russian or Turkish rule, considered themselves members 
ot one nation. Whatever happened to a part of the nation 
aroused an immediate reaction in all parts of the nation. 
Though citizenship obligations might eontliot, the Armenians 
wherever they were found were determined not to jeopardize 
-· .... 
the future of the nat~onal~ty. 
With the ~torm-elouds of war gathering, the Armenian 
people were faaed with both a threat and an opportunity. It 
would obviously have been to the ~nterest of both ~~ey and 
and Russia to win the entire Armenian people to their side if 
eonfliot should oeour. The logical medium for such support 
was the Armenian Revolationary ~ederat1on, which had gained 
the support of the overwhelming part of the Armenian popu-
lations on both sides of the artitioial·border dividing the 
Armenian homeland; the 11front-line" of the Armenian na.t.ional 
movement, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation had displayed 
great military aeility and a recklessness of saoritioe for 
the national interests which pomised great advantages to 
whi~hever side should win its support • 
.Spurred by a mystic Oriental 11 sooiology11 propoun.ded by 
Z1ya f·~ Alp and encouraged by their German alllanoe, the 
Ittihad ve Terakke ("Union and Progress") leaders of Tu~key 
dreamed of a grea~ new Pan-brk state.whieh would rival the 
greatest ye~s ot the now decadent Ottoman Empire;!! 
Armenian cooperation seemed essential for the re.alizat~on ot 
that dream, for the Armenian population was settled astride 
the land-bridge between the ~rkish areas of the Aaatol1an 
Plain and the Turko-Tatar lands of the East.Y Th(!)Ugh the 
1 • .Sarkis Atam.ian1 The Armenian Community, pp. 180-185. 
2. See Rou.ben., Ha1a.stan mioh-yergragan ou.ghineron vra1, 1'or a 
discussion o~ Armenia's geopolitical importance. 
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Ottoman gavernments had resisted the implementation of even 
the most moderate reforms in the Armenian-iRhabited areas, 
even after the establishment of the Constitution in 1908 l:>y 
the "Young hnks," the Balkan Wars had oonvineed the Ittihad 
leaders that Turkey must now pursue an active Armenian policy 
in public, until such time as. the "secret d~oision" of making 
Turkey a Turkish state devoid ot "1'oreigners, 11 as ,decided in 
the Ittihad party conference at SaJ.onika. in 1911, could be 
effectuated safely.!/ Though the t.~seness 91' Itt1hadist 
"friendship" for the A.rmenians during 'tU!le constitutional 
period had become apparent, Enver and ~a.laat, the leaders of 
the 11 Young ~rks, tt st,ill hoped to make us~ of the Armenians 
against liussia.. The Armenian appeal for !uropean supervisors 
ot the Six Provinces of Turkish ~mania .to gt;tarantee the 
previously agreed upon reforms had finally found Eurapean 
sympathy, and Hoff and Westened (of Norway and Rolland) were 
selected to go to Turkish Armenia as the High Commissioners 
of the European Powers in 1914.!/ Wi'th reform imminent, the 
Ittihadist government felt that concessions might well win 
over Armeniap support of the Turkish war aimso 
•s it h~pened, before the reforms had been put into 
effect, the Armenian Revolut.ionary Federation held its Eighth 
3. et. doewnents in Andonian, Memoirs ot Naim Bey, p. 7, 
especially. · . · · . 
4. s. Vrat zian, Hidasdani Hanrabedou tyoun, p. 5; the January, 
1914 agreement would giv~ Armenia the same status as Lebanon, 
but under a European governor-general instead ot a ~rkish 
subJect. Vratzian•s book hereafter is referred to as uaepublic. 11 
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General Congress in the city of Erzeroum during the month of 
July, 1914. A major item in its order of business concerned 
the "reform$" and the safeguards given thereunder to the 
Armenian people; the Armenian Revolutionary F'ederatioa meeting 
was the center of attention at the time of not only the 
Armenian people, but all surrounding nationalities. Before 
the conclusion of the order of business, news of the outbreak 
ot war in Europe arrived, and the Turkish government immedi-
ately caneelled the reforms and decreed a general mobilization. 
The General Congress, eoneluding that new issues would arise 
which required deeisive immediate aetion, quickly completed 
its work by electing a body of seven to make all decisions 
during the war.emergency, with ·instructions to keep Turkey 
out of the war at any eost, since that move would be a tragedy 
for both the Armenian people all;d the Ottoman state. Immedi-
ately atter the conclusion of the Erzerum Congress, 'the 
eommi ttee of seven, si tt.ing as the Western District Exeouti ve 
Committee of the Dashnaktzoutyoun, were visited, in August, 
1914, by a Turkish mission of twenty-eight members, including 
Kurds, Georgians, Gheehens, Lazes, Oireassians, and Turks, 
whose task, three months before Turkey entered the war, was 
to stir up the peoples of the Middle East against the Allies. 
T.he plenipotentiary of the Ittihad who headed that mission was 
Emir Heobmet; his proposal to the. Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation was that the Federation, ~n return for a promise 
of an autonomous Armenian state under Turkish and German 
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guarantee ( t<L..i.n..cJ..ucJe "Russian Armenia, and the provinces o~ 
Erzerum Van and }311;lis,1 in ~urkish Armenia11 ) , !I aid in the 
cause o'£ the Georgian and Oaucasian Turkish peoples for 
liberation :from Russia by cooperating in an i.asurreetion 
against the Tsarist government by the Russian Armenian popu-
latien. Behaeddin Shakir. and NadJ1 Bey pointed out that the 
mement had come when the Caucasian peoples must liberate them-
selves, and that Turkey needed independent (or autonomous) 
states to serve as a bufter betweem. Turkey and the Russian 
Empire.§/ 
In accordance with their instruction~, the Western 
District Executive Committee of the Dasbnaktzoutyoun replied 
that the advantages of neutrality to Turkey were superlative, 
that Turkey had nothing to gain in volantarily entering the 
war on the side cr:r Germany, and that the 4-rmenians under 
Russian rule were already mustered under the government to 
which they owed their allegiance, the Armenian people ia 
Turkey would perform their duty as loyal citizens of Turkey, 
if the call should be made in spite of the earnest desire 
and advice ot the Armenian Revolutionary Federation that 
5. Herbert Adams Gibbons, "Armenia in the World War, 11 The 
Lavsanne Treaty, Turkey, and Armenia,.dpp .. 126-7; see also 
Atamian, pp. 185-6; Republic, pp. 8-9; and House ef Represent-
atives, Select Committee en Communist Aggression Report No. o, 
~ommunist Takeover and Occupation of Armenia (hereaf~er re-
ferred to as "songress"), p. 3 •. Generally, erroneously, it is 
stated that the proposals were made to the Dashnak Party 
Congress. · 
6. Republic, p. 8. 
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Turkey remain at peace. It has been. pointed out that the 
answer of the Dashnaktzoutyoun was eminently correct, and 
that the Federation was giving the only assnranae the Turks 
had a right to demand, that is, that TUrkish subjects remain 
loyal.!/ While, in view of later happenings, it may now seem 
that the leadership of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
had much to gain by accepting the Turkish promise, close 
Armenian contact with the Turkish ruling circles had made them 
qlli te aware of the real a tti tade s o:f the people making the 
Dgenerous offer." 
It was incredibly naive. of the Dashnag leaders approached 
to break the two cardinal rules of. diplam:acy: l, never reveal 
your real attitude, and 2, always pretend to be basically 
favorable to propositions and keep the door of negotiation 
open. Presumably, the lesson in cynicism they were about to 
witness had its effect, and one can scarcely believe tha~ such 
honesty and simplicity will be duplicated. The whole idea, 
of course, of organizing volunteer battalions to serve in the 
-11 liberation11 of the Transeaucasian Armenians, who lived far 
',., . 
more secure, prosperous, and Armenian lives than those under 
the tyranny of ~urkey, was preposterous; nevertheless, the 
appearance of serious and protracted consideration of the 
proposals could conceivably have led to some temporary 
advantages, especially if conditions were set such as the 
prior establishment in Turkish Armenia of an.Armenian territory 
. . 
7. Gibh>ans, p. 127. 
and government. 
At about the same time, with Russia newly en~ered in 
., 
the war, Count Vorontzov~Dasbkov, the Vice-roy of the O~uoasus, 
appealed to the Armenians to support the Rus.sian armies, 
promising that their loyalty would be rewarded by the creation 
of an autonomous. Armenian state which wou~d include Erivan 
and Kars Proviees in Russian Armenia .and all of ~rkish 
Armenia.. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation had little 
more love for the Russian government than for Turkey, but 
believed that an Allied success was more .to be desired than a 
v.iotol,'y~·tor the Central Powers. When Catholicos Gevorg V, 
the Supreme Patriarch of the Armenian Church, paid an o!f:1.cial 
visit to the !I.'zar in Tiflis in November, 191~, similar as-
surance was given; the Armenians of Russia responded with a 
wave. of ent.b,usiasm for the Allied cause, believing that, at 
~ong last, Armenian union was about to be achieved. 
At first, tour volunt.eer brigades of Caucasian Armenians 
were organized to tight beside the Russian armies, with about 
2,500 experienced revolutionary fighters; these were the 
commands of Antranig, Keri, Dro, and Hamazasp. These tour 
brigades, soon Joined by a fifth under Djanpoladian, played a 
great role in initial military activities on the Caucasian 
Front .. §/ Under Ittihadist leader Enver Pasha, the Ottoman 
Minister of War, three corps ot combat tr~pps, numbering up 
to 150,000 men, attacked the Transcauoasian borders in 
8. Republic, p. 9 •. 
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November and December, 1914. The N.inth Corps quickly achieved 
its goal of Ardahan with the. assistance of the local Moslem · 
population. The Eleventh Corps took its. station on the 
Persian border, ready to sweep into the Caucasus. T.he Tenth 
Corps, striking the weakly-manned. center of the Russian 
position, was delayed. at Barduz Pass by the first At-tijenian 
battalion, under Colonel Keri; this. decided the batt~e·; ,for 
the Russian army had time to concentrate at Sari-Kamiah, and 
smashed the Turkish drive, with much of the combat .cre.dit due 
to the volunteer battalions and. the large.ly .Armenian r:egular 
divisions.~ T.he rout of Enver•s forces was complete, and the 
Turks lost very heavily in the Battle of .Sari-Kamiah, one of 
the greatest military defeats in historyo 
A second Turkish offensive was mounted in April, 19J.5, by 
violation·ot Persian neutrality. Aided by local Tatar in-
habitants, the crack Turkish division und.er General Khalil -Bey 
and its 10,000 Kurd irregulars stormed into Urumia, taking 
1000 Russian prisoners from the small Russian force, one 
brigade under General Nazarbekiano The famous Armenian 
guerrilla leader Antranig placed his battalion in the path of 
the Turkish drive toward Salmast, and foU;ght off Khalil 1 s 
30,000 men for three days, until Russian reinforcements . 
arrived. Antranig 1 s men killed about 15% of the Turkish 
etfeetive.s in that stand, and smashed the offe~sive .. lO/ 
9. Gibbons, pp. 131-3. 
10 .. Ibid., p. 133. 
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..:L J:! 
The Armenian Republic of Van. 
In the meantime, the Turkish civilian and military 
authorities had begun the massacre of the villages of Van 
Province, adjacent to the Persian border, in the expectation 
that the Turkish offensive would succeed in rousing Moslem 
revolts which would shatter Russian power to rescue or punish. 
T.he Armenians of the city of Van le~ned of the Turkish plans 
for genocide and rose 1n self-defense, soon declaring them-
selves an independent state under the leadership of Aram 
Manoogian.ll/ By May 3rd, the Armenian population, with only 
1,000 armed men, standing off the attacks.of thousands of ir-
regulars and hastily brought up regular troops, had succeeded 
in forcing the Turks out of the municipal area. Two days 
later, the first detachment of Armenian volunteers in the 
.,. 
Russian service (under Dro) reached Van, and other detachments 
of the volunteers and of the Russian army arrived on May 6, 
1915. Aram was ratified by the military occupation author-
ities as governor of Van, and the entire administr.ation en-
trusted to the Armenians; General Oganovsk1 1 s telegram of 
instructions indicated a quB.l.if'.ied acceptance of Armenian 
independence, as f' ollows :. 
In accordance with your appointment I confirm 
Aram in the office of Provisional Governor of Van, 
entrusting to him the government of the region 
11. See the very informative series of articles entitled 
"The Defense of Van, tt· by Onnig Mekhitarian, in Armenian 
Review, Nos. 1-8; 1948-9. 
around Van. He will form the administration only 
from Armenians and will depend upon Armenian home 
guards. Concerning the appointment ot a consul I 
have telegraphed to the commander of the army and 
to our consul at Tabriz to send a temporary envoyol&/ 
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Armenians from the Transcaucasus, fired with enthusiasm 
' for the new Armenian rule, flocked to Van to aid in its re-
construction and administration; large numbers of persons who 
later served in the Armenian Independent Republic first re-
ceived administrative experience in Van. The government 
rapidly gained strength, with canton governments in Shatakh, 
Gavash, ArJe~h, Altch.avash, Hayotz, Tzor, Berkri, Artamet, 
Shahbaghi~ Aliur ( Thimar), Tohanik { Thimar), Arjak, Khoshab, 
Moks, and Norduz. Seventy days later, on July 18th, the 
Russian army, acting under orders based on political motives 
rather than military necessity, in keeping with the Tsarist 
policy of securing "Armenia without the Armenians," ordered 
the Armenians to evacuate the Van region with the Russian 
troops then there; the neophyte Armenian government wished 
to remain and fight for its life if necessary, rather than 
withdraw, but the Russian orders were unchangeable.~ 
The occasion for the Russian destruction of the Van 
Armenian Republic was a third offensive by the Turks, again 
under Khalil Bey~ With eleven f.resh divisions, in July, 1915, 
he launched an attack on the Russian center which seemed 
12. Ibid~, Armenian Review, No. 8; December, 1949 1 p. 130 
13; Ibid., pp. 131-133. 
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threatening; Armenian volunteer battalions, however, attacked 
Khalil's reinforcements in the rear of the Turkish advance, 
seriously disrupting its orderly progress, while General 
Nazarbekian brought up reinforcements which swiftly turned 
the Turkish offensive into a Russian counter-offensiveol4/ 
During the spring, the battalions of Keri, Dro, and 
Hamazasp had united into the Ararat Legion ttnder the over-all 
command of the Armenian revolutionary fighter Vartan, 'and a 
new battalion had been organized under Isbkhan and Hovsep 
Arghoutian.l5/ By the end of 1915, there were seven bat-
talions of Armenian irregulars in service. Including the 
total of volunteers who served in the battalions ot irregulars 
(converted into regularly staffed sections of the Russian army 
in 1916), the Armenians ot the Russian Empire gave 13% of 
their population to military service, according to the 
official Russian figures, some 250,000 soldiers on the various 
fronts. 16/ Though the Armenian forces had proven themselves 
superior as fighting men to the Turks during the course of 
the war so far, in the interests of ;mperial policy, the 
Russian government had kept Armenian military numbers on the 
Caucasian Front limited, sending most of the Armenian recruits 
14. Gibbons, pp. 133-134. 
15. Republic, p. 9. 
16 •. Republic, p. 10. For Armenian war activity, see K. 
Gorganian, La Partici ation des Armenians a la erre mondiale 
sur le front du Gauoase 1914-1918 , an excellent study. 
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to the Polish or other fronts. There ean be no real question 
that the Armenians were capable of holding the Catteasian 
Front alone against the Turkish regular army, for the heavy 
losses which the Turks had already sustained had seriously 
reduced their combat effectiveness; the total number of 
Armenians serving in the Russian armies by the end of 1915 
probably was greater than the total of remaining Turkish 
military effectives on the Caucasian Front. If the Russian 
government had seriou~ly wished to create a favorable oppor-
tunity for the implementation ot its promise of an autonomous 
state, it could readily have supplied sufficient arms to the 
Armenians so that they themselves could have liber~~ed Turkish 
Armenia. To make matters worse, the Russian imperial command 
drew off the bulk of the Armenian troops still on the 
Caucasian Front for the Polish and Galician Fronts after the 
smashing of the Third Turkish Offensive. 
Armenian Defense of the Caucasus 
During the course of 1916, while the Turkish Armenians 
were suffering massacre, rape, deportation to the desert, 
disease and starvation, the Russian high command, having 
seriously reduced the forces on the Caucasian Front, was satis-
fied to leave the real task of defense to the Armenian 
Legionnaires, the volunteers now incorporated as regular de-
tachments of the Russian army. Before and during the course 
of withdrawing forces from the Caucasian Front, the Russian 
J 
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armies, in a series of successful local offensives, much of 
the credit for the success of which rightly belongs to the 
Armenian detachments, swept the greatly weakened and de-
moralized Turkish forces back from Moush, Bitlis, Khnous, 
Erzeroum, Erzinga, and Trebizond.!1/ There were few 
Armenians left in that area to be rescued, however, and the 
reestablishment of Armenian power in the occupied parts of 
Turkish Armenia would be a matter of considerable time. 
While the Armenians who had succeeded in living through the 
Turkish genocide drifted back· to their homes in occupied 
Armenia, and Armenian agents scoured the countryside for 
random Armenian orphans in order not to lose the remaining 
fragments of the Armenian population, events were transpiring 
in Russia proper which were to have a g~eat impact on the 
future of the Oauoasian Armenians as well as of the surViving 
Turkish Armenians. 
Despite public promises of the establishment of an 
Armenian state made by the various Allied Powers, secret 
agreements for the division of the Turkish Empire had been 
reached, without provision :for a Ufree, united, and independent 
Armenia." At the same time, 1916 saw a growing anti~war 
propaganda in Russia itself, and the Russian internal situation 
was headed for an explosion. The abuse of responsible govern-
ment by the Tsarist officialdom and court had reached such 
1?. Q.. Sassoun1, Dad.1gaha1astanl:\ Rousagan Dirabedout:van Dag 
(1914-1918), pp. 99-123. 
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depths that the populace no longer felt the strong ties of 
identity with the destinies of the court which had restrained 
the antagonistic social forces tor centuries. Yet, in spite 
o:f slogans of lfpeace" and "self-determination,u the various 
political elements in Russia proper seem to have maintained 
a basic imperial unity on the national question, for no 
Russian political leadership existed whiCh was sincerely 
willing to see the separation of the national areas from 
Russian rule. Thus, the secret agreements reached in the 
spring of 1916 between France, Great Britain, and Russia pro-
vided tor the division of Armenia into two spheres of 
occupation and imperial rule, with the major part of Turkish 
Armenia going to Russia (not to an Armenian state, despite 
the earlier public commitments), and Gilicia and southwestern 
Armenia as far as Kharpert to the French. 
Russian military forces were in sufficient strength, and 
the Turkish power had been weakened to such a degree that all 
Turkish Armenia could have been liberated during 1916. The 
Russians apparently were still pursuing the historic policy 
of Lobanov-Rostovsky of securing "Armenia without the 
Armenians," for no real move was made to rescue the remnants 
of the refugees, and Russian military advances were halted by 
the high command when the major area specified for Russian 
expansion was taken. Russian officials now openly began to 
talk of limiting Armenian rights to the maintenance of schools 
alone, and stated that Turkish-Armenia had no right to the 
1')0 
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establ~sbment of national autonomy.l8/ T.he Armenian people 1 
who had lost so heavily at the hands of the common enemy, 
who had given some 300,000 soldiers to the Allied cause, who 
had received the firm promise of self-rule from the govern-
ments of the All~ed nations, were now being betrayed in more 
cynical fashion than ever before in their history. 
The Transcaucasian Commission 
T.he Russian Revolution transformed the situation of 
Transcaucasia. The imperial ties 1 already greatly weakened 
by the evidences of duplicity and cynicism, were now nearly 
totally severed as the Transcaucasian peoples moved toward 
independence. The Provisional Government of revolutionary 
Russia created a separate administrative commission for the 
Transcaucasus on March 9, 1917 (known as-the nozakom11 ); this 
. body reached Tiflis on March 16, and immediately set to work, 
with the enthusiastic support of the local populations. 
Difficulties soon developed, however, as the Georgians, with 
two members (A. ahkhen~eli and Kita Abashitze) already serving 
on the five man Ozakom1 sought to increase their numbers to a 
commanding proportion. ~'fuile the Georgian and Tatar repre-
sentatives spoke out in the Ozakom' sessions for their national 
and political beliefs 1 the Armenians were unhappy with their 
representative, M. Babachanian who spoke.for the minuscule 
18. Republic, p. 12. 
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11 Oadet 11 (Constitutional Democrat) faction of the Armenians,· 
rather than the Nationalists. 
The entire period of the Ozakom represented a series 
ot political frustrations for the Armenians in the Trans-
caucasus. The meeting of the Caucasian Army authorities in 
Tiflis, serving as a revolutionary committee, in early March 
had refused to discuss the national issues, stating that the 
national question must be reserved for the Constitutional 
Convention. The Ozakom, itself unrepresentative and unable 
to enforce its decisions, in turn proved itself unable to 
secure any guarantees for the Armenian national interests.19/ 
In discussions over redrawing the national area boundaries in 
the Transcauoaaus and other issues, it became obvious that the 
Georgians and the Tatars had eome to an agreement, and the 
Armenian people were neglected as an insignificant interest 
in the Ozakom's policies. 
T.he Bolshevik Rebellion, which brought the Bolshevik 
leader Lenin to power in November, 1917, threw the situation 
of Transcaucasia into greater chaos. The autonomous states 
of Transcaucasia refused to accept the authority of the 
Bolsheviks, and the Ozakom continued its unsteady existence. 
The actual governmentt such as it was, rested in the hands ot 
various national councils and political parties, which de-
termined the policies of each area. 
19. Ibid., pp. 15-21. 
In the fall of 1917, the Armenian political parties had 
gathered at Tiflis to elect a National Council to safeguard 
the Armenian nation in the current insecurity. It was agreed 
that half the delegates were t0 be appointed and half 
elected; of the 203 delegates, 112 were members of the Dashnag 
Party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation). Most non-Dashnag 
members were seated by appointment, and it was obvious that 
the Armenian people had given a mandate for their political 
leadership~ In the Constitutional Assembly elections of the 
Russian Empire, which were held at about the same time, the 
Armenians were to elect nine representatives as their quota; 
the Dashnag Party swept this election also, choosing all nine, 
with a popular vote of 558,400, nearly 90% of the Armenian 
votes cast.&Q/ 
Developments in Turkish Armenia 
.. 
Meanwhile, events in the Russian-occupied parts of 
Turkish Armenia moved rapidly. On April 27, 1917, the Pro-
vis~onal Government ot Russia had declared occupied parts of 
Turkish Armenia to be separated trom the government of the 
Cauoasll.S and cU.r~erbly subject to the laws and decisions of 
the provisional government and its military authorities. An 
appointed governor-general was to rule with the advice of a 
citizens' advisory council, and the commissar (governor-
20. Armenian Youth Federation, The A.Y.F. Handbook, p. 30; 
also, Vratzian, .2l2.· _ill., p. 30. 
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general) of Turkish Armenia was to make whatever recommendations 
he and his advisory council found desirable in the provisional 
law of June 5, 1916 for the governing of Turkish Armenia.~ 
By that declaration on the part of the Revolutionary Govern-
ment, the question of Turkish Armenia's future was again to be 
thrown into the arena of international diplomacy, and Russia 
had thus disavowed the solemn promises of an independent state 
in the Six Province area of Turkish Armenia. However, there 
was one hopeful aspect to the decision which caused some 
satisfaction to the Armenian political leaders, that is, that 
the Turkish Armenian area was to be allowed a certain amount 
of autonomy separate from the hostile and unsatisfactory 
political elements in ~ Ozakom; the mutual ethnic bitterness 
prevailing .between Georgian and Tatar leaders on the one hand 
and the Armenian and Russian leaders on the other would have 
promised only further difficulties for Turkish Armenia if that 
area also had been subject to the rule of the Ozako~. 
Armenian survivors had rapidly returned to their hom~s 
in many parts of Turkish Armenia. A consultative council com-
posed in large number of Armenians had been instituted, and, 
under the security provided by the occupying army, Turkish 
Armenia had quickly begun a program of reconstruction which 
. promised .well for 'the future of tb.e area. Relief supplies 
.. 
.!:lad b~en ro·shed to the occupied area by Armenian and Russian 
charities, and the countryside was quickly recuperating from 
21. Republic,·pp. 22-3o 
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the deserted and ravaged condition to which the Turks had 
reduced it. The early hostility between Russian civil and 
military officialdom and the.Armenians, who now were the· 
real rulers of the occupied districts, gradually vanished. 
By the end of l917t over 142,424 Armenian refugees had re-
turned to their homes in Turkish Armenia, and were busy in 
the rebuilding of their villages. Armenian agricultural re-
construction, especially, was a cause of growing Russian 
friendliness toward the Armenians, for the chaotic condition 
of transport in revolutionary Russia had disrupted the food 
supply of the Russian forces in occupation, and they in-
creasingly relied on the Armenian repatriate farmers for food 
stooks.W 
T.he First Western Armenian Assembly 
On May 2, 1917, in the city of Erivan, assembled a 
number ot repatriate and refugee delegates to a genel?al 
assembly of the Western Armenians. T.hat assembly, called 
together to bring about an end to inter-party and inter-ethnic 
troubles and disagreements, was convened at the invitation of 
a special committee set up by the refugees in Tiflis, composed 
ot Aram (the hero of the defense of Van), V. P.apazian, and 
Antranig. The major refugee centers in the Transcaucasus and 
the various important aistricts of occupied Turkish Armenia 
22. Ibid., p. 25. 
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we:roe invited to send delegates; the Transcaucasian re:t"ugees 
were well represented, but a number of the Turkish .Armenian 
delegates cou.lu rtot attend because of transportation and 
other difficulties. In all 85 delegates and guests were 
seated, '15 .from thee occupied distria!ts, 2'7 :from refugee 
centers, 14 :from various associations and groups, 8 from the 
political parties, 3 .from the Tu~kish Armenian press, 6 guests, 
ll advisors, and a representative of .the Catholieos o:f the 
Armenian Church; 64 of these were tully empowered delegates, 
of which only 41 were members of the Dashnak Party, though in 
the occupied area the Dashnak Party was the only functioning 
political group. The remaining 23 delegates were designated 
for the Hunchakian, Ramgavar, and Social Democrat Bolshevik 
Parties' fragments in the refugee centers, for it was desired 
that no opportunity be given for partisanship to obstruct 
national unity in the Turkish Armenian reconstruction. 
The order of business was simple: 1. The present condi-
tion o:f the immigration work; 2. ~he organization of the 
immigration work; 3. Political conditions and the desires of 
the Western Armenians. In the ten days of the assembly, it 
was decided to place all the immigration work under the central 
control of a special body, that body to be a new Council of the 
Western Armenians, with full authority over all other bodies of 
the Turkish Armenians, and solely empmgered to speak. :for the 
' Western Armenian population. Full control over all bodies 
. . ' 
working among the Western Armenians in any way, such as 
1 ')C 
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commerce, orphanages, and repatriation, was given by the 
assembly. The Council was warned, however, not to consider 
itself a political body in pursuing the Armenian Case, but to 
express its beliefs to whatever political or pan-national 
bodies might be set up to pursue such aims. 
It was decided that there be 15 members of the Council, 
with 10 alternate members. Political difficulties arose over 
the election of the members, and it appeared that some persons 
were desirous of disrupting the assembly before such a body 
couldpe chosen. Though the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
was the sole organized party in occupied Turkish Armenia and 
had the ove~Thelming support ot the refugee centers, in the 
interest of national harmony, after several days of intense 
. 
negotiations, it offered a compromise slate of candidates, 
which was unanimously approved; eight were Dasbnaks, seven non-
Dasbnaks. From those fifteen were chosen a "bureau," or 
central executive body, of.five, who were to act as the supreme 
cabinet of the Western Arme~ians, maintaining in fact branches 
and subordinate bodies capable of taking over as the actual 
government on the liberation of Turkish Armenia from foreign 
rule. The members of the Bureau were Vahan Papazian, Ardag 
Ta.rpinian, H. Der-Zakarian, Garo Sassouni, and H. Kaligian. 
Shortly after, the Bureau created a unified central relief body 
whiah brought in the representatives of the major charities, 
the Caucasian Armenian Benevolent Union, the Armenian Agri-
cultural Union, the Brotherly Aid Committee, the Refugees' 
1 ')7 
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Central Committee~ T.he only major group which failed to Join 
the new Central Body was the Moscow Armenian Committee, which 
continued to work independently.~ 
The Clarifi.oation of Western Armenia 1 s Status 
Unsatisfied by the indefinite attitude of the Provisional 
Government toward the Turkish Armenian provinces, the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation sent its brilliant member Doctor 
Zavriev (Zavrian) to Petrograd to bring about a clarification 
of the Armenian status in the occupied areas. Zavriev, in 
extensive conversations with Kerensky, completely succeeded in 
his m~ion and the previously referred to April declaration of 
the Provisional Government was a result of his efforts; in 
that declaration, as well as in the promises given to Zavriev 
by the Kerensky government, it was made plain that Turkish 
Armenia was to be consi4ered an indivisible state separate 
from the Tranacaucasian administration. General Aver+aov was 
appointed governor-general, with Dr. Zavriev as hi,s assistant .. 
Administratively, four p.rovince·s wer~ set up~ Trebizond, 
Erzeroum, Daren, and Vasbouragan. While numbers of Russian 
officials of the occupied areas enjoyed life in Tiflis, sub-
ordinates carried over from the Tsarist regime continued to . 
govern in Turkish Armenia;·l917 was a year of gradual weeding-
out of the old officialdom, and Turkish Armenia became more 
23. See Sassouni, pp. 136-140, and Republic, pp. 25~28 for 
discussions of the Assembly and its work. 
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and more Armenian-ruled. Progress in Armenianization in 
Trebizond and Erzeroum was slow, but by mid-summer of 1917 
both Daron and Vasbouragan were nearly completely Armenian in 
administration. The October Revolution of the Bolsheviks 
threw the orderly progress of Turkish Armenia into turmoil. 
Russian officials deserted Turkish Armenia for the relative 
safety of Tiflis, while dissatisfaction among the troops grew 
apace. The Armenians called on the youth of Transcaucasia to 
move west to save their fatherland. During the months of 
November, December, and January, while Russian troops deserted 
the front, numbers of Armenians rushed in to salvage the 
nation.W 
The Collapse of the Russian Army 
As on other fronts, the Russian army was badly infected 
with the defeatism spread by the Bolshevik agents. The short 
slogans of Lenin had a particular attra~tion tor the ordinary 
Russian soldier, homesick and contused as to the purpose of 
the war. "Down with War! Soldiers toward their homes!" were 
as prevalent on the lips of the soldiers of the Russian 
occupation forces as on any other front, and no force on earth 
could have stopped the complete disintegration of the Russian 
army in Turkey when news of the Bolshevik Revolution reached 
the Turkish Armenian provinces. The half million occupation 
and supply forces of the Russians disappeared from Turkey 
24. Sassouni, pp. 141-3. 
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and the Oaucasus in a disorder1y rush during November and 
December of 1917, leaving ruins behind them as they stripped 
homes of wood and ransacked the coutryside for food. The un-
expected catastrophe placed the entire existence of the 
Armenian nation in jeopardy, and threw the improving situation 
into chaos. 
fhe Georgian and Tatar areas of the Transcaucasus were 
jubilant, quickly seizing great stores of Russian arms and 
wealth; the railroad town of Shamkhor witnessed bloody mass-
-acres of.homeward bound Russian troops by Tatar irregulars in 
search of arms which would render them a dominant force in the 
Transeaucasus. 25/ The Armenians alone continued to entertain 
friendl.y sentiments toward the Russians, and alone refused to 
tale advantage of the Russian troops. The military stores at 
Kars, Alexandropol, and Erivan were seized by the Armenians 
for the purposes of self-defense when it was obvious that no 
hope remained for the re-organization of the Russian army. 
The Georgians and Tatars knew their policy and followed it 
unhesitatingly; the Armenians, on the other h&nd, were unsure 
which way to turn, and so placed their faith in the weak 
protection afforded by a Federation of the three Transeaucas1an 
peoples. To make matters worse, most of the Armenian national 
organizations and institutions were in Baku and T1fl1s 1 
separated from Russian Armenia_. Thus, the Bolshevik call to 
25. Vardges Aharonian, "On a Recent Work on Transcaucasia;" 
Armenian Review, No. 31, September, 1956, p. 50. 
the troops to desert the Caucasian Front while the pitiful 
surrender of Brest-Litovsk was being negotiated, meant an 
abandonment of Turkish Armenia and the exposure ot the 
Caucasian Armenian population to the criminal Turkish policy 
of genocide. It is significant that, in the course of wooing 
the small nations for a general class war, Lenin himself 
spoke strongly in favor of the right of Armenia to inde-
pendence in December, 1917, while surrendering Kars Province 
to the Turks in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.W 
. Preparations for \far or Peace 
While this is not the place for a detailed history of 
international diplomacy or a complete account of the desertion 
of Turkish Armenia, a brief sketch of the events which brought 
about the loss of the Western Armenian districts is essential 
for understanding subsequent Armenian attitudes and events. 
The Transcauoasian administration had refused to accept the 
Bolshevik Revolution, and was acting as the government of 
Transcaucasia, though not so empowered formally. T.he Tatars 
were 'openly siding with the Turks, who spoke a similar 
language, had a similar religion, and for years had propa-
gandized the idea of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islam among the 
Caucasian Tatars through numerous agents. Georgia was de-
termined to create a great new Georgian independent state, 
26. Atamian, p. 204. 
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believing that German and Turkish support might prove very 
helpful to that end; the Georgians especially sought German 
protection, for Germany, as an ally of Turkey and a power, 
could be counted on to protect Georgian interests against 
Turkish des~res if the Turks should prove rapacious. Armenia, 
already heavily committed to an Allied victory and convinced 
that only Allied success could rescue the remnants of the 
Armenian people from extinction and restore the Armenian 
people to the Armenian land, could find no common language 
with the Tatars, while friendship with the Georgians, highly 
desired, foundered on the shoals ot divergent national orient-
ation and dispute over rule of border areas. 
In November, 1917, the commander of the Russian army of 
the Gaucasus had ·received a letter from Ferid Vehib Pasha, the 
commander of the Turkish Third Army, requesting an armisticej 
at this time, the Turkish army was demoralized, terribly 
weakened, and on the verge of collapse. With the approval of 
the Russian revolutionary center and command, the Ozakom sent 
a committee of negotiation, which drew up articles of armi-
stice whioh were signed in Erznga (Erzindjan) on December:5, 
1917. In a. letter on January 1, ~918, General Odishelitze, the 
Georgian commander of the Caucasian army, was asked by Vehib 
Pasha on what terms the Transcaucasian government would re-
establish peaceful relations with the Turkish state. On 
January 15, 1918, Vehib Pasha again wrote, stating that the 
Brest-Litovsk signatories were prepared to receive diplomatic 
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representatives from the Transoaucasian government and to 
recognize its independence. On february 3rd, the Transcaucasian-
government informed Vehib Pasha that the Transoaucasus was pre-
pared to enter a peace conference with Turkey; 271 while the 
Transcaucasian government was preparing to negotiate peace, _the 
Turkish Armenians were preparing for the defense of 'the liber-
ated parts of Turkish Armenia. 
In the city of Tiflis, the Western Armenian Bureau called 
a conference during the first week of December, 1917, to dis-
cuss the protection of Turkish Armenia and its population. 
Compulsory military service of Turkish Armenians was decided, 
with the hope of securing a force of 20,000 to protect the 
liberated area. An eight man committee of Safety was elected, 
with broad military and political powers; composed of four 
Dashnaktsagan members, three Ra.mgavar, and one Runchakian, 
that body was of such a nature that all Turkish Armenians, 
regardless of partisan feelings could cooperate freely in the 
national defense. The famed revolutionary leader Antran1g, 
now made a general of the Russian army, was placed in command 
of the forces of' the Western Armenians. While the conference 
was still in' session, Armenian bands in Khnous, Moush, 
Malazgerd, Van, and Erznga had taken possession of the Russian 
arms left behind by the withdrawing Russians, and had, in 
27. Republic, pp~ 4~-48, discusses the negotiations in 
detailo 
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tact, become the military forces of Turkish Armenia. &W 
Armenian battalions were established and stationed at 
.Akhlat, Alashgerd, and Khnous, while the battalions of Sebouh 
and Mourad, aided by mixed forces of Russian Armenians and 
Turkish Armenians, held the sensitive Papert-Erznga front. 
In the short space of one month, the committee made feverish 
efforts to organize respectable military forces to withstand 
the expected Turkish attack, tor it was known that Turktsh 
forces in the Erznga area were being greatly strengthened. 
Armeno-Turkish War of 1918 
Before the efforts of the Committee of Safety could bear 
much fruit, and while negotiations for peace were under way, 
the Turkish army began a series of offensives in the expectation 
I 
that no serious resistance would be forthcoming because of the 
collapse of the Russian armies. The first major skirmishes 
were fought in January, 1918, while a few weak clashes had 
occurred in November and December, 1917, before the Turkish 
forces had been strengthened. The Turkish forces were playing 
a double game. While pretending a desire for negotiation of 
peace with the Transcaucasian government, they hoped to so en-
mesh the Oaucasian Armenians in the frustrations of federation 
politics that it would be impossible for the Armenian people 
28o Sassouni, PP• 143-152, relates the efforts of the Oommittee 
of Safety, of which he was a leading member~ 
to stand unitedly and forcefully against the occupation of 
the Turkish Armenian provinces. The Committee of Safety sought 
to neutralize the Turks and Kurds of the occupied areas by a 
guarantee of proper-ty and safety. The barbaric passions which 
had been roused by the Itiihadists during the genocide could 
not be stilled so readily~ even_when the crimes were overlooked 
by the victims and it proved impossible to reduce the hostility 
of the local Moslems. 
On February 7, 1918, the Committee of Safety called.a 
conference of Kurdish leaders at Khnous, to try to bring about 
the much sought for Armeno-Kurdish alliancee Thirty-five 
leading Kurdish figures were present, but the Kurds could not 
be convinced, despite their hatred of the Turks, that it was 
possible for Armenian and Kurd to cooperate. That meeting 
awoke the Armenian leaders to the fact that the Kurds were even 
more unreliable than had previously been thought, and a policy 
of active punishment of villages involved in attacks along the 
highways was begun. Meanwhile, Sebouh and Mourad were forced 
to take drastic action against Turkish irregular attacks be-
hind the Armenian lines in the Erznga-Erzrou.m area·~ No mass-
acres of Moslems by Armenians had yet occurred, but it was 
apparent that the Moslems had not given up their genocidal 
tendency, and the patience of some of the Armenian repatriates 
was apparently growing a little thin in the face of the 
threatened total. annihilation of the Turkish Armenians.~ 
29. Sassouni, pp. 155-8. 
While Lenin gratuitously decreed the independenee of 
Turkish Armenia on January 3, l918 as justification for the 
withdrawal of the Russian armies from the oecupied area, the 
Turkish forces had already begun to advance into the lightly-
held northern part of Turkish Armenia.30/ Though Sebouh and 
Mourad fought desperately with all thei~ men against the 
Turkish army, now outnumbering the Armenian forces by better 
than three to one, they were forced to give ground. Erznga 
was lost on January 30, and Papert fell to the Turks on 
February 4th.~ The Armenian military forces shielded the 
population as they fled through the severe winter weather 
toward Erzeroum. That evacuation of Upper Armenia was a new 
tragedy, as many suffered death !~om the cold or were ambushed 
by the local Moslems. In rage, the Armenian refugees turned 
on whatever Moslem villages they passed, and a two-sided 
massacre continued until the Armenians, greatly depleted in 
numbers, reached Erzeroum and temporary shelter.321 With all 
Turkish Arm~nia endangered anew, the hapless Armenian population 
began to flee again toward Transcaucasia. General Antranig 
collected all his available forces and hastened to Erzeroum. 
While both f'orces were preparing for a battle at that city, 
30. Ibid., pp. 160-1. 
31"' .Ib~d., pp. 161-2. 
32. Republic, pp. 71-3. 
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two Turkish columns tried to smash the lines in the direction 
of Daron and Van, but the Armenian forces_in the southern 
districts stood fir~, smashing every attempt of the Turks 
until February 27, when they were ordered to withdraw because 
of developments in the north. The total Armenian troops, 
regular or irregular, numbered from ten to twelve thousand 
before Erzeroum, as against some fifty to sixty thousand in 
the attacking Turkish army. On February 25th, the Turks 
delivered an ultimatum calling on the Transcaucasian government 
to vacate all the lands surrendered under the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, but the Armenians stood firm and rejected the demands 
of the Turks. 
In a bitterly fought battle, the superior numbers and 
military training of the Turks proved decisive, and Erzeroum 
fell on February 27, endangering all the Armenian forces in 
Turkish Armenia. With local Moslems in the rear rising to cut 
the road of retreat, the Armenian forces fought their way back-
ward stubbornly, protecting the civilian refugees along the 
way. From Erzeroum, the retreat reached to Sarikamish and 
halted at Kars. From the southern districts,. the Armenian 
civilian population, defended by slim force's against the Moslem 
irregulars, fled toward Igdir and Mount Ararat.~ 
33. Ibid., pp. 6?-76, and Sassouni, pp. 161-4, for accounts 
of the military operations to the defeat at Erzeroum. 
The Trebizond Conference 
While they scored such encouraging successes on the 
military front, the Turks did not forsake the diplomatic 
front, but increased their pressure on the Armenians through 
negotiation with the Transcaucasian government. After the 
success at Erz.eroum on February 27th, the Turks began a great 
diplomatic effort to destroy the morale of the Caucasian 
Armenians. They very cleverly involved the Caucasian Armenians 
in Transcaucasian Confederation politics and hostilities. The 
Georgians, who had failed to provide troops to hold tpe line 
Gumush Khaneh to Trebizond as promised following the evacuation 
of the Russians, a failure which had exposed the entire northern 
part of the front to Turkish arms, were, in fact, desirous of 
preventing the Turks from entering the Transcaucasus,~ but 
their narrow view of national interests had led them to con-
centrate their :forces on the Georgian borders, while Armenian 
interests required a general defense on all fronts. 
On March 26, 19181 the Beym of the Transcaucasian Con-
federation gave Cbkhenkel1 plenipotentiary powers to negotiate 
a peace. At the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Committee, 
on April 5th, it was announced that Transcaucasia was ready 
to oede to Turkey all the Olti district, the southern part of 
Ardahan District, the southwestern part of Kars, and the 
34. Dr. G. Pasdermadjian, Why Armenia Should Be Free,. pp. 35-
36. 
western part of the Kaghizvan district, and, at the same time, 
was willing to negotiate a permanent solution of the Turkish 
Armenian question by treating the problem as one of return of 
the Armenians to their homes in Turkey under satisfactory 
guarantees of personal safety.££/ This, of course, amounted 
to a complete betrayal of the.promises made to the Armenians 
and of their interests; it was motivated solely by a desire on 
the part of the Georgians to keep Turkish armies away from the 
Georgian-inhabited districts. Even that, however, appeared 
too pro-Armenian to the Turks, who flatly refused to even 
discuss return of Armenians or security tor Caucasian Armenian 
districts. On April 6th, the Turks replied that the terms of 
Brest-Litovsk must be accepted and that Transcaucasia must 
declare its independence. In response to that ultimatum, the 
Transcaucasian Confederation was prepared to surrender even 
more land, but still hesitated to relinquish all claims to 
Kars Province and Batoum, as granted to Turkey by the 
Bolsheviks in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. On April 14, 
Gegechkori, the President of the Ozakom, ordered the Trans-
caucasian delegation to return to Tiflis, but Cbkhenkeli 
announced to Reout, the head of the Turkish delegation, that 
this was for consultation, not a termination of negotiations. 
35. Republic, pp. 77-78. 
The Turco-Georgian War 
On April 13, with the resistance against the Turkish 
army of more than 100,000 regulars crumbling, the Seym met in 
emergency session in Tiflis. Gegechkori informed the deputies 
that the Turkish army had again begun hostilities in front of 
Batoum; he declared that acceptance of the terms of Brest-
Litovsk would render the independence of Transcaucasia 
illusory, and that Transcaucasia would become a part of the 
Turkish Empire, if those therms should be accepted. Georgian 
speakers w~ned that Turkish imperialism and "internal be~ 
trayals 11 (referring solely to the danger from the Tatars) 
could end democracy and freedom for Transcaucasiao T.he Musavat 
Party representatives spoke out· openly in favor of Turkey, 
stating that the Moslems of Transcaucasia would not war against 
their co-religionists, but would retain ttneutrality.n361 W'ith 
such division, it was impossible for Transcauc.asia to do more 
than issue a general call to arms. T.he Georgians had found a 
common interest with the Armenians for the moment, for neither 
could afford a Turkish advance into Transcaucasia. 
Scarcely had war measures been approved when news arrived 
on April 14 that Batoum had been taken without resistance, for 
the Georgian troops fled to Khodjabahar or were taken prisoners 
in large numbers. At the same time, it became obvious that the 
36. Republic, pp. 78-82 gives a detailed description of the 
events in the Seym, including the text of the Call to Arms. 
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entire Moslem part of the population of Adjaria and Akhaltsikhe 
along the pre-war Russo-Turkish border had risen in support of 
the Turks. T.he Georgian people did not support the Trans-
caucasian government with arms, and the morale of the Georgian 
troops vanished, despite a minor victory near Cholok, as the 
Turks continued to drive deep into Guria against little re-
sistance, reaching Ozurgeti very soon after the start of the 
offensive.§21 With the collapse of the Georgian army, the 
Georgian leaders placed their country officially under German 
protection, 381 and. the Turkish ad.vance halted. The Armenians 
were again alone, now facing a greatly increased Turkish army 
and many thousands of marauding Caucasian Moslem irregulars. 
The Armenian Congress 
The members of the Armenian National Council, after the 
fall of Erzeroum, had gone to the front to encourage the 
soldiers, whose morale was waning. At Alexandropol, Kars, and 
Sarikamish, they consulted with the representatives of the 
ordinary soldiers, as well as with the higher officers, and 
raised the morale noticeably. The loss of' Sarikamish was ex-
pected, but the Armenian troops stiffened their resistance as 
the battle perimeter shortened toward Kars, where General 
Nazarbekian had a number of troops. On April 20th and 21st, 
the entire Armenian people were represented at a pan-national 
37. Ibid., p. 83. 
38. Pasdermadjian, p. 36. 
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congress, in which participated the Armenian National Council, 
the Committee o~ Safety, the Seym deputies, the Trebizond 
peace conference representatives, representatives of the 
political parties, of Alexandropol~ Erivan, and Kars cities, 
of the army, of various organizations, and outstanding public 
figures, including General Nazarbekian, General Silikian, Aram, 
Dro, and many others.. This was the most representative 
Armenian assembly since the fall of 1917, and it spoke for the 
whole Armenian people. With the grim netf'S of Georgian ma-
neuverings to desert the aims of the Confederation, the congress 
was faced with serious problems. It was too late to salvage 
the situation of Georgia, for the Georgians had ended their war 
with Turkey and had agreed to declare the independance of the 
Transcaucasus and acceptance of Brest-Litovsk. The Assembly 
faced a choice between isolated death of the Armenian nation 
at the hands of the Turkish army and the surrounding Moslem 
populace or continuance of a tie with Armenia 1 s neighbors, 
though the cost be the surrender of Turkish Armenia's claims 
and rights and one-third of Russian Armenia. As the lesser of 
two evils, it was decided to take part in the new Transoaucasian 
Republic. Some participants in the assembly desired Armenia 
to become allied with the Bolsheviks, for Lenin, they stated, 
had proclaimed the independence of Armenia, and the Bolsheviks 
were prepared to guarantee Armenia's existenee.39/ 
39. Republic, pp. 83-5. 
Independent Transaaucasia 
The twenty-second session of the Seym met on April 22, 
1918 in Tiflis; the atmosphere was thiak with gloom on the 
part of the Armenian and Georgian deputies as the subject of 
independence was brought forward. The resolution was defended 
by the initiating Mensheviks, but their position was exposed 
mercilessly by the Russian Semeonov and Social-Revolutionary 
deputy L. Toumanian. Only a part of the Georgian nationalists 
and the Tatar Mussavat Party deputies :felt any cheer, for these 
latter welcomed the tie with Turkey and Germany. 1f.hen dis-
cussion was ended, the Seym passed the following resolution: 
"The Transcaucasian Seym has decided to proclaim the Trans-
caucasus a democratic, federative republic." After hearing 
the report of the Trebizond negotiators, by previous aonsult-
ation of the parties presented without discussion, the Seym 
accepted the resignation of the Gegeohkori government and en-
trusted the :formation of a new government to Ohkhenkeli, whose 
partisan maneuverings had caused the abandonment of the pro-. 
Allied Oonfederation~1Q/ 
The Loss of Kars 
The Turkish advance had been held up after Sarikamish by 
an increasing Armenian resistance as more Armenian forces 
reached the front from reserve areas; at the same time, the 
40. Ibid., PP• 84-7. 
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forces withdrawi~g from Khnous, Moush, and Akhlat had halted 
temporarily on the Alashgerd Plain, and the military forces of 
Van were only just beginning a general withdrawal. 41/ During 
the period of negotiation and the short-lived Turco-Georgian 
"war," more an advance against token resistance, Turkish army 
levies were diYerted from the Palestine Front to reinforce the 
Turkish forces on the Caucasian Front.~ Delayed till April 
22nd in reaching Kars by the rearguard skirmishes of the 
Armenians, the Turks attacked in strength on that date, ex-
pecting to sweep Armenian resistance before them. For four 
days, the Armenians repulsed the Turks in bloody battles, the 
outcome of which was determined by the artillery mounted in 
the Kars forts. 431 Chkhenkeli, acting without the knowledge or 
approval of the Transcaucasian high command, of the Seym, or 
even of his cabinet, meanwhile negotiated with the Turks to 
secure maximum advantage for the Georgians in the current situ-
ation; in return for a pledge of the return to Georgia of the 
important port and naval station of Batoum, he made secret 
commitments to deliver Kars to the Turks without the necessity 
41. Sassoun1, pp. 164-5. 
42. Gibbons, p. 136, quotes testimony of von Ludendorff and 
von Sanders on the withdrawing of troops from the Palestine 
Front. 
43. Pasdermadjian, P~ 36. 
for taking it by storm. 441 When the Turks had actually reached 
the environs of the city, ankhenkeli sent telegrams urging 
~ediate cease-fire negotiations, as the government had 
decided to make peace with Turkey and an armistice had been 
agreed to. Sent on his own initiative, the news of an armistice 
caused a sharp drop in the morale of the troops, for it seemed 
senseless to die if Turkey and Transcaucasia had, in fact, al-
ready agreed to peace. Thus, at a crucial moment, the Trans-
caucasian army at Kars, nearly all Armenian, with some Russian 
remnants·from the former Imperial army, began to disintegrate 
as a fighting force. 
While the Armenian troops had fought fiercely for four 
days, they were in doubt as to what purpose their fighting was 
serving. On the night of April 24th, General Nazarbekian re-
ceived orders from th~ high command of Transcaucasia to accept 
the aease-fi~e conditions of the Turks and yield the torts. 
T.ne Transcaucasian army withdrew from Kars, together with the 
civilian population, after burning the better buildings in the 
city, and, despite the acceptance of all the TurKish conditions, 
had to fight its way to the Akhourian River. The Turkish 
forces entered Kars· in the evening of April 25, and treated 
44. Ibid., pp. 36-37, and !iepublic, pp. 88-92, give detailed 
accounts of Obkhenkeli 1 s betralal of the military forces at 
Kars. T.he loss of Kars, in light of the facts recounted, must 
be ascribed to the Cbkhenkeli Menshevik nationalists, rather 
than to failures of military leaders. 
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the city to the sight of a typically Turkish victory oele-
brationt With all its attending barbarities.~ It is unknown 
how many persons were tortured, killed, or raped, or how much 
loot was seized, but, \ :.fortunately, the major part of the 
Armenian inhabitants had succeeded in escaping with the army. 
The commitments which Chkhenkeli had believed the Turks to have 
made were riot respected, and when the Armenian army crossed the 
Akhourian River in accordance with the orders of the high 
command, on April 28th, the political life of Transcaucasia 
was in turmoil. 
The New Peace Conference at Batoum 
The news of the occurrences at Kars had caused deep pertur-
bation among the Georgians and Armenians. The Armenian National 
Council called an emergency meeting.. Leading persons contacted 
General Nazarbekian to urge a complete defense of Kars, but 
Nazarbekian was forced to answer that it was too latet and the 
turmoil grew. The Seym and the newly-organized government had 
stormy sessions, with A. Aharonian, Kaohaznouni, and Khatissian, 
the Dashnag ministers, furiously protesting Ohkhenkeli 1s il-
legal methods. The Dashnak ministers resigned, and the 
Dashnaktzoutyoun publicly branded Cbkhenkeli a traitor and de-
manded his resignation. The Georgian Social Democrats through 
45. of. R~publio, pp. 90-93, Sassouni, p. 165, and 
PasdermadJian, pp. 36-37 for the military events of the Kars 
defense and withdrawal. 
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Jordania and Tseretelli expressed their regrets over the un-
fortunate happenings and blamed Ohkhenkeli, but announced 
that they would withdraw Chkhenkeli 1 s candidacy only if an 
Armenian, such as Kachaznouni, would become Premier; in 
effect, that meant the end of the Transcaucasian Republic 
under the present circumstances. Still hoping to retain at 
least the Georgians as non-hostile neighbors, the leaders of 
the Dashnaktzoutyoun permitted themselves to accept 
Obkhenkeli as the head of government, rather than see the 
Transcaucasian Republic die. 
• 
A new peace mission was organized, with the following 
members: A. Cbkhenkeli, president; N. N~~latse; A. Khatissian; 
H. Kachaznouni; M. Gachinsky; Khan-Khoysky; tog~ther with a 
number of assiStants. On May 6th, they arrived in Batoum, 
and on May 11 began the peace conference. On the Turkish side 
were Khalil, Vehib Pasha, Nousret Bey, Orkhan Bey, and others, 
while General von Lossow, Count Schulenburg, and 0. von 
Wesendonok represented Germany. At the very start, the 
question of the representation of the Mountain Republic of 
the Caucasus arose, and it was finally agreed that Haidar Beg 
Bammad be admitted as the representative of the Mountaineers. 
At the beginning of the actual negotiations, ankhenkeli set 
forth the proposition that the negotiations be based on Brest-
Litovak, "which was acceptable," but Khalil immediately re-
jected that position, for, he contended, since the end of the 
Trebizond Conference had occurred a war between Turkey and 
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Transcaucasia, blood had been shed, and, therefore, Turkey had 
the right to make new demands, and, in order that "negotia-
tions not be delayed," he gave to ankhenkeli an already pre-
pared" treaty of peace and friendship between Turkey and the 
Transcaucasian Republic," which, in effect, was an ultimatum. 
Of the terms of that proposed treaty, embodied in twelve 
articles and three appendices, it can only be said that it 
meant the end of any progress and freedom in the Transoaucasus. 
Georgia and Armenia, especially the latter, were to be par-
ticularly weakened, Georgia losing the entire Batoum coastal 
area and Akhalts1khe, while Armenia was to be reduced to an 
insignificant corner of mountainous land incapable of either 
agricultural or commerical life. The Alexandropol-Kars and 
Alexandropol-Djoulfa railroads, on which Armenian economy de-
pended were to be in Turkish hands, as also Akhalkalak, 
Alexandropol, the major parts of Shirak and Etchmiadzin 
Districts, and Sourmalou; Thus, Turkey would have.ended the 
ability of the Transcaucasian states to retain any but a 
shadow autonomy, while securing a land bridge. through Kars-
Sourmalou-Nakhitchevan-Zangezour-Gharabagh to Persian and 
Russian Azerbaidjans and Baku, and, in time, to the Trans-
Caspian lands. The Pan-Turanian dream was to be realized, if 
the Turks had their wa:y. 
The Turkish demands astounded not only the Armenians and 
Georgian representatives, .but also the Germans, who immediately 
communicated with Berlin on May 12th, warning that Turkey had 
gone far beyond the terms of Brest-Litovsk, had demanded purely 
Armenian territories, planned to exterminate the Armenians in 
Transcaucasia, and, despite von Lossow 1 s protest, claiming his 
permission, had ordered their troops to Alexandropol to occupy 
the Alexandropol-Djoul!a rail 11ne.1§1 
A New Turkish Offensive 
While a mixed military committee argued this latter de-
mand, against the stubborn refusal of Generals Odishe1itze and 
Ghorghanian to agree to such a proposal which could only be 
accepted by a higher authority, and permitted only by terms in 
a peace treaty, the Turks presented an ultimatum to the 
Armenian forces to vacate Alexandropol and move 25 kilometers 
eastward, turning over the city by seven o'clock in the morning 
of May 15th. Without waiting for an answer, at two in the 
morning of May 15th the Turkish Army opened a general attack, 
and demanded evacuatl.on of the city by 6 A.M. The Armenian 
army caught by surprise retreated rapidly, and Alexandropol 
fell to the Turks. On the instructions of General Nazarbekian, 
the Armenian army split into two columns, one retreating toward 
Geok-Yoghoush-Bekeand-Avdibek-Pamb villages, the other moved 
toward Sardarabad to strengthen the Erivan forces. General 
Antranig, who since May first had been in the Akhalkalak area 
46. Republic, pp .. 93...:96, gives a careful account of the !orm-
ation and activity of the new peace mission, as well as the 
occurences at the Batoum Peace Conference. 
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with his troops, was ordered to protect the Northern districts, 
but he retired to Djalal-Oghli, refusing to obey orders sent 
him. 
By May 22nd the Turkish Army had reached Hamamlou 
station, which opened the way to Erivan. Furious efforts were 
made by the Armenians to strengthen the front; Dro was sent to 
Bash Abaran and General Nazarbekian appealed to the patriotism 
of the Armenian troops to protect the remnent of the nation-
~e retreat of the Armenian forces halted. On November 24th 
a series of Armenian counterattacks began on the Erivan front, 
while a bitter battle was ragi~g at Gharakilisse in which the 
Armenians were successful. The badly defeated Turks withdrew 
toward Hamamlou. Armenian successes against the greatly 
superior Turkish forces continued during tlle next few days, as 
the Turks r~ceived great losses and witnessed the shattering 
of their carefully laid plans.. On May 25th and 26th occurred 
new bloody encounters in which the Turkish_retreat was ac-
celerated~ Receiving reinforcements and new artillery on May 
27th, the Turks attempted to counterattack. On May 28th, the 
Armenian forces smashed the right wing and penetrated the 
center of the Turkish lines. T.he great victory of Gharakilissa 
created unprecedented enthusiasmo At the same time, great 
battles were raging at Bashabaran and Sardarabad, in which the 
Armenian forces were similarly successfu1. 47/ 
47. For accounts of military activities, see Congress, pp. 4 
and 5; Republic, pp. 96-7 and 117-123; Pa~dermadjian, p. 37; 
Gibbons, p. 136. 
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Internal Difficulties 
While the Armenian nation was fighting for its life at 
Bash Abaran, Gharakilissa, and Sardarabad, difficulties faced 
Armenia within. The Turkish Armenian General Antranig had 
refused to obey orders from General Nazarbekian, and had ex-
posed Northern Armenia to possible Turkish attack by with-
drawing his forces, first to Djalal Ogli, then to Dilijan, 
which he reached on May 30th. At the same time, while the 
Armenians had been fighting the invading Turks, the Moslems of 
various sections of Russian Armenia had risen to cut communi-
cations and massacre and loot Armenian villages. On May 22nd, 
the Transcaucasian government decided to send mixed commissions 
of Dashnak and Mussavat members to particular trouble spots. 
It was, unfortunately, impossible to restrain the fury of the 
Armenians· betrayed at a critical moment by their neighbors. 
Against the massacres and robbery of the Tatars arose a storm 
of revenie, and a number of Moslem villages suffered heavily 
in turn. 481 
48. ~· Republic, pp. 97-116, tor a clear discussion ot the 
tangled hostilities and unneighborly relations between the 
Caucasian Moslems and the Armenians, not only in Russian 
Armenia, but throughout the entire Caucasus. T.hat Turkish 
Pan-Turanian, Pan-Islamic propagandists and agents were behind 
the civil troubles is recognized. 
The End of Transcaucasia As a Republic 
-gr.:l 
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While the Armenians were forging notable victories 
against the Turks during May, the negotiations at Batoum had 
proved fruitless for the Turkso On May 26th the ~rkish 
delegation presented an ultimatum to force its harsh terms 
on Transcaucasia before the outcome of the battle if possible. 
The same day a Georgian representative at the Seym proposed 
the dissolution of the Republic. The Georgian National 
Council declared the independence of Georgia, with Azerbaijan 
following that action the following day. On May 28th, the 
Armenian National Council, as a natural outgrowth of the pre-
ceding events, likewise declared the independence of the 
Armenian areas of Transcaucasia. 49/ Turkish troops still 
threatened the land, and were in occupation of Kars District 
and the Alexandropol area, but the wave of enthusiasm which 
had arisen from the ·defeats inflicted on the Turkish forces 
raised the national morale to an unprecedentedly high point; 
the Armenians were now determined that their future should be 
determined by the.·Armenians alone. 
On May 30, 1918, in Batoum the peace negotiators of 
Turkey and of the now independent Transcaucasian republics of 
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaidjan reassembled. The Armenian 
delegates were not formally the representatives of a republic 
in fact, for Alexander Khatissian, M. Babachanian, and H. 
49. Congress, p. 5. 
Kachaznouni had been selected by the Armenian National Council 
on its own authority on May 28th, while meetings between the 
various responsible Armenian bodies were yet to take place on 
May 29th, with no formal proclamation being· issued by any body 
until May 30. The May 30 Proclamation of the Armenian National 
Council did not, even then, use the term independence, for the 
Armenians felt that Armenia's unitary and de jure independence 
could only take place at the end of the war, when the promises 
made extensively by all the Allied nations would become a 
reality. However, the consultative meetings of May 29th had 
agreed to the establishment of Eri van as the capital of 
Armenia, and the acceptance on May 28th of the Turkish conditions 
for further negotiation at Batoum was in fact a declaration of 
Armenian independence. The Turkish emissaries, pursuing a long 
range plan of "divide and rule," insisted on "national inde-
pendence11 of the Transcaucasian peoples as the only basis tor 
t 50/ fur her negotiations. 
The Batoum Treaty 
When the Armenian delegates began to discuss terms with 
the Turks, on May 30, the situation of the Turkish army was 
not as favorable as it had been before the break~up of the 
Transcaucasian Federative Republic, for the Armenians had 
succeeded in smashing the three-pronged Turkish offensive with 
50. Republic, pp. 130-2. 
153 
heavy losses to the Turks~ and only one major military threat 
continued~ that around Alexandropol, where Turkish forces were 
preparing for a new offensive. With Turkish reinforcement, 
however, the entire front could become bighly dangerous again, 
for Armenia had less than twenty thousand troops ready for 
combat, a number which, no matter how fiercely the Armenian 
army fought, could be overwhelmed~ exposing the remaining 
Armenian people to extermination. Under such circumstances, 
at the very time that the order had been issued by General 
Silikian to counterattack and drive the Turks from the Alex-
andropol area,211 the .delegations at Batoum affixed their 
signatures to a preliminary peace treaty, on June 4th.Qg/ 
In that treaty, binding until conclusion of a final peace 
conference to be held in Constantinople later in June, the 
Armenians were secured against annihilation at the hands of the 
Turkish army, but at a heavy cost. 531 T.he Peace and Friendship 
Treaty of Batoum was no act of charity, for though Turkey thus 
became the first to recognize the independence Of Armenia, the 
latter republic was limited to a mere 12~000 square miles 
(Vratzian, in a rare slip, says square kilometers!), with 
nearly one million inhabitants, including the refugees. And, 
51. Congress, p. 5. 
52. Oddly, Gibbons, p. 137 and Pasdermadjian, p. 37~ give the 
date as June 14, 1918, while Sassouni, p. 165, gives June 5, 1918. 
Republic, p. 132 and Congress, p. 5 agree on June 4, 1918. 
53. of. Republic~ pp. 132-4; ~- Appendix of Documents, this 
manuscript. 
a scant seven kilometers from the capital city Erivan, Turkish 
artillery watched over the new state! On the 32,000 square 
kilometers granted to the Armenians were to found only one-
third of the Armenian population of Trensoauoasia;§!/ of 
Russian Armenia's territory of slightly over 25,000 square 
miles, less than half had been left to the Armenians, the rest 
being allotted to Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan. 
Armenia, after four years of heroic fighting on the side 
of the Allies, was forced by her heavy losses and the threat 
o~ annihilation to make peace with the Central Powers. On 
June 19, 1918, the ratification Congress of Constantinople 
brought together the empowered representatives of Georgia, 
Azerbaidjan, Armenia, Turkey, Germany, and Austria. Armenia's 
representatives were headed by Alexander Khatissian, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Avedis Aharonian, the 
President of the Armenian National Council. While a prelimi-
nary set of cond_itions had. been accepted at the Batoum armi-
stice, the final wording of the actual treaty was agreed on in 
the Congress of Constantinopleo The unjust terms imposed on 
Armenia by the Central Powers, of course, were no more binding 
after the defeat of the Central Powers than was the Roumanian 
Treaty of a few months earlier. T.he Armenians of Trans-
caucasian districts arbitrarily assigned to Georgia and 
Azerbaidjan refused to accept severance from the Armenian 
54. Pasdermadjian, p. 38. 
155 
state 1 and continued to fight against incorporation in any 
but an Armenian state. At the same time, the Armenians of 
Van had continued to occupy much of that area of Turkish 
Armenia, fighting off all the attempts of the Turks to dis-
lodge them. Cut off from Caucasian Armenia by the Turkish 
military measures of May, the Armenian military formations in 
Van continued to hold that area for two months more, then 
witharew toward Urmia in Persian Armenia in July. Joining 
the Assyrian Christians in that area1 they fought off the 
attacks of large forces of Turkish and Kurdish regulars and 
irregulars, finally breaking through the Turkish lines in 
September and reaching the British forces at Ramadan in 
Persia. 55/ 
The Defense of Baku - Background 
lr.hile Baku is not in Russian Armenia, and the Armenian 
colony there could not be said to have played a leading role 
in the defense of Russian·Armenia1 cut off as it was from the 
major Armenian districts by the Tatar territories of 
Azerbaidjan, its important oil wells were the most important 
supply of the vital war fuel available to the Central Powers. 
While the Batoum-Constantinople Treaty had made peace between 
Turkey and the Armenian Republic, it had not ended the 
hostilities between the Turks and Armenians outside the area 
55. Ibid., p. 38. 
I 
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of that Republic. As mentioned above, hostilities continued 
at Van, in Gharabagh (which had been given to Azerbaidjan in 
the Treaty), and especially in the Baku area. After the 
terrible massacre of the Russian home-ward bound soldiers at 
Shamk.hor in mid-January, 1918, by the Tatars, the rail con-
nection of Baku with Gharabagh and Tiflis was severed, and the 
route between Baku and Gantzak (Elizavetpol) was in the hands 
of the Turko-Tatars; Armenians could no longer travel through 
that area, as the Mohammedan bandits regularly stopped the 
trains in order to kill whatever Armenians were on board. 
Thus, a large number of Armenian soldiers en route home from 
the Austro-Hungarian and German Fronts were forced to remain 
in Baku, idle and restless. They disturbed the local situation 
and were potential prey to Bolshevik machinations. Especially, 
the upsetting news of Tatar and Armenian killings and massacres 
in Gharabagh, Gantzak, and other Armenian ethnic areas stirred 
them, and dangerously ugly passions began to rise. T.he 
Armenian National Council initiated firm measures to control 
the situation, organizing a brigade of 3,000 men under the 
command of Hamazasb to give employment to the restless veterans. 
With difficulty, the Baku Armenian National Council finally 
succeeded in securing the arms left behind by the 279th 
Battalion of the Russian army. 
During December, 1917, and January, 1918, inflamed by the 
outrages they had successfully perpetrated on the Russian 
civilian refugees and the withdrawing Russian soldiers, the 
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Tatar population began to loot, massacre, and enslave various 
Armenian areas, destroying a number of Armenian villages in 
the Noukhi and Shamakhi Districts. Isolated killings and 
small-scale pillaging and massacring forays took place along 
the rail line. To try to prevent the outbreak of general 
civil massacres, the Armenian National Council of Baku invited 
the Mohammedan National Council of that city to meet with it; 
the conference began on January 15 1 1918, and discussed the 
following subjects: general - (1) relations with the Russian 
government, (2) the future political organization of the 
Transcaucasus, (3) the status of the war-front and measures 
to bring the war to a close, (4) the administrative division 
of the Caucasus; local - (1) the organization of rule in Baku, 
(2) the opening of the rail line and other routes, (3) the 
anarchy in the interior, etc. The only favorable outcome 
possible between the two factions, so completely at odds in 
loyalties and attitudes toward the war, was the establishment 
of mixed bodies of Moslems and Armenians to tour Gantzak, 
Noukhi, and Khatchmaz to try to calm the flaming tempers in 
those areas; the mixed bodies succeeded in temporarily less-
ening the civil disorders, but shortly they broke out in even 
more extreme degre~ •. At the same time, the Armenian National 
Council of Baku sent arms and experienced military leaders to 
Armenian-populated districts in order to encourage the local 
Armenians to resist attacks. However, the scattered Armenian 
areas away from Gharabagh and Armenia continued to sutter 
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heavily during the next few months, with heavy loss of life 
and many thousands made refugees and thro1~ into a starving 
condition. 56/ 
The Baku Civil War 
The simmering feelings in Baku proper finally came to a 
boil on March 30th, when the Workers' Soviet established by 
the Bolsheviks under Nariman and Shahumian began an armed 
fight with soldiers of ~he Mussavat Tatar nationalist party .• 
Trouble between the Mussavat and the Bolsheviks had been 
brewing for some time, but the open entry of a part of the 
Tatar 11 Savage Div1sion11 into Baku set off the spark. There is 
no agreement as to where the blame for the outbreak rests. 57/ 
Djivanshir, one of the heads of the Mussavat Party is known, 
by the testimony of his wife, to have been in Baku at the end 
58/ 
of March, just at the time that open preparations were being 
made to seize the city for the Turks. On that same day, in 
56. Republic, pp. 135-9, gives a detailed account of conditions. 
57. Ibid., p. 139-140, absolves the Tatars of blame, and states 
exactly how the fighting began, in detail. Firuz Kazemzadeh, 
The Struggle For Transcaucasia ( 1917-1921) ,. in his partially 
valuable, though frequently inaccurate and biased book, states: 
11 It is immaterial who fired the first shot.n (p. 17) It is · 
very material, for there can be no doubt that the Moslems of 
Baku had prepared a rebellion which was prematurelt fired by 
the clash of the Soviet with the 11 Savage Division, and so 
failed. 
58. Document, ttThe Trial of Missak Torlakian, 11 Arm Review, No. 
31; September, 1955, p. 86. 
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the city of Baku and in other parts of the Transcaucasus, 
appeared the following call to arms: 
Awake, Turkish brothers! 
Protect our rights; union with the Turks means 
life. 
Unite, 0 children of the Turks! 
Brothers of the noble Turkish nation, for 
hundreds of years our blood has flowed like water, 
our motherland has been ruined, and we have been 
under the heel of thousands of oppressors who have 
almost crushed us. We have forgotten our nation. 
We do not know to whom to appeal for help. 
Countrymen, we consider ourselves free hereafter. 
Let us look into our conscience! Let us not listen 
to the voice of plotters. We must not lose the way 
to freedom; our freedom lies in union with the pro-
tection of the Turkish flag. 
Forward, brothers! Let us gather ourselves under 
the flag of union and stretch out our hands to our 
Turkish brothers. Long live the generous Turkish 
nation! By these words we shall never~~gain bear a 
foreign yoke, the chains of servitude.~ 
Preposterous, unverified statements have been made about 
the outbreak of fighting in Baku. For example, historian 
Kazemzadeh has stated: 
It has been suggested that the latter the 
Tatars might expect their the Pashnak 1 s help 
against the Bolsheviks. If this was the case, then 
the Armenians were largely responsible for provoking 
the massacres that ensued, because the Musavat 
plunged into armed conflict, thinking that it had 
only .one .enemey to face. 
But it was neither the Kadets, nor the 
Mensheviks, nor the Socialist-Revolutionaries who 
saved the Soviet during the March Days. It was the 
Dashnaktzutinn with its militar50qrganization that tipped the scales in its favor.~ 
The Armenian National Council of Baku, dominated by 
Dashnaks, immediately denounced the civil conflict on its out-
59. Pasdermadjian, p. 39. 
60. Kazemzadeh, p. 71. 
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break. Communal discord, either in the city or outside, was 
the last thing desired by the responsible Armenian bodies, 
under the leadership of the Dashnaktzoutyoun, in every part 
of Transcaucasia, for the Armenian remnants were in grave 
danger if such outbreaks occurred. Heroic measures had been 
taken by the Dashnak Party to prevent such disorders, and 
great efforts had already been made to stop troubles in all 
areas where they had started; earnest consultations had been 
initiated with the generally unresponsive leaders of the 
Mussavat Party to secure communal stability in all Trans-
caucasian areas of mixed population. 51/ That all efforts of 
the Dashnaktzoutyoun failed to prevent such civil outbursts 
can be ascribed solely to the machinations of Turkish agents, 
who found a willing audience among the leaders of the Mussavat 
Party of the Tatars, and who succeeded in unleashing Moslem 
hatred of the Armenians as a weapon to weaken the possibility 
of Armenian continued resistance to the advance of the Turkish 
army. 
After the war, in a famous trial at Constantinople, it 
was established by an Allied Court that: the events in March 
(old calendar reference) were the result of conflict between 
the Bolsheviks and the Mussavat; some Tatars, inclu~ing 
Narimanov, later the President of Soviet Azerbaidjan, co-
operated with the Bolshevik side; in the fights, many Tatars 
61. For details of such efforts, cf. Republic, pp. 100-116 
and 135-140. 
owed their lives to protection afforded by the Armenians; the 
encounters ended in a truce between the Mohammedans and the 
Bolsheviks. 62/ Kazemzad.eh does not mention 11 w.ho 11 suggested 
that the Armenians would rise to help the Mussavat; every 
evidence available suggests that no such offer or promise 
could have been made under the prevailing conditions. Certain-
ly, if such an offer had. been made, the members of the Armenian 
National Council of Baku would have been aware of it; yet, 
not one person in the responsible Armenian bodies has ever 
heard of such a suggestion. On the contrary, the Armenian 
National Council and Bishop Bagrat, Prelate of the Baku 
Armenian community, immediately declared absolute neutrality 
in the Soviet-Mussavat conflict, 631 endeavoring at the same 
time to reestablish peace and calm. Because the Tatar forces 
which began to reach Baku on March 31st were under the leader-
ship of Turkish officers, and it was apparent that a victory 
for the Mussavat meant subjection of Baku to Turkey, large 
numbers of the idle demobilized Armenian soldiers in Baku 
reacted warmly to the overtures of the Baku Soviet, ~d joined 
the Bolshevik forces. The Dasbnaktzoutyoun officially main-
tained a bands-off attitude to.ward the fighting proper 1 for it 
62. Document, Torlakian Trial, p. 86. 
63. Vardges Aharonian, non a Recent Work on Transcaucasia, 11 
Armenian Review, No. 31; September, 1955; p. 44. Also .Qt .. 
Republic, pp. 140-2 for minutes of the Armenian National 
Council for the period of the fighting, with decisions to try 
to halt the fights. 
too desired the defeat of the Mussavat,~ but, when the 
actual conflict began to turn toward punishment of the civil 
population, the Dashnaktzoutyoun cooperated fully with the 
Armenian National Council's policy of sheltering the Tatar 
non-combatants, even to the point of turning over its party 
building for that purpose. 65/ The unwavering policy of the 
Armenian National Council was one of pacification, and, to 
halt the threatened massacre, it sheltered and fed some 1~'1 000 
Tatars in public buildings (the Mayiloff, Record, and Ramsey 
T.heaters, the Ephimov Amphitheater, the Budaghian Armenian 
School, and the Armenian Cultural Building), as well as 2,000 
in private homes and the Dashnak Party Building. 661 Tazief, 
the Tatar leader whose son's funeral had brought the Savage 
Division soldiers to Baku, after the fighting stopped ex-
pressed his gratitude for the Armenian National Council's 
efforts to preserve the civil population by telegrams to the 
major Moslem chiefs of the entire Caucasus.67/ 
Nevertheless, although the Dashnaktzoutyoun and the 
Armenian National Council of Baku arrayed their forces between 
the troops of the Soviet and of the Mussavat at 4 A.M. of 
64. Republic, p. 140. 
65 .. Aharanian, p. 44. 
66. Ibid., p. 44. Republic gives details (p. 143) from the 
Council's post-fighting memorandum. 
67. Document, Torlakian Trial, p. 86. 
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April 3rd, in order to bring the fighting to a clo,se • the 
Mussavat adherents and the numerous Tatar and Caucasian 
Mountaineer irregulars throughout Azerbaidjan had begun to 
uproot and terrorize the Armenian population in many districts. 
Strenuous military measures were taken by the Baku Armenians, 
and military expeditions were sent :from the city to sate-
guard and reestablish the refugees. While about 2,500 
Armenians had been slain in the fight at Baku (against about 
10,000 Moslems),§§/ the Armenians could still assemble about 
10,000 experienced :fighters; on April 9th, under the command 
of T. Amirian, a relief expedition was sent to Shamakhi, which 
swiftly ousted the marauders and reestablished security for 
t~e Armenian population. Similarly1 the Gecktchai District 
was pacified, with the local Turko-Tatars fleeing before a 
Baku-dispatched relief force. 691 
The Armenian Defense of Baku 
Following the abortive Moslem fight in Baku with the 
Bolsheviks and Armenian troops not controlled by the decisions 
of the Armenian National Council, the Mohammedan forces of the 
eastern Caucasus attempted to unleash a murderous general 
attack on all the Armenian people, the campaign being mainly 
conducted by the Mountaineers. Their leader, Imam Kochinski, 
68. Pasdermadjian, p. 40. 
69. Republic, p .• 143. 
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in late March, had telegraphed them to 11punish11 the Armenians, 
in effect a call to "jeh~d., n holy war •. Though the Mountain-
eers had cut the Petrovsk-Baku railroad by February, 1918, an 
organized drive was initiated which in early April reached 
Balatchar; counter-attacking Baku Armenian forces smashed the 
Mountaineer forces and drove their bands back in flight in 
mid-Apr11.1Q/ This new victory greatly raised Armenian 
military morale at Baku, despite the political shift of control 
to the Bolsheviks under the) capable and practical leadership of 
Shahumian. 
Intoxicated by the success agains·t the Mussavat forces 
in early April, the Bolsheviks and their Military Revolutionary 
Committee had determined to end the influence of the Dashnakt-
zoutyoun and its associate, the Armenian National Council of 
Baku. On April 8, 1918, ~he -Soviet announced the end of the 
Council, but the guiding body of the Armenian community refused 
to die so easily. On April 14th, after consultations, the 
Soviet and the Council came to the agreement that: 
1. The Armenian Second Reserve Brigade is dis-
solved. One part of it shall enter Hamazasb 1 s 
battalions, while the remainder the Soviet 1 s Red 
battalions. · 
2. The battalions of Hamazasb shall be re-
organized and shall be entirely subject to the 
authority of the Soviet and shall be entered into 
the Red Army under the name "16th and 17th 
Battalions .. 11 
3. In command of the 16th and 17th Battalions 
is designated Hamazasb, and assistant Serko 
. Manouoharia.n •••• 
70. Ibid., P• 143. 
4. The battalions of Hamazasb have the 
purpose of beginning operations in a westerly 
direction in the near future~ that is toward 
Gantzak-Erivan. 
Signed: s. Shahoumian M. Gorganian 
A. Gulkha.rltanian N. Ter-Gh.azarian 
H. Ter-Ohanian 71/ 
By that agreement, some 10,000 to 12,000 troops, .with 
fifty cannons~ came under the control of the Baku Soviet~ 
though the Dashnaktzoutyoun continued to maintain direct 
control over six to seven hundred soldiers under the direction 
of G. Balaian. Both the Dashnaktzoutyoun' s and. the Social-
Revolutionaries' forces were included in the total troops 
under the disposition of the Soviet after April 14. ~fuile 
the Bolsheviks solidified con-trol, ·taking full control of the 
Baku Government on April 25th, the enemy was rapidly preparing 
for battle. Before the m$naee of a new TUrko-Tatar onslaught, 
the Armenian National Council continu~d. to maintain existence 
and to exert some influence. At Gantzak, Nouri Pasha, the 
general agent of the Ittihadist government of Turkey, was 
collecting a great new "Islamic Army 11 under the direct officer-
ship of Turkish regular army officers; the purpose of that 
army was to take Baku and advance to the North and East. In 
early June, regular detachments of the Turkish army were in-
corporated into the 11 Islamic Army, 11 and the government of 
71. Ibid., pp. 143-4. 
Azerbaidjan was assembling all its armed forces and irregular 
bands and rushing them toward Baku, already having reached as 
far as Ratchi-Kaboul when the Military-Revolutionary Committee 
decided to take counter-measures. 
On June 5, the Baku forces, numbering 4,400 soldiers, 
began an offensive which drove back with heavy losses the 
better-armed, but poorly organized Azerbaidjanis. In a series 
of bitter clashes lasting until June 26th, the Baku Armenians 
succeeded in .surpassing the original aims of the Military-
Revolutionary Committee and in achieving the line of 
Karamerkian-Kyurdamir-Zouboyka, on one side, and Zoubovka-
Petropavlovsk, on the other. They had taken a rich booty in 
cannons, rifles, maehineguns, and cartridges 1 while many 
hundreds of tb.e Tatar soldiers had lost their 1ives.W 
On June 25th, it became known that one regular Turkish 
division was moving toward Geoktchai, another in line with 
Evlakhi, and the Islamic Army was rushing its forces to 
Outchari for more determined measures. The Baku commandariat 
decided to try to upset the Turkish plans, and ordered 
attacks aimed at occupying Outchari and Geoktchai. On June 
27th, the new offensive began, against bitter Turkish re-
sistance; for two days, the Turks, with heavy losses, re-
treated, moving to the counterattack on June 29th. The ex-
hausted and outnumbered Armenian troops, taking with them the 
Armenian.population of Geoktchai, retreated toward Karamerkian, 
72. Ibid., pp. 144-5. 
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and the initiative passed to the Turkish forces. On July lst, 
reduced by casualties to 2,400 men, the Armenian forces began 
an uninterrupted retreat, harassed constantly by sorties and 
attacks of the enemy. On July 6th, the Armenian troops, 
braced by the news that General Bicherakhov had reached Baku 
from Persia with his troops the day before, halted along the 
line Shamakhi-Karasakhkal-Kyurdamir. On July 8th, 
Becherakhov's reinforcements unleashed an attack at Kyurdamir 
which developed into a general offensive as the Turks sustained 
heavy losses in men and supplies all along the front. The tide 
of battle turned again, and the Baku forces began to retreat, 
fighting a series of bitter rear-guard actions and taking with 
them all the surviving Armenian population of the districts 
they passed through. At this time, a large number of Armenian 
women and children, refugees from Noukhi and Shamakhi districts, 
sought refuge toward Georgia and Armenia; some 15,000 such 
refugees were turned back by Georgian troops at the point of 
bayonets from the border t.own of. Lagodekb. into the arms of 
Azerbaidjani troops and irregulars, who.proceeded to massacre 
nearly all of them~ 73/ The hostile feelings roused against 
the Georgians by that act of the troops of a "brother, Christian 
nation, 11 did much to hinder friendly relations between the new 
Georgia and the Armenian Republic. 
73. Kazemzadeh, p. 156, quoting M. Varandian, The Armeno-
Georgian Quarrel and The Caucasian lvar. 
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The retreat of the Baku Armenian forces, Which had begun 
on July 14, was accelerated by ·the treachery of Bicherakov, 
who suddenly fled with most of his forces to Derbent on July 
26th, exposing the entire front. By July 2? and 28, the 
Turkish army was at the gates of the city, and Baku appeared 
doomed. In a series of meetings of the various bodies of the 
city on July 2?th, despite the exhortations of Shahumian and 
the Bolsheviks to make peace with and aid the Turks, it was 
decided to ask the British forces in Persia to send aid. 
Bolshevik influence in the Baku government was thus ~endered 
nil, and the people renounced further ties with the Bolshevik 
leaders of the Baku Soviet. Until July 30th, the Bolsheviks 
shipped out of Baku at night the bank funds, military supplies, 
the troops of the Red army (except those who had reestablished 
their previous pro-Dashnak or pro-S.R. attachment), the 
families of leading Bolsheviks, and numerous supplies of various 
sorts. On that date, taking things into their own hands, the 
Council held a special session, at which Shahoumian was called 
on to explain; he delivered an appalling speech, in which he 
blamed the Menshevik, Dashnak, and S.R. organizations for the 
troubles, and especially the Armenian National Council, and 
declared that the Peoples' Workers' Soviet was resigning from 
authority and transferring to Astrakhan.111 
On the removal of the Bolsheviks, a Baku diotatura was 
?4. Republic, pp. 145-8. 
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created, composed of Social Revolutionaries Velountz and L. 
Oumanski, Dashnaks A. Arakelian and s. Melik-Yolchian, and 
three sailors of the Caspian fleet. One of the first acts 
was to send armed ships to bring back the fleeing Bolshevik 
leaders tor trial. Meanwhile, on the battle-front, the 
Armenians, and especially the Dashnaktzoutyoun, had the major 
responsibility for continued defense. The British forces at 
Enzeli, in Persia, numbering about 5,000 men, at the most de-
pressing moment informed the Armenian National Council ~hat, 
if they could hold Baku for two more days, the British would 
be there to aid them. The emissary of the Council, A. 
Araradian, had succeeded i~ convincing the British, but only 
arms could hold off the Turkish army for the necessary time. 
The famed Armenian revolutionary leaders Mourad and 
Sebouh, who had had such an import~t. part in the fighting in 
the occupied part of Turkish Armenia, had meanwhile reached 
Baku from the Volga; they rushed to the front, along with every 
capable fighter, and fought the Turks with bitter abandon. 
Mourad lost his life, as did many other notable Armenian 
military figures. The 'massive Turkish. attacks of August 2nd 
and 4th increased the pressure on the city, but the Armenians 
resisted stubbornly and inflicted heavy casualties.1Q/ On 
August 4th, several dozen British troop~ (about seventy) 
arrived, announcing they were the vanguard of 5,000 coming to 
75. Ibid., pp. 148-9, for details of the fighting, as well as 
politics. 
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the aid of Baku. 
At this time, the attacking forces had two Turkish 
divisions and an equal number of irregulars against 8,000 
defenders, nearly all Armenian with a scattering of Russians. 78/ 
The attackers were well-armed and equipped \'Ii th fine German 
artillery. In spite of that preponderance, the Armenian and 
Russian troops of the Baku dictatura smashed the Turkish drive 
on August 4th, and on the following day the Turkish forces were 
in full retreat. T.he British troops, arriving after the re-
pulse of the Turks, reached a total of 2,500 by August 19th, of 
whom 150 to 200 were lost in the fight in defense of the city. 
T.he arrival of the British at the request of the Armenian 
National Council caused stormy disagreements among the pppu~ 
lation of the city, for the lo~al Tatars were openly pro-Turk 
and viewed the British as a force capable of halting the Turk-
ification of Baku. At the same time, the Bolsheviks were 
seeking to establish friendly relations with the Turks in 
keeping with general_policies formulated by the top Russian 
Bolshevik leaders. .Some non-Bolshevik Russians of Baku in-
dulged in a spate of anti-Armenian propoganda, for they viewed 
the arrival of the British as a threat to Russian imperial 
interests in Baku, with its valuable oil. Leaflets proclaimed 
"Down with the Armenians," "Long Live Turkey and Russia," 
78. A. Rwlinson, Adventures in the Near East, 1918-1922, 
pp. 70-71. 
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"Death to the Armenians. 1177/ At the same time, the attitude 
of the British foraes aannot be said to have been~riendly," 
and the seorn and snobbery they displayed made more diffiault 
the defensive effort of the.Armenians, whose General 
Bagratouni had been plaaed in aatual aommand of.the fighting 
foraes on August 5th.Z§/ 
Defeat and Massacre 
For three weeks, the Turkish foraes regrouped and re-
ceived reinforcements. On August 29th, they began a great 
new attack, aimed mainly at the section of the front held by 
the British, who soon withdrew, after a stout resistanae, from 
a part of the lines. On September 1, as the Turks achieved 
sucaesses on the right flank, Dunsterville, head of the 
British forces, suggested peace be made and hinted that the 
British were going to withdraw from Baku; at this, the 
dictatura threatened to shell the British ships unless the 
British forces went to the front. The British complied. By 
September 13th and 14th, the attacking Turks had entered the 
edge of the city, and the British boarded ship in imitation 
of the Bolsheviks earlier. Despite the desperate plea of the 
Armenian National Council that Dunsterville remain for three 
days more so that the population aould be evaeuated, the 
77. Republic, p. 149. 
78. Rawlinson is replete with scornful references; ~· p. 
70-1. 
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British leader replied: "In two hours, we depart. Raise the 
white flag." The population fled to the wharves and the 
shore in panic, and the military forces began to retreat in 
all sections, though some, desperately seeking to gain time 
for the civilian population, ~ought to the last bullet, and 
were massacred or fell prisoner. The Turkish army held back 
from entering the city until September 16th. In the meantime, 
the last ships had left with as many civilian and military 
personnel as possible toward Persia, Petrovsk, and Krasnovodsk 
while rape, looting, pillage, and massacres by the Tatar . 
population spread like fire through the city.791 
That the massacres in Baku was part of an organized 
attempt to exterminate the entire Armenian population of 
Azerbaidjan was later established by the Allied Powers. 
Azerbaidjan•s Minister of the Interior Djivanshir had sent a 
code order, which reads: 
This is a holy war to unify the divided factions 
of the Turkish race, for this reason the extermination 
of the Armenian race is an imperative necessity. T.he 
Armenians are the tools of the British, the sole 
obstacle to the success of our policy - a policy which 
opens the road to India. 
We must exterminate the Armenians, and over their 
corpses we:'must march to our goal. Therefore, spare 
no one and execute your orders to the lett~~' Only 
in this way can Istanbul emancipate India.~ 
Public declarations signed by Djivanshir and Khan-
Khoyski warned: 
79~ Republic, pp. 149-151. 
80. Document, Torlakian Trial, p. 88. 
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All the Russians~ the Georgians and the Jews 
may rest easy and return to their former occupations~ 
but if any one~ no matter who~ protects an Armenian 
he will be regarded as outside the pale of the laW1 
that is to say, his aot will be regarded as a crime 
against the Government and he will be severely 
punished accordingly. He who has information about 
Armenians in hiding, or those who know people who 
are hiding Armenians, ~~7Y should come forward and 
notify the Government.~ 
Another minister of the Azerbaidjan government, Melik 
Aslanof, had frankly stated to a Russian princess in Baku 
that: 11 We w~ll not lay down our arms until we have liquidated 
all the Armenians of Azerbaidjan. 11821 Although about 20,000 
Armenians had been slain in the massacres in Baku and 10,000 
of the 301 000 refugees met death after their flight from the 
city, about one-third of the 90,000 Armenian inhabitants being 
killed,~ it was established at the afore-mentioned trial 
that persecutions kept up even after the entry of the Turkish 
/. 
troops had put a halt to the open massacres. The conduct of 
the Turkish forces, while not exemplary in all cases, was 
proper in general; dissociating themselves from the savagery 
shown by the Tatar inhabitants under the urginings of the 
Azerbaidjan government, the Turks rapidly restored a degree 
of public order, and even safeguarded the existence of some 
of the Armenian population, though the Armenians were now 
81. ~-~ p. 88. 
82. ~., p. 88. 
83. B. Ishkb.anian, Bakue Medz Sarsapnere, pp. 184-187,. 
considered b~Uodd the protection of the law. 
The defense of Baku and its tragic ending had a profound 
effect on the Armenian people. Many of the attitudes created 
toward the Bolsheviks, the Azerbaidjani Tatars, the Russians, 
the British, and the Turks during the events just described 
continued to play an important role in the formulation of 
Armenian public opinion durin£ the life of the Independent 
Armenian Republic, and, subsequently, in the Soviet Armenian 
Republic. To the Armenian, whether under Soviet or other 
rule, Baku remains an important source of bitterness and 
suspicion, and the warning the events of Baku pose to the 
Armenian people explains much in future Armenian political 
life. 
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THE ARMENIAN REPUBLIC: ESTABLISBING A GOVERNMENT 
When the Armenians 1 in the wake of notable military successes 
against the Turkish army in the triple battles of Bash Abaran, Sard-
arabad, and Karakilisse, on May 28, 1918 declared their national in-
dependence~ it was the culmination of the Armenian revolutionary 
movement and an act regretfully undertaken because of the inter-
national situation. Armenian independence could not be more than 
a shadow of the desired Armenian republic until the war had been 
brought to a successful conclusion and the Allies, for whose cause 
the Armenians had sacrificed so heavily, had proved victorious. 
The condition of Caucasian Armenian areas was desperate. The 
complete absence of an administrative machinery added to the 
difficulties of economic disruption, the refugee problems, and war-
caused ruin and devastation. The collapse of Russian administration 
had led to the short-lived, abortive Trans-caucasian Federation, which 
failed to re-establish even a :minimal machinery of govermnent. The 
Armenian National Council and the Armenian Committees of safety, 
while effective in giving direction to Armenian efforts at self-pres-
ervation and the pursuit of Armenian interests, were not a govern-
ment. 
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THE ARMENIAN COUNCIL 
I 
After final recognition of Armenian independence at the Congress 
of Constantinople, Armenia prepared to build a new government during 
the summer of 1918. The first session of the Armenian Council was 
held on August lst, in the presence of von Kress of Germany and Fran-
kelstein of Austria. The city of Erivan displayed a holiday atmosphere, 
and everywhere the Armenian people hailed the first session of the Ar-
menian Council with enthusiasm and hope. The first assembly was re-
presentative of the Armenian Popular Party (Jhoghovourtagan), the 
Moslems, the Yezidees, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(Dashnaktzoutyoun), the Russians, the Social Democrats, and the Soc-
ial Revolutionaries. Opened by the president of the Armenian National 
Council, Avedik.Sahakian, the session proceeded to elect officers, 
with the Social Democrats abstaining. Avedik Sahakian. (Dashnak) was 
elected President, with Kr. Der Khatchatrian (Popular) and T. Zou-
pian (Social Revolutionary) as Vice-Presidents, B. Zakarian {Indep-
endent} and E •. Sarksyan (Dashnak) as Secretaries. 1 
At the second session, on August 3, 1918, Premier Katchaznouni 
. 2 
read the formal proclamation of government. 
1. S. Vratzian, Haiasdani Hanrabedoutyoun, {hereafter referred to 
as 11Republic 11), p. 164. 
2. ef.. Appendix of Documents, this manuscript for partial text .. 
Realizing that conditions were such that it would be impossible to 
make realistic settlements of many other outstanding problems, as 
well as the futility of all-encompassing, glorious 11Plans 11 which 
could not help render the state more secure or viable, but would 
open the door to serious disappointments, the new regime declared 
itself to have only the attainable 1 important goals, for the time 
being~ of establishing acceptance of Free Armenia by its neighbors 
in fact and making Free Armenia as. strong as possible~ while 
working to improve the conditions in which the new state found it-
self. 
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On the completion of KatchaZlll.ouni 1s speech, members of the 
various political groups deClared their attitudes toward the pro-
gram. l'he representative of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(Dashnak Party). Smbat Kb.atchadrian, found the program com-
pletely satisfactory and stated his party would support the regime 
in every way. A. Khond.karian, speaking for the Social-Revolution-
aries, declared the program to:b:e ~incomplete, for nothing had been 
said about the system of government and about civil rights. Khond-
karian severly criticized the section on foreign affairs. for nothing 
was said about Russia; the proclamation did not satisfy the Social-
Revolutionary Party1 and they would await the actual work of the 
govermnent before deciding whether to support. The Armenian Pop-
ular Party, on the other hand, found the program completely satis-
factory and stated that nothing more would have been possible under 
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the conditions prevailing. The representatives of the Mohammedan 
and Russian minorities also found the program completely s:atis-
factory~ and A. Zorin, the Russian delegates declared that it was 
necessary to bring about more cordial cooperation with the Russians. 
The only hostile notes were struck by the representative of the 
Social-Democrat Menshevik Party, H. Azadian, supposedly rep-
resenting the All-Russian S.D. Party~ but actually chosen and sent 
by the Georgian Mensheviks, and the representative of the Social-
Democratic Bolshevik Party, A. Melikian, chosen by the Bolshe-
vik1s Trans caucasian Section. Both came out openly against the in-
dependence of Armenia and against the Premier 1s program. 
In a session on August 6th, Katchaznouni answered the criti-
cisms, declaring that circumstances dictated the extent o£ the pro-
gram, but assuring the Council that civil freedom and democratic 
principles would always be the foundations of his regime's activi-
ties. Calling for a vote of confidence, so that the government could 
g_et to work on a firm footing, Katcha:znouni precipitated a crisis, 
for it became apparent that, initially, only the Dashnaks and the 
Mohammedans were willing to support the regime. In receSS 2 
private discussions succeeded in winning over a part of the Popular 
Party, and final votingshowed the following. in s.upport of there-
gimej all Dashnaks, the Mohammedan and Russian minority repre-
sentatives, and 4 Populars; abstaining and opposed were five Social-
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Democrats (both Menshevik and Bolshevik}t three Social-Revolution-
aries, two Populars# and one independent (B. Zakarian) who later 
consistently voted with the Social-Democrat$.. Thus, even before 
the government had started its work, the Armenian Council found 
itself divided~ unable to pursue a common policy for the good of the 
nation, and a source of disaffection a.Ild weakness for the common 
people of the country. Without a strong majority because of its 
broad concessions to other parties, the Dashnak Party had suc-
ceeded in giving a forum to dis:r:uptive elements through its excess 
of zeal for the unity of Armenia. 3 
From Out of the Abyss 
Premier Kachaznouni had referred to the condition of Armenia 
as 11 shapeless chaos and ruinsn; that picturesque phrase aptly des-
cribed the appearance of the land and economy which the new regime 
was to govern: Germany was victorious on the Eastern Front. Turk-
ish armies were at the gates of Baku, endangering the large Armenian 
population there. Russia was already in the throes of a vicious civil 
war. No help, supplies, or financial support could come from out-
side the country; everything must be done by Arm~nian effort alone, 
and the Armenians were a ruined, hopeless people. Nearly 450, 000 
refugees huddled in the streets and ruined buildings, 40, 000 in Er-
ivan alone, unable to buy food in a land already desperately short of 
3. Republic,pp. 166-7. 
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supplies because of military movements and the loss of crops and ani-
mals.. Tens of thousands of orphans, exposed to the cold, wandered 
the country, dying by the hundreds of disease and starvation. Epi-
demics were striking everywhere~ one after the other, and it ap-
peared as though, with food, medicines, and doctors completely un-
equal to the magnitude of the task of keeping the people alive$ the 
Armenian nation faced extinction., Refugees, military deserterst 
and bands of native Armenians, or individuals whose livelihood had 
now disappeared, turned the roads into a source of livelihood by 
robbery and banditry. 
Conditions steadily wor·sened. By October, the bread supply of 
Armenia was exhausted. In the winter months, many thousands died 
of starvation, and there was no relief before the spring of 1919, when 
finally American flour arrived. The Turks had· created a situation of 
genocide more effective even than the deportations, for in six ".m.onths 
alone~ about 180 .. 000 Armenians had died of starvation and disease in 
the area of the R·epublic •. Simon Vratzian, a former premier of the 
Republic, has ·s.tated that in another six months the plan of the Turks 
would have succeeded, for Caucasian Armenia, too, would have been 
eradicated .. as Turkish Armenia had already been. The Turkish troops 
did not need to fight any longer to destroy the Armenian poeple, and it 
was sent to Baku to further Turkish gains, once it was obvious what 
Armenia's destiny must be. 
. ' 
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Even the best-laid plans are s.ometimes thwarted, and the bitter fight-
ing going on in Palestine in the fall of 1918, resulting in the surrender 
of Turkey and the arrival of relief supplies, cut short the genocide by 
disease and starvation unleashed by the Turks. 4 
Armenian vo,lunteer forces, the famed Orient Legion of the French 
Foreign Legion, fighting for vengeance on the Turks and to rescue the 
remaining fragment of their people, played a remarkable role in break-
ing the backb-one of the Turkish Southern Army., enabling the Allied 
forces to swiftly advance to Aleppo, crushing the will of the Turkish 
people, and causing the early surrender of Turkey. The Armenian 
volunteers 1 victory at the Battle of Arara over select German troops. 
bolstering the Turks in Palestine, caused the Turkish armies to dis-
integrate; from that day, Septemb-er 19, 1918, the Allied advance was 
like a whirlwind over Palestine, Syria,. and into Cilicia, where the 
Armenian volunteers were~supposed to form the nu.cleus. of an Ar-: 
5 
meni?-D- army. .The capitulation of Turkey to the Allies on October 30, 1918 
gave hope to the Arme~ans. 
4. Ibid, 168-9 
5. e£. Herbert Adams Gibbons, 11Armenia in the World War 11 , The 
Lausanne Treaty, Turkey, and Armenia, pp. 140-Z. ~Also, 
Captain Sarkis Torossian, From Dardanelles to Palestine, pp. 188-199; 
and Kahire-i Hai Likionagan Mioutyoun, Gamavore (entire) for 
story of the Armenian volunt-i:~ers in Palestine,. Syria., and Gilicia. 
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During the terrible winter of 19 8~ Mehmet .Ali Pasha~ the represen-
tative of Turkey in Erivan2 fro time to time would turn over a stolen 
wagon-load or two of Armenian grain as relief to the Armenians 2 carry-
ing on the guise of charitable w rk~ while attempting to transport the 
Mohammedan population of Arm nia to Sourmalu or Sardarabad in order 
to rescue them from disease an famine and to render Armenian dis-
tricts Moslem in majo~ity populltion. 6 
Despite the terrible conditilns 1 the new Armenian government did 
succeed in keeping an important part of the Armenian people alive 
through these trying days. nistries: were organiz-ed quickly and 
put to work on the most pressin issues,~ the army and administrative 
agencies were re-organized, mi •tary and civil service pay-scales were 
revised~ efforts were made to r nder the courts effective, schools were 
of the orphans into orphanages, nd for their care. Pending the calling 
of a Constitutional Convention, t e Armenian Council declared that laws 
of the Russian Provisional Gave nment formerly accepted in the Armenian 
territory as altered and complet d by the Transcaucasian Commissar-
iatt the Transcaucasian Seym, d the Armenian Council would. be the 
basic law of the Armenian Repub ic. 
As an example of the early ctions undertaken by the Armenian 
Council, the following facts are f interest: 
~. Republic, 169. 
' TIO 
On August 8t 6 million rou les were appropriated for the re-
fugees, food stocks, and army eorganization. 
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On August 21,. all Armenia was declared jeopardized by cholera 
and the medical-sanitation cong ess of the Armenian Council was con-
verted into a supreme body ove all institutions combatting conta-
gious diseases. 
On August 29,. a law was p ssed confiscating to the state all pri-
vately-owned weapons and milit ry supplies~ after bitter debate. The 
Social-Democrats fought this m asure 1s passage and wanted to keep 
the general population armed. he law passed by 15 votes to 7. 
On. September 11, cotton production was nationalized, wit;h a 
government~set price of 49 rou les~ 50 kopecks per pood (set on Dec. 
3., 1918) to be paid by a·central gency collecting for the government 
and handling the marketing of th cotton crop. Cotton was the only 
possible source of income to th government at the time, but this act 
was made the occasion of viciou anti-government propaganda by the 
opposition. 
On September 11, also, wa passed the School Act which, though 
it gave the government general upervision, declared it the right of 
all ordinary or communal org zations., alliances, or associations, as 
of individuals also, to open schools and to administer them freely, by 
their own resources. 
OnSeptember 28, a law wa passed granting land and work to those 
refugees capable of still workin • The government was obligated to pro-
vide land, work, or relief to th refugees and immigrants if other eff-
orts failed. 
On October 8, an appropria, on_ of 6, 691> 200 roubles was passed to 
finance a concurrent law to prep re employment for capable refugees, 
primarily women, in governmen weaving plants 1 to have I, 500 looms 
and 20, 000 spindles in the first 
On October 11) a law ass 'ng the care of all immigrant orphan~· 
and their aducation as well, by t e government was passed~ placing the 
orphan question under the imme ate control of the Ministry of Public 
Welfare. To associations,· indi 'duals, and independent bodies. was 
left the right to open and maint · orphanages only under the super-
vision of the government. 
On October 11, also, wasp ssed an act appropriating a sum of 
121 736,250 roubles for the orph s, destitute immigrants, and con-
struction or renovation of living uarters for the refugees. 
Though the activities of the overnment were concentrated prim-
arily on these pressing problem , a series of other acts opened funds 
for supplies, regularize food su ply, established police, fixed prices, 
etc. All the efforts of the gover ent were but a stop-gap in the face 
of the chaotic needs of the count y, nevertheless, to prevent the des-
truction of the Armenian refugee in nearby areas 1 an appropriation was 
made of 500, 000 roubles to aid t e impoverished Armenian refugees at 
' .' 
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Baku; on November 4th1 five ion roubles were voted the Armenian 
National Council· of Georgia for the refugees work there; on December 
3rd, a 300~ 000 loan was opened for the refugees from Persia. 1 
The Opening _i Border Troubles 
On October 5~ 1918, .Khalil Pasha, the Turkish Commander on the 
Eastern Front, announced in Er van that he had received orders- to 
evacuate the Lori-Pambak Dist ict. The Armenian and Turkish commands 
immediately drew up the bound ry lines of the district and prepared to 
assure the orderly turn-over of that area to the Armenian state in accor-
dance with the treaty obligation • The Republic ordered the commander 
of the Dilidjan-Lori force to pr ceed with the occupation. He sent 
detacbJ:nents~ on October 18th, otaling two hundreu cavalry under Gouro 
Tarkhanian, to occupy the line 1 segh-Kolgeran-Kacha-kan and another 
force under Colonel Ghorghani to occupy the line Djalal Oghli-Gerger-
Kourtan. Though the occupatio! of the assigned areas was conducted 
swiftly and without incident, exc pt for two minor clashes with the 
Georgianss the action caused gr at dismay in T:i:flis. The two minor 
clashes were these; the Georgi s sent a small party to Katchakan villaget 
within the Armenian zone, but it was quickly routed by the Armenian 
cavalry; a German force with th Georgians went to Karindj village, 
where it was disarmed by the Ar enians, and shortly later, after it had 
been sent back to the Georgian a ea and instructions had been received 
from Erivan1 the arms were ret rned. Though Lori-Pambak had not 
yet become the scene of determi ed border contention, the seeds had been 
sown for future difficulties betw en the sister Republics by the failure 
1. cf. 1 Ibid., pp. 170-1 forla s; general situation1 c£. 1 J. Missakian: 
A Searc-hlight on the Armeni Question1 pp. 7Z-3, and Congress 
Report No. ~,.pp-:5'-6. \ . 
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of the Georgians to respect the pre determined division lines and the 
notice given them of occupation by the Armenian authorities. 8 
1The Question of Reorganization of the Regime 
Though some Armenian intellectuals and non-Dashnak persons out-
side the Armenian Republic scoffed at the HRepublic 11 and 11Independence 11 
during the troublous months preceding the Allied victory in October# 
1918# and even the Dashnaks had a minority who had no faith in the 
future in Armenia itself felt the c,ause was hopeless~ a great change took 
place after the defection of Bulgaria from the Central Powers. De-
mands were widespread that the govermnent of Armenia be reorganized 
on a 11 coal tion11 basis (though to the Western mind that appears certainly 
to have been what Armenia had, and a source of weakness). Such de-
mands gained strength through the inability of Katchaznouni to retain a 
majority in the Armenian Council. The Armenian Popular Party sent 
Samuel Haroutounian and Minas Berberian to Erivan. at the end of Octo-
ber to press that demand in a party volte face, for the Populars in the 
Council had, for some time now~ been voting consistently with the 
Social-Democrats and Social-Revolutionaries against the.national pol-
icies of the government. In 11coalition11 discussions,. it was found im-
possible to satisfy all, for the Social-Democrats# without popular 
strength inside the country, demanded at least two ministries~ one of 
8. Republic, 171-2. 
4/ 
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which must be either the foreign or interior ministry. It was not 
possible to satisfy such adherents of a 11socialistu policy~ that is, 
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those demanding the organization of a coalition of the leftist element 
in the Dashnak Party~o the Social Revolutionary Party, and the Social 
Democrats in order to form a socialistic minis_try. Thus, it became 
imperative that a general coalition be put aside in favor of a working 
agreement between the Dasb.nak. and Popular (Jhoghovourtagan) Parties 
if possible. In talks between the Dashnak. and Popular Party leaders, 
the Populars demanded the foreign* justice, budget, and education 
ministries, while the Minister of Military Affairs was to be non-par-
tisan; the Dashnak..Party accepted these conditions except for the 
foreign ministry~ which it reserved for itself. The Populars also 
demanded that the land question be left for the Constitutional Convention1 
or until the assembling of a representative body elected by universal 
ballot; to this the Dashnak. Party agreed# but to the purely partisan 
demand that Aram and A. K.hatissian not be permitted in the government~ 
the A.R.F,. reacted vigorously and unfavorably, for they were important 
Armenian national figures. On November 4th~ the coalition of the 
Dashnaks and Populars .was formed. 
On that date, by their joint vote, the two parties elected a new 
ministry. after accepting the resignation of Katchaznouni 1s first ministry. 
Katchaznouni was to be Premier again, despite the bitter opposition of 
the Social De;mocrat representatives. Katchaznouni announced his 
I'?{/ 
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second ministry as being: Minister without Portfolio, Katchaznouni 
(Dashnak); Minister of Foreign Affairs, S. Tigranian (Dashnak); 
Assistant in Foreign Affairs, G. Melik-Gharageozian (Popular); 
Miniester of the Interior, Aram (Dashnak); Military Affairs, Gen-
. . 
eral H. Hakhverdian (non-party)l Budget, A. Enfiadjian (PopUlar); 
. ' 
Justice, S. Haroutyounian (Popular); Public Education, M. Atabe-
gian {Popular); Food Supply, L. Ghoulian (Pop.ular); Welfare, Kh. 
Karchikian (Dashnak). Popular Party member Minas Berberian 
was elected Overseer, though the Social-Democrats and Social-
Revolutionaries abstained. Thus, the Armenian Republic had been 
forced to move slightly toward the right by the refusal of the S. R. 
and S. D. members to cooperate, and a great democratic {Dashnak) 
bourgeois (Popular) coalition had taken place, wrote the Armenian 
newspaper Horizon at the time. 9 Within two weeks, the Popul.ar 
leaders began to flee the terrible living conditions of Erivan for 
Tiflis~ gradually conver~ng the work of the government into a 
farce as the Food Ministry changed hands twice (within a few weeks) 
between Popular leaders. The assassination of Welfare Minister 
, < 
Karchikian on November 14 by a member of his own party was a 
serious lass. 
Desi?ite the weaknesses apparent in the coalition government, 
9. Horizon, Nov. 10, 1918, as repqrted in Republic, p. 175. 
, -"I 
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with Allied victory everyday more apparent, on December 3rd,. an 
official Delegation of the Armenian Republic was selected to go to 
western Europe to represent the Armenian interests; that delega-
tion was to be composed of A. Aharonian (Dashnak) as president~ 
M. Babachanian (Popular), and H. Ohandjanian (Dashnak). At the 
same closed session, it was decided that the Delegation should in-
sist on a Black Sea port frontage, and that, if mandates became an 
issue, the order of acceptability would be the United States, England, 
France, and, only as a last resort, Russia. Allied victory seemed 
to the Armenians to be the rescue of their people from foreign sla-
very and from annihilation. The closeness of the Armenian brush 
with extinction has been shown graphically in the reports of invest-
igating commissions and newspaper reporters which revealed the 
condition in which the Turkish troops, which for eight months had 
held so large a part of Caucasian Armenia, had left the occupied 
areas when they had to withdraw behind the pre-Brest Litovsk 
frontiers during the last two weeks of November., Nothing was left 
to the few living skeletons who were all that were left alive of the 
Armenian population1 no property, no crops, no buildings, no 
. 
railroads, no telephones, no food, no doors 7 no windows 1 even, 
in many places, no clothing whatsoever. Where the Turkish army 
had been~ there was left only a howling wilderness, nearly deserted 
of life. All the cotton, grain, building supplies, cattlet- furniture, 
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many of the men and children (as slaves)t everything that could be 
moved had been plundered and taken to Kars and Erzeroum; what 
could not be moved was destroyed. From the Persian border to 
Georgia~ except in the small state allowed to the Armenians 1 Cau-
casian Armenia was an appalling scene of devastation, a nearly 
uninhabited desert. 10 
That the Republic could survive the addition of the devastated 
areas to the already famine-stricken population areas unoc_cupied by 
the Turkish army~ that it could gather the ~emnants of the popula-
tion and feed and shelter them, that it could begin the gigantic task 
of collecting the thousands of wandering~ starving" diseased orphans 
from the occupied areas and keep so many of them alive is a testi-
mony to the ability and national devotion of the leaders and people 
of the Armenian Republic. That such a new-born state, beset by 
internal problems which would s.tagger more prosperous, larger 
nations, could still maintain a common-sense approachto the dem-
ands of international diplomacy is little short of unbelievable. The 
selection of the Armenian Delegation, fortunate by any standards~ 
was made at the mos.t opportune time~ comi:ng just as victory had 
arrived1 before negotiations wer~ supposed to start, an4 just vyhen 
it was most necessary for the Armenian Case to be one of a state 
10. The above details on the coalition and Turkish occupation are 
~rom the Republic, pp. 172.-180. 
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demanding justice be done~ rather than an appeal for retri ution by 
an uprooted~ decimated~ and viciously persecuted people. 11Armenia 
was not yet accorded formal recognition by the Allies as indepen-
dent and sovereignStateJ and the boundaries were not inte nationally 
11 . 
defined, 11 therefore, the Armenian Delegation, whicJ:lleft or Europe 
at the end of December, had high hopes of success at the V rsailles 
Peace Conference scheduled for January 18, 1919. 
The Armeno-Geo11gd.an Boundary Issue 
The most important event in the days of the 11 Coalition" govern-
ment was conflict over the Armeno-Georgian boundary._ Th t conflict, 
which seriously weakened both states, and left the, door to Bolshe-
vik propagandat created a smouldering national discord whi 
its stamp on the national relations of the two peoples, both •thin and 
without the Soviet Union. Yet it has not received the attenti 
While a full study of that conflict is beyond the scope 
few pertinent facts must be considered. 
Armeno-Georgian relations had been poor in Tiflis 
Transcaucasian Republiq with the e~tablishment of Armeni in-
dependence and the inauguration of the Armenian Council, no im-
provement was forthcoming. On the contrary, new ,issues ar se over 
sharply conflicting viewpoints regarding the division of formr r gov.ern-
ment possessions and supplies and a general border 
11. Missakian., pp. 74-5. 
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Though the Georgians had often, before independence., agreed publicly 
that Akhalkalak and Bor,tchalou-Lori were Armenian districts and 
should be under Armenian administration, under the leadership of 
Tsereteli, demands were made in the summer of. 1918 that these 
districts become a part of the Georgian Republ:!.c in order to give the 
Georgians a strong military border. In June, 1918, Jordania, the 
head of the Georgian National Council, and Georgian Premier Rem-
ishvili visited the Armenian National Council and suggested that Bor-
tchalou be divided on an ethnic basis; no mention was made of Akhal-
. ~ 
kalak because it was still under Turkish occupation. 'I'he Armenian 
National Council designated Kh. Karchikian,. Khatissian, and Gen. G.' 
Ghorghanian as representatives~ and to them, in the name of the Georg-
ian National Council, Tsereteli announced that all the Akhalkalak, 
Ghazakh1 and Bortchalou districts, together with the Pambak section 
of the Alexandropol District, were to be included in the Georgian 
state. Tsereteli also announced that the inclusion of those areas in 
Georgia was necessary to make it a strong military, Christian state~ 
12 
uwhich would be to the advantage of the Armenians, as well. 11 This 
imperialistic pronouncement was a profound shock to the :Armenians, 
and Ka.rchi.kian bitterly denQunced the Georgian claim as nothing short 
of a division of Armenia between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan. 
Earlier Jordania and Ramishvil.i had officially assured the 
12. Republic, .pp •. 181-2. 
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Armenian National Council that the German detachments which had 
been sent to occuply Bortchalou during the Turkish advance were in 
temporary occupation only and that they would be withdrawn when the 
Turkish forces left the area1 as would all other forces attached to 
the Georgian army. Though Tsereteli promised to reconsider the 
matter with the members of the Georgian National Council1 within 
a few days the Georgian governm.ent proclaimed the areas annexed 
and began to rule as if the districts, were not in contention, despite 
the firm protest of the Armenian governm.ent. Local administrators 
friendly to the Armenian governm.ent were removed-and Georgians 
sent in their place. Heavy taxes were assessed. Despite the over-
whelmingly Armenian population in the areas~ by force and fraud 
nresolutions" asking Georgian rule were collected from the local 
population. A decree was i-s sued for the surrender of arms, and 
the local population was drafted for military service in the Georgian 
army. 
On August 26th, A. Djamalian presented a strong protest to the 
Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. against that conscripti-on, which 
declared inter alia that those sections without question formed a part· 
of the Armenian Republic, calling attention to the fact that in June the 
Georgian governm.ent had declared the oc.cupation temporary and for 
the sole purpose of keeping the Turkish army from Tiflis. Though 
the Georgian governm.ent declared that there had been a misunderstand-
ing and corrective measures would be taken1 a policy of Georgification 
continued. On September 29th, Djamalian presented a new, extremely 
strong protest which declared that the local population continued to 
inform the Armenian government tha.t military impressment was 
continuing. When the Turkish army, after repeated Armenian ap-
' . 
plications, began to withdraw from Lori-Pambak in October1 1918, 
the situation became critical. As the Armenian forces under Gen-
eral Dro took over the vacated .positions of the Turks, in accordance 
with the agreements 1 the Georgian authorities declared that action 
illegal, and delivered a protest on October 19th. 
On October 20th, Gogouatze, in command of the Sanahin occu-
pation area delivered an ultimatu.:m to the Armenian army to with-
draw within twenty-four hours from all Lori an4 the Shahali section. 
A direct command from Tiflis r~ached Gogo~atze on October 21: 
Tomorrow, October 22nd, at 12 o'clock, by railroad will reach 
you 250 soldiers of the state brigade~ while General Taitsianov 1s 
division, composed of artillery and infantry, is moving toward 
Vorontzovka. After General Tsitsianov 1s arrival, he will be in 
command ~£ all military forces.. The clearing of all the Bortcha-
lou District and the need for extending to the borders. of Tiflis 
Province is imperative. 
On October 22nd, Georgatze, the Georgian Minister of Military 
Affairs, commanded Gogouatz.e to begin immediate occupation_ of the 
areas previously designated~ not to go beyond the Georgian border 
tentatively decided upon and to prevent anyone crossing that line 
without the express permission of the Georgian government. Witha 
German protectorate~ the Georgians felt secure that, if 'o/ar broke 
out, they would secure German aid. Von Kress, the German rep-
,_,. / 
resentative in the Transcaucasus;J on his part was using every 
... 9, l ~ 
method to persuade the Armenian government to accept the Geor-
gian demands, going so far as to tell Djamalian that Germany was 
committed to protect the Georgian state with whatever borders that 
republic determined for itself. Despite the war-like preparations of 
the Georgian Republic~ Armenia was determined to find a peaceful 
solution to the controversy, if at all possible, but to defend itself 
if an attack took place. Unanimously, the Armenian Council agreed 
to the policy of the coalition government in its session of October 2Znd1 
and telegrams were sent to the Georgian government stressing the 
common loss to be suffered by an outbreak of war between the two sister 
republics, urging peaceful solution1 and recommending that no further 
military operations be conducted by either side, pending peaceful 
settlement of the differences. On October 23~ actual military opera-
tions were begun against the small Armenian outpost and the Armenian 
villagers at Shnikh. By October 26th, Gogouatze 1s forces had reached 
Hairoum village~ where they demanded that the Armenian Population 
accept Georgian rule. 
In the midst of such preparations for war" Georgian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Ramishvili addressed an unprecedented invitation to 
the governments of Armenia1 Azerbaidjan., and the Mountain Republic 
to convene in Tiflis at a specified. time at the Foreign Ministry for 
discussions on certain specified topics; written in such a way as to 
.1.::,-
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be, in effect, a directive to local authorities by a central govern-
ment, the 1_1invitation11 rouse~ firm and unanimous opposition in Ar-
menia,_ especially as it included settlement of all border questions, 
in the general conference apparently reinstituting the Georgian-
Tatar Alliance for the restriction of Armenian administrative areas 
which had been prevalent during the Transcaucasian Republic. In 
order not to upset the possibility of peaceful settlement of differences) 
howevers the Armenian Council 1 on November lOth, passed a resolu-
tion calling on the regime to initiate discussions to arrange participa-
tion, the order of business, the time and place of such a conference 2 
and stressing that the Georgian-Armenian boundary issue must be 
settled by discussions between the two states, and not by general 
consensus. Immediately, Ramashvili postponed the conference, 
indicating that it had, in fact, been a ruse to seize the Armenian 
border districts by the concurrence of the anti-Armenian Moslems. 
Conditions in the Georgian-occupied districts deteriorated, even 
~~orgian military ;eaders at times protesting at the uncalled for 
attitude of the occupying forces. Georgian troops subjected the 
villages to 11enemy occupation11 , rather than serving as police forces 
in districts officially considered a part of their country. Looting~ 
plundering~ criminal attacks, and general undisciplined bearing im-
posed grave hardships on the local Armenian population, and :m.uner-
ous protests were received by the Armenian Republic. 
I 
Protests were also directed to the Georgian authorities, but Gen-
eral Tsouloukitze at Sanahin ordered the imprisonment of the bearers 
of the protests, and he ordered a special punitive force against the 
town of Uzounlar, which had, justifiably according to local Georgian 
military investigation1 risen against certain cri:m.in.al elements of the 
Georgian occupying force in the district. That resistance was not in 
the nature of a revolt, but it was so dealt with under the instructions 
given by Tsouloukitze. On December 8th, the punitive force of Georg-
ian troops moved against Uzounlar, precipitating an armed conflict 
with the native population. Skirmishes occurred on the 8th and 9th, 
and on those dates the Georgian forces subjected the town to contin-
ual bombardment. Responding to an urgent protest by the Armenian 
population of Uzounlar, the Armenian Republic sent a new official pro-
test against the tyranny unleashed by occupying Georgian forces in 
lands which were part of the Armenian Republic and threatened that, 
unless immediate measures were undertaken to cease such tyranny, 
·~ ~:-.tli; Armenian government would not hold itself responsible for the re-
sults. 
Meanwhile, in November 1 the Georgian government had sent 
S. Mdivani to Erivan with plenipotentiary powers to settle the boun-
dary dispute. He presented a written document on November 29, 1918, 
stating that: 
In accordance with the demand of the government of the Repub-
lic of Georgia, the boundary between the Armenian and Georgian 
Republics must pass alongthe old boundary of the Tiflis Province, 
that is~ along the line presently dividing Akhalkalak and Bortcha-
lou Districts on the south from the previous borders of the former 
Alexandropol District of the former Erivan Province, while on the 
east along the line separating Bortchalou District from the former 
Ghazakh District of the former Gantzag Province. 
In reply, also in writing, S. Tigranian stated that the boundary 
between Armenia and Georgia had been affirmed more than once be-
tween the Arn:ienian and Georgian representatives; that border, based 
on the ethnic principle, had been determined in 1917, and the Annen-
ian government recognized it as still in effect. That division of 1917, 
Tigranian stressed, had agreed that: 
The entirety of Akhalkalak bistrict and the greater part of Bort-
chalou District, where the Armenian population formed an over-
whelming majority, are inseparable parts of Armenia1 at the same 
time, the northern section of Bortchalou District and the northern 
section of Tiflis District up to the city of Tifl.is, despite the fact 
that in these areas the Arme.nian population is greater than the 
Georgian, are entered into the organizing area of Georgia, with 
the stipulation that the Georgian Armenians shall have guarantees 
of national and cultural self-determination. 
If Mdivani and the Georgian government insisted'" he declared, on 
reopening the border question, then it should not be limited to Akhal-
kalak and Lori alone, but should be a general reexamination including 
the northern part of Bortchalou and the Tiflis District. While Mdivani 
continued to repeat his stand, the Georgian army moved into Akhal-
kalak on the heels of the withdrawing Turks, taking the city on Dec-
ember 8th and declaring Akhalkalak District a part of the Georgian 
Republic, 11not subject to debate on historical, political,. or moral 
grounds 11 • OnDecmeber 9th and 12.th, Katchaznouni again protested 
against the looting by Georgian troops, warning that if Georgian forces 
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were not withdrawn the Armenian Republic would be forced to protect 
its citizens and its area by immediate strong measures. All Armenian 
political groups, even the Tiflis-oriented Social-Democrats, were un-
ted in their fury against the Georgians for seizing integral Armenian 
lands for Tsereteli 1s 11military bordersttt but the government still 
sought to preserve peaceful relations, despite the unfriendly inter-
ference with transit and transport to starving Armenia by the Georgian 
authorities. 
Though open hostilities flared on December 13th, the Armenian 
Republic still pressed for a peaceful settlement and friendly relations 
with Georgia. On December 14th, S. Tigranian sent a new message to 
Georgia's capital, which stated, in part: 
Not only did not the Georgian Government accede to our de~ire 
to settle the question of boundaries peacefully, but it resorted 
to oppression of the peaceful population~ subjecting it to blood-
shed and malevolent tyranny, in order to forcibly seize foreign 
soil, even going to the extent of bombarding Armenian villages. 
The Armenian Government cannot remain as a pitiless onlooker1 
because the soldiers of the neighboring state are conunitting crim-
inal acts on the soil of Armenia and against the citizens of Armenia. 
My Government, earnestly desiring to prevent future difficultie.s, 
wishes to believe that your Government, respecting the desires of 
the people and the rights o£ Armenia! will immediately undertake 
to withdraw its troops, will give your diplomatic channels the op-
portunity to begin discussions with ours, will reinstitute telegraphic 
communication, and thereby w.Ul stre:q.gthen the peaceful co-e:xis-
tence of the two neighboring and legitimate states. 
No answer was forthcoming. From the first moment of hostili-
ties, General Crane, the newly-arrived English chief of the Trans-
caucasian Mission, attempted to reopen discussion between Georgia 
and Armenia, suggesting the dispute be settled by peaceful means 
199 
through a conference of the two states. Armenia acceptedJ and sent 
a delegation to Gharakilissa., but Georgia refused to send a delegation 
unless Armenia permitted Akhalkalak and all Lori to remain under 
solely Georgian military occupation. On December lith, A. Erznkians 
A. Kotcharian, Ter-Ohanian, and Abovian, on behalf of the Georgian 
Armenian National Council, Were sent by the Tiflis authorities to 
Gharak:Uissa to convince the Armenians. to accept the Georgian posi-
tion. On government orders, they returned to Tiflis, but before they 
could leave they were subjected to a deomonstration of public hostility 
by the Armenians of the occupied area, being sworn at and Kotcharian 
being beaten; as Er.znkian was a member of the Georgian Assembly~ 
the situation was dangerous, for the Armenian population was con-
vinced that he was a spy for the Georgian government. Mdivani also 
was in the Gharakilissa area, and he sought to preserve peaceful re-
lations; after protracted telegraphic conversation with General Tsoul-
oukitze, he asked that Armenian forces withdraw from Lori, the ad-
vancing Armenian troops be halted, a Georgian-Armenian border com-
mission tour the area and convince the Armenian inhabitants to adjust 
themselves to and recognize Georgian rule"'. and then the Armenian and 
Georgian governments confer on settlement of the boundary between the 
two states. Under the conditions prevailing, that was s repetition of 
inadmissable demands and gave little hope for fair treatment o£ the 
population of Lori or honest negotiations devoid of national chauvinism 
. .ali t b.ti 13 or l.mperl. s am l. ons. 
13. Summarized from Republic, 181-194, a fine, documentary account 
of the growth of friction between Georgia and Armenia. 
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The Georgian-Armenian War 
The chronicle o£ the early events of the war is a time-table of 
withdrawal under pressure by the Georgian army. From the very 
beginning of the 11rescue operationn by General Dro on December 13th, 
the Armenian troops proved themselves superior in fighting ability 
and morale to the better equipped,. better fed, and better clothed 
Georgian forces. Between December 13 and Dacember 18, the 
Armenian army shattered all oppositipn and drove back the Georgians 
rapidly. Several hundred Georgian soldiers had been killed, wounded, 
or taken prisoner, and the fleeing troops left to the Armenians cannons, 
armored cars, and machine-guns~ as well as a large amount of mil-
itary stores and ammunition. By the l8thl the fighting and reached 
Sadakhlou, where General Tsouloukidze was rallying his forces. 
Georgia was.in.an uproar, calling up the People's Guard and announc-
ing general war measures. On the 18th, the War :!Minister arrived with 
1, 000 fresh infantrymen, one cavalry squadron~ some mountain artil-
lery~ and an armored car to reinforce Tsouloukidze. 
Refusing to go on the defensive, General Dro continued to ad-
vance his forces, Gouro Tarkhanian occupying Shulaver after crushing 
strong opposition on December 20th, Strong clashes continued around 
Sadakhlou, where many fresh Georgian reinforcements were trapped 
with the remnants of the original Georgian forces. On December 23rd, 
that station was taken by the Armenian forces~ unreinforced during the 
course of the war. Meanwhile Shulaver had fallen to strong new Georgian 
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forces, and an Armenian detach:ment under Lieutenant-Colonel Korol-
kov was ordered to attack in that area. His forces gained a signal 
victory on December 25. With an added reinforcement of l:r 500 men 
newly detrained from Tiflis, the Georgians began new attacks in that 
area and subjected the town to air attack. Armenian counter-attacks 
pushed back the Georgians and the fight continued thus till December 
28th~ with attack and counter-attack, without a decision. 
Allied representatives in Tiflis at the same time were desperate-
ly seeking to halt the warfare, which could only serve to render more 
difficult the reestabUsh:ment of stability and peaceful reconstruction 
of the Transcaucasus. On December 25, English General Raycraft, 
French Colonel Jardini, and Jordania signed an agreement whereby 
a cease-fire was to go into immediate effect and Georgian government 
representatives were to go to the front to explain the details of an agree-
ment worked out by the French and British officers. The Armenian 
representative Djamalian was present, but refused to sign because of 
the sections pertaining to Akhalkalak; because of that, Raycraft and 
Jardini added a post-script that "Mr. Djamalian is not in favor of the 
clause stating that the Akhalkalak District be occupied by G~orgia. 11 
The same day a copy was sent to ErivanJ it had been decided that a 
mixed conimission of the English, French, Georgians, and Armenians 
be immediately sent to the front to establish the following conditions: 
The commission shall decide the number of troops the Georgians 
shall be permitted to maintain in the northern part of Bortchalou, 
the Armenians in the southern parts and the Georgians in Akhal-
kalakJ the number of troops shall be small. The Georgian troops 
must remain in .their present occupied positions1 the Armenian 
troops must withdraw to the D 1 segh-Djalal Oghli Turkish line; 
Between the areas of occupation of the Georgian and Armenian 
troops, British troops will be stationed on the rail-line; the 
administration of this disputed area will be mixed; 
In the Akhalkalak District~ an AlliedSupervisory Body, in which 
will be included representatives of both the Armenian and Moham-
medan native population, shall oversee Georgian ru1e; 
The representatives of both Armenia and Georgia shall in the near 
future be sent to Europe, where all the border question will be 
settled by the Big Powers. 
Though the Allied Commission reached Gharakil:i.ssa on December 
28th and gave a cease-fire order to the Armenians, the Armenian gov-
ernment having been forced by British pressure to accept the agree-
ment, the greatly reinforced Georgian army had begun a general of-
fensive the day before, and Georgian agents had stirred up an organ-
ized rebellion by the Mohammedan minority behind the. Armenian lines. 
The condition of the linreinforced and hungry Armenian troops was 
nearly desperate, for the Republic cou1d not supply them with the need-
,,-·. 
ed clothing, food supplies, reinforcements.1 or ammunition, and they 
could continue the fight only by means of the stores they had captured 
from the Georgian forces. 
Most of the new fighting took place around Shu1aver, where a 
series of attacks began by the Georgian regu1ar army on December 
27th were repelled by Korolkov 1s forces over a period of days. On the 
same days, 1 .. 000 Georgian regu1ars 1 aided by the Mohammedan volun-
teer bands;J succeeded in driving back small Armenian forces to Giavour 
Arkh and Sion villages, but the timely arrival of a small reinforcement 
/ 1<:./ 
under Timchenko to the right wing prevented a collapse of the 
Armenian position there. Though Georgian and Mohammedan 
forces entered Sadakhlou on December 30th~ they were hurled out 
by skillful use by the Armenian army of a captured armored car. 
General Dro finally received the reinforcements he had been de-
manding1 but Armenia could spare only 600 fresh men. Both sides 
were fighting against time, for the cease-fire was set for midnight 
of the 31st, and both Armenia and Georgia wished to have the ad-
vantage of position when it went into effect. 
On December 31st occurred a great battle, though the numbers 
involved appear small by modern warfare standards, between vastly 
s:uperior Georgian forces and the Armenian troops, the numerical 
advantage of the Georgians being perhaps two or three to one, around 
Sadakhlou. No clear decision was. won, though the Armenians were on 
the attack when the cease-fire ho1,1r struck. There has bee~ much chest-
thumping about the Battle of Sadakhlou by both the Georgians and the Ar-
menians as to who won; the mixed nature of the results supports the 
national pride of both sides. The important fact has been overlooked 1 
for neither side won by the last-minute battle. In fact, neither side won 
by the entire war,. which was unnecessary and disgraceful from the start. 
That the two sister Christian republics of Armenia and Georgia, despite 
earlier agreements on division of territories on a fair 1 ethnic basis, 
should have permitted the influence of a few chauvinist leaders to pre-
cipitate war was a great loss. to the two lands. The cost inlives~ while 
20~ 
not heavy~ was deplorable for lands newly liberated, which had already 
suffered the burden of warfare over a period of years. Armenia, es-
pecially1 could not afford the further loss oflives. While the fault 
lies mainly with a fraction of the Georgian leadersJ who carried " 
national self-seeking to a dangerous extreme, some Armenian guilt 
must be found in the situation also, for the Armenian leaders need not 
have let a situation develop in which it was necessary to liberate Ar-
menian districts. Calm acceptance of a temporary Georgian suzerainty 
over Armenian districts until self-determination could be applied through 
the Peace Conferencet perhaps would have contributed to settling Arm-
eno-Ge.orgian differences in an amicable way, to the ·point that Georg-
ian troops would not have been imposed on the districts, and the war 
would not have begun. At any rate 1 Georgian actions in rousing the 
Moha:m:rn.edan population and arming them during December was repre-
hensible; the embittered feelings roused both among the Georgians and 
the Armenians against each other made difficult future alliance against 
a common threat. Worst of all, the Georgian-Armenian war served to 
gain many converts to the Bolsheviks, who seized on the propaganda 
advantages to be found in warfare between the former Russian-ruled 
areas, both nsocialistic 11 republics, though their socialism was scarcely 
comparable or stron. 
During the last stages of the war and the month of January, the 
Armenians of Georgia and of the occupied areas were treated to a 
Turkish-style celebration of conquest which can only reflect on the 
christian Georgian people, for Armenians were stripped of all posses-
sions, even in the city of Tif1is.1- subjected to slavery, rap-e, looting, 
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and imprisonment or slaughter. while the Armenian national in-
stitutions were seized, the orphanages closed1 the relief supplies 
and the funds of the Armenian state in the Tifiis banks seized and 
the Armenian border districts depopulated by deportations. The 
social bitterness caused by such occurrences cannot be magnified. 
The later willingness of many Georgian Armenians to cooperate with 
or join the Bolsheviks in bringing Transcaucasia into the Soviet fold 
stemmed from those events, for many Georgian Armenians felt that 
Armenia had not been able to protect them as an independent state 
and were more than ready to aid in the Sovietization of Georgia, 
while willing to acquiesce in the end of Armenian independence. 
Though the peace conference between the two republics be-
gan in mid-January, 1919, Georgian representatives carried on a 
policy of stalling for time1 inasmuch as Armenia's condition more 
desperate with each passing day. Georgia had confiscated some 
13, 000, 000 roubles of Armenian state funds, a large part of the 
government's working capital, while its looting of the Armenian 
community in Georgia and its seizure of individual Armenians funds 
in Georgian Banks had seriously reduced the ability of the relatively 
wealthy Georgian Armenians to co:o.tribute to relief and other measures 
in Armenia. Though active persecution of the Armenians lessened 
and came to a halt after the arrival of the Armenian delegation, no 
real progress was made toward agreement on the various points of 
discussion until the Armenian government forced the issue by setting 
, ,., I 
a time limit on February l0th1 instructing the Armenian delegation 
to complete its work and return to Erivan by March. After February 
28th, in rapid order came agreements respecting diplomatic relations, 
recognition, transit :tights, the conditions of the rule to preva.U in the 
neutral belt of Lori, post-telegraph, passport rights for citizens of 
the two states, (but not the right to travel to Armenia of the Turkish 
Armenianrefugees), and such relatively minor issues. However~ no 
agreement could be had on the border question~ and, though normal 
diplomatic relations had finally been established, a residue of hos-
14 
tility remained. 
Early 1919 and the Growth of Armenia 
During the winter of 1918, as earlier stated, famine had been 
raging in the Armenian Republic, and epidemics of typhus, typhoid 
fever, and cholera decimated the population. In spite of every effort 
of the government, it proved impossible to improve the situation except 
temporarily, and, as food supplies began to vanish entirely in some areas, 
the total food supply of the Republic not being equal to the needs of even a 
minimum diet, large numbers of people died. The people of the country-
side foraged i~ the fields for grasses with which to stay alive, and the 
death rate achieved terrifying proportions. The Armenian Republic gave 
14. cf. Republic, pp. 195-213;M. Varandian, LaGuerre Armeno-
georgienne in entirety; W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian 
Battlefields, pp. ; Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Trans-
caucasia, pp. for the detailed history of operations and the outcome. 
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serious consideration to all possible ways of alleviating the general dis-
tress~ but the lack of accessible suppliesJ combined with the uncoopera-
tive attitude of the Georgian government~ rendered efforts to stem the 
distructive tide of the epidemics and the famine useless. The English 
forces in the Persian-Transcaucasian area helped in small part by 
bringing six cars of flour and grain to Alexandropol from Kars in Janu-
ary~ together with a small supply by way of Sharour to the south. A:n 
insignificant amount of flour was also brought from Tiflis by the English 
in January~ but from January until late April no further supplies reached 
Armenia. 
In late January, the Armenian coalition cabinet prepared an emer-
gency plan, ratified on January 27th by the Council of Arm·enia, to send 
special emissaries to Europe and, especially, to request of the American 
authorities immediate shipment of sufficient grain and flour to keep the 
country alive. Though Premier Katchaznouni personally w:ent to Ti:flis 
on February 15th to head that mission, the English authorities refused to 
permit him to leave the Transcaucasus for so long that he returned to 
Erivan and resumed his post on April 2nd. Finally securing the permis-
sion of the English command on April 16, he left with A. Enfiadjian 
{Minister of Budget), H. Firalian {Minister of Agriculture}, and army 
officerS. Melikian. Meanwhile 1 the President of the Council~ Avedik 
Sahakian, had gone to Tiflis on March 12th to plead before the Allied 
representatives for food and seed supplies. The first American relief 
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shipment finally reached Batoum on May 20th, and from then on1 large 
food supplies were sent to halt the threatened extinction of the Caucasian 
Armenian population. American relief supplies saved Armenia. All 
Armenia's transport was marshalled on an emergency basis to speed the 
flour supplies to all parts of the Republic. The Georgian Republict how-
ever~ still did not prove cooperative, but demanded a share of the supplies 
as rail rental fees:t and, at the sanie time, the Georgia.:as made no move to 
relieve the famine conditions in Georgian-occupied areas. The Armenian 
govermnent realistically faced the situation by immediately sending more 
than one-tenth of the supplies received to Akhalkalak. to k~ep alive the 
Armenian population there, despite the fact that it was now under Georgian 
15 
rule. 
Though the food problem remained the most important for some months 
more, the Armenian Republic sought to settle other pending issues. The 
English in Transcaucasia had not given satisfaction to what the Armenians 
considered legitimate demands, and the grievances could become trouble-
some. Especially~ the English attitudes toward Kars, Zangezour, and 
Gharabagh caused Armenian concern. In Kars, despite the fact that it 
had been historically an Armenian area,, was a part of the Christian Armen:. 
ian administration .section under the Trans caucasian Republic, and was 
always Gonsidered a part of Caucasian Armenia, the English officers 
had;, in practical fact recognized a Moslem assembly which sought to keep 
15. c£., Republic, pp. 214-7; Congress 1 p.6. 
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it a part of Turkey or~ failing that~ to create a new Moslem state known 
as Southwest Transcaucasia which would include Akhaltsikhe and Batoum .. 
Despite a compromise agreement with the Armenian gove:rmnent on Janu-
ary 8~ 1919, the British officers continued to display a marked pro-
16 
Moslem prejudice and did not extend proper cooperation toward reestab-
lishing the Armenian refugee population or Armenian adminstration. In 
a long documentary letter~ on March 6.~ the Armenian Foreign Minister, 
S. Tigranian, recited the history of British interference in Sharour-
Nakhi~chevan as: well, revealing that agreements had been drawn up 
between the representatives of the native Moslems and the Armenian 
government by. which the districts would accept peacefully Armenian 
suze;rainty, but British officers had interfered in order to prevent Armen-
ian, administration and peaceful relations. At th~ same time, Turkish 
underground organization was aided by British ignorance, complaisancyJ 
or sympathy in Sourmalou District, while the almost entirely Armenian 
area of Gharabagh was turned over to the Azerbaidjanian Republic by the 
17 
British. . In Akhaltisikhe, Akhalkalak, Baroum, Ardahan~ and Kars, 
the Mohammedan inhabitants were well-armed; the British did little to 
reduce that dangerous situation, instead standing by as onlookers while 
the Turks continued to send arms across the border of Turkey, and to 
build up military formations. 
16. A good example of the pro-Turkish bias: of the British officers is 
seen in A. Rawlinson1s memoirs, Adventures in The Near East {1918-
1922), pp. 151-5, inter alia. ·- ----- --- --
~For the complete text of this remarkable docUxn.entt see Republic, 
pp. 219-221. 
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The Armenian government continued to press the territorial ques-
tion before the Allies~ for the situation was critical. Armenia could 
not exist within the narrow strip of mountains it now held. It was imper-
ative that the refugees be returned to their fields to ease the food ques-
tion~ for with spring already near~ if the refugees were not given land 
and seed~ the country could not produce .sufficient food to prevent new 
mass starvation and a general famine. It was imperative for the govern-
ment to regain the Armenian areas at least of Russian Armenia in order 
to be able to govern,~ rather than continue to act primarily ~s a refugee 
relief organization and a caretaker of orphanages. The British:~ though 
they changed their attitude in April, 1919, had aided the propaganda of 
disruptive elements and by their initial unfriendliness ~oward the Chris-
tians had incurred deep suspicion of Allied motives. 
By agreement between the Allied Command and the Armenian govern-
ment1 it was decided that Kars Province· should be occupied by a joint 
force of British and Armenians. On April 24~ the city of Kars was 
taken without a serious fight, and the British imprisoned and deported 
members of the Moslem Assembly which sought to resist. On April 28, 
the entire administration of the city was given the Armenians.r and the 
refugees began to stream toward their homes. The reoccupation of 
Kars Province continued rapidly.r despite resistance in some places 1 
and by May 2 the Arpatchai-Sarikamish rail line was under Armenian 
control. On May 9th2' the Armenian forces. were welcomed into 01ti 
and Kaghzvan by the Kurds and Turks with salt and bread, in token of 
acceptance of·Armenian rule. On May llth, at a mass celebrated in 
the historic Armenian Apc;>stolic Church of Kars, vice Premier Khatissian 
(who had taken Katchaznouniis vacated post) declared that Armep.ian forces 
would occupy the Alashgerd Plain and Pass en by the 15th; Armenian ref-
ugees were already on the way to their homes in those districts. 
Similarly~ Arm'enian occupation of Nakhitchevan was swift and easy, 
once the British attitude changed because of instructions from the Council 
of The Allied Powers in Europe. On April 9, the Armenian government 
decided that the administration of Nakhitchevan should be divided into 
three districts: Goghtan, with Agoulis as its center; Nakhitchevan1 with 
Nakhitchevan city as its center; and.Sharour, with Bash-Norashen as its 
center. On May 3 1 a governor-general for the entire district was appointed, 
noted lawyer Gevorg Varshamian, and General Dro was designated to com-
mand the Armenian forces in tP,e re-occupation. On May 3rd also, an 
. order signed by English General Davies and Armenian General Dro to the 
population of Nakhitchevan tJ:lat that area was under Armenian adminis:-
tration, that the population should remain calm and peaceful, that the 
Armenian government would treat all subjects equally, without regard to 
race or religion was issued. On May 20th~ the Artn.enian army entered 
Nakhitchevan city. The entire reoccupation of Nakhitchevan took pl':Lce 
without incident, and the Armenian forces had been welcomed throughout 
18. Ibid., pp. 221-2 
the entire district by the remaining Armenian population and the refugees 
there. By the end of May, the refugees had been returned to their homes 
in Turkish-evacuated districts of Nakbitchevan~ Shirak., Kars, Kaghzvan, 
Koghb, Sardarabad, Sourmalou, and Vedi Bazar, and conditions of life 
were slowly improving as the administration became regularized and sup-
19 
plies· were sent. 
During the spring and early su:mmer months, the Armenian Republic 
made great strides in various fields of activity. Its diplomatic status 
rose as a number of nations recognized the government and sent repre-
sentatives to Erivan. Corrunercial negotiations were carried on with 
neighboring lands. The transit route via Tiflis and Batoum gave Armenia 
a link to Russia and Europe, though it was under Georgian control. Army 
reorganization and modernization began in January and promised good 
results, as the Council of Armenia cooperated by appropriating needed 
sums; the army was reduced somewhat in size, with only the January 1, 
1894 to the January 1, 1899 classes being kept under arms. Orphanages 
were opened in various centers and an agreement made with the Near 
East Relief by which that organization would take over the care of 15, 000 
. 
orphans for two years. The government appropriated 3, 000, 000 roubles 
to aid the starving population of Akhalkalak. and 7, 400, 000 roubles to 
provide seed grain for that district of Georgia. The government sent 
appointees and funds to organize and aid the relief and orphanage work 
19. Ibid. 1· pp. 222-4. 
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in areas outside Armenia~ as well as to all parts of the territory under 
the Armenian Republic. A central railroad administration was opened 
in Alexandropol~ and on April 29th an appropriation of 11~ 230,537 
roubles made to renovate the railroads, rebuild the stationsJ and recon-
struct needed buildings. On March 26tht an appropriation of 50, 000, 000 
roubles was made to provide seed for the rural population, but the work 
of the Ministry of Food Supply had been badly hampered by poor organi-
zation on an ad:ministrative level; on March 1, the Ministry was entrusted 
to K. Verm.ishian. On March 27th, because of the resignation of War 
Minister Hakhverdian, Colonel Araratian was raised to the rank of gen-
eral and given the ministry, with General Dro as his assistant. On 
April 25th, Armenia organized a Staff, with General Nazarbekian as 
Chief of Staff and Generals Hakhverdian and Baghramian as members J 
General Nazarbekian was also designated Commander of the Armenian 
20 
ar~y. 
Meanwhile, the political situation Within the country rapidly changed. 
Though there had been s.ome hope of effective government b'f a coalition 
cabinet between the Dashnak Party and the Jhoghovourtagan (Popular) 
Party, the e-egime came under increasing fire, as the Popular leaders 
continued to look to Tiflis, rather than Erivan. The Popular Party 
membership within the Armenian Republic, in disgust at the foreign 
20. Ibid.~ pp. 225-6. 
81~ 
orientation of their leaders, began to oppose the regime and a strong 
current was in operation against continuation of such a coalition. A 
riotous questioning of the ministers concerning use of police force 
against the unpacified and violently hostile Mohammedan minority of 
the Sourmalou section near Igdir on February 28th spelled the doom of 
the coalition. Now that the country in general was calm and government 
had been reestablished, demands were made for the holding of general 
elections. Finally, on April 27th, the Council of Armenia voted a reso-
21 
lution of dissolution, bringing to a close the coalition cabinet period, 
though the administration was empowered to continue ruling until a new 
regime could beg~. , 
The Union Of Western Armenian Lands 
. _.;..;__ ___ ----~ ---
and the Act of May 2 8, 1 919 · 
The Turkish Armenian refugees and the expatriate Armenian com-
munities were sharply divided over the establishment of the Armenian 
Republic. Noted Armenian revolutionary hero Antranig, for example, 
had d.enounced the new republic as "a creation of the Turks 11 • Turkish 
Armenians had long been faced with a critical political division in the 
Turkish Empire ,between the mass of the people in provincial areas and 
the clerico-wealthy classes in ~ome of the Turkish Armeniantowns, 
but more especially in the towns and cities of Turkey itself. While it 
would be dangerous and unscientific t~ hold that the division was abso-
22 
lute, that it existed is incontestable. 
21. Ibid~ 2 p. 227. 
22. This subject forms the basis for an unusually acute socio-historical 
study of the Western Armenian cm;nmunity inSarkis Ata.mianrs, The Ar-
menian Community, which also treats the growth of a pro-Soviet attitude 
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Because of the confusions caused by that socio-political division, 
a number of refugees from Turkish Armenia looked upon the Armenian 
Republic as only a temporary 11Ararat Republic 11 1 which would give way 
to a new1 enlarged Armenian state to be organized under the leadership 
of Boghos Nubar Pasha, the head of the Armenian National Delegation 
sent to Europe in 1912 by the Armenian Church authorities.· Boghos 
Nubar Pasha was supported most vocally by the Ramgayar Party, whose 
Caucasian Armenian ally was the Jhoghovourtagan (Popular) Party. 
While there is some question whether he was formally a member of the 
Ramgavar Party, Boghos Nubar Pasha, the son of the famed Armenian 
Prime Minister of Egypt, was treated in terms which make him appear, 
in retrospect, to have been a sort of heir apparent to a new Armenian 
throne, though the loose Ramgavar, Jhoghovourtagan, conservative, 
wealthy, clerical, townspeople alliance which supported him may not 
have so intended. At any rate, the confusion caused., especially the 
maintenance of both the official Armenian Delegation and Boghos Nubar 
Pasha's National Delegation at the Peace Conference, and the accept-
ance of both by the Allies., tended to create a sense of separation be-
tween the Western Armenian refugees and the Caucasian Armenians. 
Some refugees refused to ~ccept military service in the Republic 1s army 
or to perform their other obligations toward their nationality and the new 
state in the belief that they owed their allegiance solely to a forthcoming 
Armenian state to be created at the peace tables. 
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Despite that attitude of a minority of the refugees from the West~ 
the Armenian Republic did everything in its power to create an atmos-
phere of national solidarity, realizing that a feudal attitude of particu-
larism was a natural outgrowth of division UJ:?.der foreign rulet but, at 
the same time, a dangerous threat to the life of the Armenian state. 
The Republic 1s authorities willingly appropriated 35, 000 roubles to 
finance the calling of a Second Western Armenian Assembly, which would 
bring together the elected representatives of all the_ Turkish Armenian 
refugee populations in Transcaucasia! 
That Second Western Armenian Assembly was held in Erivan from 
February 6th through February 13th, with fifty-five elected delegates 
present, as well as the nine members of the inter-party organizing 
committee, two members of the Western Armenian Council, Simon 
Vratzian for the Armenian Republic, one member of the Brotherly Aid 
Gormnitteea: a representative of the Caucasian Armenian Benevolent 
Society, a representative of the Lord Mayor 1s Fundl two editors of 
refugee newspapers, Bishop Gevork Cheorekjian (on behalf of the 
Catholicos), and several invited guests. General Antranig refused an 
invitation to attend, and the refugees at Sissian, Ghamarlou, and Dara-
lagiaz did not send delegates, while the two delegates elected by those 
2.3 
at Gharakilissa did not arrive. Under the mistaken impression that 
Z3. Western Armenian Executive Body, Hamarod Deghegakir Arevmdahai 
Yergrort Hamakoumari, summarized in Republic, pp. ZZ9-Z30. 
217 
Boghos Nubar Pasha had an.nounded in Paris the independence of a free 
and United Armenia1 the delegates voted to support that new state, 
while at the same time calling for close cooperation with the 11Araratian 
Republic". A strange duality existed in the decisions they passed1 on 
the one hand seeking to satisfy the demands of the supporters of the 
Ramgavar Party and of the National Delegation, on the other encouraging 
2.4 
the supporters of the Ar~enian Republic and the Armenian Delegation. 
Nevertheless,. in spite of appeasement of the Ramgavar bloc in the official 
resolution1 it had been decided to· send messages to the government of the 
Armenian Republic asking that immediate steps be taken by the state to 
"declare the independence of Free and United Armenia and take practical 
steps to·:establish that union as a living reality. 11 
Though the executive body established by the Assembly was organized 
in such a fashion as to be, in effect, a govern:rnent alongside the govern-
ment of the Armenia;n. Republic, in keeping with the earnest desire of the 
Assembly that immediate measures be taken to unify the country;1 the exec-
utive body petioned the government of the Republic to proclaim Armenian 
areas in Turkish Armenia united to the area of the Republic. That petition 
was taken under advisement on February 25th by the government,. and 
after unanimous approval was given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
presentation to the Council. With popular sentiment strongly demanding 
24. See the official resolution of the meeting in Republic:1 pp. 231-2. 
213 
the union of the two major parts of Armeniat the Ministers 1 Council,. 
functioning in the name of the Council of Armenia1 accepted the proposed 
Act of Union on May 27, 1919., but withheld final approval until the twelve 
members .of the Western Armenian Executive Council could be present. 
In their presence.~ on May 281 1919 was passed the Act of Union, pro-
claimed throughout the capital to tl;te enthusiastic populace. The Jhorgho-
vourtagan {Popular) Party Ministers took a prominent part in passing .and 
25 
proclaiming that Act. The twelve representatives of the Western Armen-
ian Assembly also publicly proclaimed their approval of the Act. A civil 
amnesty was proclaimed in celebration, and criminal offenders were 
26 
granted a half-amnesty, that is, their sentences were reduced by one-half. 
From all Armenian settlements came messages of joy and congratulations, 
but the Ramgavar Party leaders overseas were crest-fallen. 
Within a few days 1 the Tiflis leaders of the Popular Party began to 
return to Erivan, to protest the action of the Armenian people as con-
trary to its interests. The objections centered around the fact that Boghos 
Nubar Pasha had not sanctioned that act beforehand. That incredible pro-
test., officially presented by the Popular leaders who had pr.eferred the 
comforts of Tifl.is to the difficulties of El"ivan, revealed a fact which has 
been difficult to compl"ehend fol" many Armenians, namely that the foreign 
25. cf., Republic, pp. 234-8 and Atamian, pp. 213-5, for discussions 
of the passage of The Act of Union. 
2.6. Republic, p. 237 
communities of the Armenian people are not actually in touch with the 
sentiments and desires of the native Armenians. That the Act of Union~ 
which roused the almost universal enthusiasm of the population of the 
Armenian Transcaucasus and of the Armenian refugees from Trukey~ was 
met by the stunned silence or the vocal opposition of a minority, and that 
minority almost exclusively in distant areas which had only ties of kin-
ship~ religion, and in part, culture with the living Armenian population, 
whether Caucasian or Western refugee, reveals how alien were the polit-
ical plans and attitudes of the leaders of part of the expatriate c?mmuni-
ties. The Armenian nation knew what it wanted. It had stated its case as 
to how that aim should be achieved. It had chosen loyalty to the Armenian 
Republic as the only practical path to national union. 
The Demands of the ''Armenian National Council" 
In support of the Armenian National Delegation of Boghos Nubar 
Pasha~ an international election had been called to form anArmenian 
National Council~ which was supposed to speak for the entire Armenian 
people, and to the composition of which there could well have been many 
serious objections. Simon Vratzian has pointed out the great disparity in 
27 
representation for the various Armenian colonies and has termed it repre-
28 
sentatlve not of the Armenian people, but of the expatriate community. 
27. For example, Roumania, with 40, 000 Armenians, had one repre-
sentative, the s~e number allocated to the minuscule colonies of Italy 
and Switzerland; England~ with no colony to be counted, sent two, the 
same as Persia, With over 100;~ 000. 
28. Republic, p. 243. 
That would certainly appear to be the case. 11Armenia11~ whether by 
that is understood the people of Caucasian Armenia or the ;efugees 
from Turkish Armenia in the Caucasusk had no representatives·. Ap-
parently planned to bqlster the appearance of Boghos Nubar Pasha's 
speaking for all the Armenian people~ and used by his Ramgavar Party 
supporters as a method of taking over rule in an independent Armenian 
state ·including Turkish Armenia, the elections proved a shock to many :a: 
for they showed that the Independent Republic of Armenia:a: and the 
Dashnak Party which was it.s st.J;ong:ast suppo:rt:t had gained the sym.p-
athy and loyalty of most of the expatriate Armeniansl to say nothing of 
the Armenians whithin the Republic. Though not all forty delegates were 
elected~ a number being appointed1 the Dashnak Party adherents re-
ceived a majority of the places. As Atamian states: 
. As for the rest of the list, 11 are Ramgavars, including the five 
· who were appointed or called:r leaving only 6 Ramgavars who 
were elected; 16 Dashnaks were elected and 1 appointed~ and 8 
were neutrals. with no party membership. 
Hence:r excluding the neutral and questionable categories or 
giving half of both categories to Dashnaks and half to Ramga-
vars1 the Dashnaks have a clear majority. Even by appoint-
ment and selection.3 the Ramgavars:a: apparently1 ~ould not 
gain control.. When Ramgavars argue that the Dashnaks opposed 
the Delega"tion of Western Armenians~ they seem to forget the 
international election in which the Dashnaks were elected into 
a majority ••• hence giving them at least as much no£ficial 11 
power to represent the Western Armenians also~ since the Ram-
gavars claim that only the delegation was the representative of 
the Western Armenians. From the United.States which had the 
largest number of delegates 1 four who were elected were Dash-
naks. The United States delegation was crucial in the prestige 
factor.. 29 
29. Atamian:t pp. 212-3 .. 
The Act o£ Union precipitated a crisis in Armenian political life. I . 
The external Ramgavar Party saJ its last ehance at establishment in 
I 
power "in a free Armenian state slipping through its fingers by the action 
o£ the Second Western Armenian ..t}sse:t:J?-bly and the Armenian Republic 1 
and it inim~dlately threatened a break in the delicate relations main-
I 
tained in Paris between the Arm~an groups. Boghos Nubar Pasha pre-
pared to issue a proclamation den~uncing the Union as a tyrannical seizure2 
but was restrained by the head o£ the Armenian Delegation~ Avetis 
Aharonian~ and other cooler persons. Negotiations began between Nubar 
. . 
Pasha and Aharonian to place the Armenian Republic_ on a broader £op.n.d-
ation; the Armenian Republic and the Dashnak Party,. still seeking to 
establish Armenian national unityJ welcomed such a possibilitY.• After 
the suspension of preliminary ~egoti~tions and the holding of Armenia 1s 
elections:t ~ubar Pasha sent a delegation,. headed by the noted Ramgavar 
leader Vahan Tekeyan,. to Erivan •. Nubar Pasha 1s supporters made pre-
posterous demands inthe prelimi~ary talks: that Nubar Pasha be made 
Premier o£ United Armenia~ but that he remain in Paris as head of the 
Armenian Delegation~ that the mil!l.isters he chose should not be subject 
to change by the Parliament; that "While some of the minsters should be 
Dashnak.s, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Military A££aris 
I 
i 
should be filled by non-Dashanaks;1 that the Armenian Delegation be com-
posed of ~hree or four persons semt by the parties~ but that the Turkish 
Armenian delegates be chosen by Nubar Pasha,. while the rest should be 
! 
ch~sen by the' coalition cabinet; thbse and the other conditions were of 
such a nature as to place Armenia under Ramgavar r'\il.a in spite of the 
30 
will of the people. 
Tho"lfgh the Dashnak Party later agreed to concessions which would, 
without qestion~ have seriously weakened the inte.rnal condition of the 
country~ the ability of the government to rule~ and~ not leastt the im-
portance in Armenian p-olitical life of that party~ the Ramgavar negoti-
ators who came to Armenia under the chairmanship of Vahan Tekey~ 
after the elections were adamant in their dema~ds for absolute political 
control.~ or1 failing that, an absolute veto power over the ability of the 
government to act~ seeking1 in effect, to create a 11Polish Parliament", 
31 
unaple to act because of veto. 
The Free Armenian Elections 
-----With the failure of these negotiations" the Armenian Delegation and 
the Armenian National Delegation urgently recommended that no further 
negotiations be started toward a coalition government until the distress-
ing diplomatic situation cleared somewhat. Meanwhile 1 in accordance 
with the electionpromise given.t on March lZ, 1919 was published the 
Law for the Election of the Armenian Parliamentt which gave the vote 
to all persons over the age of tv?"enty, regardless of sex, creed, or 
race; Armenia was to be regarded as one electoral unit, with votes 
electing candidates on. a proportional representation basis; the Turkish 
30. c£. S. Vratzian;t Panaktzoutyounner AzgainPatvirakootyan.t yev. 
HaiaSdani Hanrapetoutyan Mitchev,. p. 19; Republic1 pp. 247 -9; Atamian1 
p; Z16 
31. cf. Vratzian (Panak.tzoutyouru:ter) 1 supra, pp. 58-60; Atamian• pp. 
216-8; Republic, pp. 252-263 1 for the final discussions and the end of a 
ttcoalition'' program. 
Armenians were to have the same voting privileges as the Caucasian 
populations within the R:epubliq eighty deputies were to be chos-en. On 
April 25 ~ compilation of the registration lists in various sections· of the 
Republic showed., outside Kars and Sharour-Nakhitchevan, a total of 
365,780 qualified voters. 
The election was set for June 21~ 22~ and 23 in the various areas, 
and the parties had turned in their slates of candidates as follows: Dash-
riaks, 120; Armenian Popular Party~ 65; Social-Revolutionary Partyl' 35; 
Kurds, 2; Assyrians, 3. On June 20th~ in the midst of hot campaigning" 
a split occurred between the Tiflis-centered and the Erivan branch of 
the Popular Partyo On the.instructions of Boghos Nubar Pasha, the 
Tifl.is center of the Popular Party. reversed its policy and ordered a with-
drawal from the elections, as 'the Armenian Republic was held to be only 
a part of the country to be es.tablished2 therefore incapable of electing a 
Parliament. The Erivan Popular Party conti~ued to campaign~ but the 
gratuitous inslut to the land and the people made a deep impression:- In 
the elections, of the 3 65, 7 80 registered voters, 230:t 272 voted for the 
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (DashnakParty),. giving that group 72 
deputies; 13., 239 voted for the Social-Revolutionaries, giving 4 deputies; 
8~ 187. voted for Turks., giving them 3 deputies; 4~ 224 voted for the Non-
.partisan Peasant League, giving 1 deputy; Kurdish candidates received 
.. 32 
11 305 votes; the Popular Partyl' 4~1 votes; the Assyrians_, 178 votes. 
32. .cf. Republic, pp. 249-2$0., and Atamian, pp. 219-22.0. 
It is obvious that, even if the Popular Party had stayed ln. the race, 
even if the non-voting persons were taken as abstaining supporters of 
the Popular Party and the Ramgavar Party (limited to the Turkish Ar-
menian refugees_ exclusively) 1 the Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
had won the support of 63% of the eligible voting population of the Repub-
lie,_ exclusive of areas. where commrmications and security had still not 
improved to the point where free elections were possible. Of course.to the 
actual percentage was far highert for the slightly more than one-third 
who did not vote can scarcely be considered as protesting, the free elec-
tions by abs,tainingJ in view of the transportation difficulties,. the need 
for work in the fields, the hesitance of many women to participate, and 
other natural and understandable causes. 
The newly-elected parliament opened on August 1, 1919. The organ-
ization of a new cabinet was entrusted to A. Khatissia;n. A. Djamalian* 
V. Kh.oreni, and S. Vratzian were elected Majority leaders in the Parlia-
mentJ and A. Khatissian discussed the composi-tion o£ the new cabinet 
;;vfth them. The opening of a freely-elected Parliament was celebrated 
' 
throughout the capital city by the enthusiastic populace. At its second 
meeting, the Parliament elected its officers. On an urgent request from 
the Armenian.Delegation in Paris, Avetis Aharonian was elected formal 
President for the diplomatic prestige to be gained thereby in advancing 
Armenian negotiations. Levon Shant and S. Araratian were elected vice-
presidents, while H. Ter-Hacobian:t A. Safrastian, and A. Ter-Mikaelian 
were elected secretaries. 'rn the third session, .on.August 1t by a vote 
of forty votes to eightt A. Khatis:Sian was elected Premier, and the 
entire Parliamentary membership was divided into tw.elve committees. 
On August lOtht the fourth sessi0nt the ministries were ratified l:»Y a 
vote of thirty-seven to two; the ministers: selected were as follows: 
Premier and Foreign Mix:~:i'ster 1 A. Khatissian; Minister of Internal 
Affairs and of Justice, A~ Geulkh:andanian; of Budget and Food Supply, 
S. Araratian; of Welfare and Lapor 1 A •. Sahakian; of Public Education 
and Culture 1 N. Aghbalian; 'of Military Affairs, General K. Araratian. 
The arrival of the/ delegation sent by Nubar Pasha in mid-.October did 
33 
not alter the composition of the government. 
Armenia 1s organizing period was over. The borders had expanded 
and seemed about to include the major part of Turkish Armenia. Stabil.,. 
" ' . 
ity,. public safety and rehabilitation were advancing rapidly. Free 
elections had just been held, and the regime had been granted a 11land-
slidell mandate and vote of coniiQ.ence. 
33. Republic, pp. 251-263. 
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THE .ARMENIAN REPUBLIC: ITS LIFE AND DEATH 
1. Moslem Movements in Armenia 
The Turkish and Tatar minorities did little to disguise 
their enmity toward free Armenia. The Azerbaidjan leader-
ship encouraged dissidence within the boundaries of their 
neighbor, since they wished to be linked to Turkey by aMos-
lem belt across Gharabagh, Zangezour, Nakhitchevan, Sour-
malou, and Kars. ·on the withdrawal of the Turkish army, 
· with the encouragement· of the Turkish military 11 independent 
republics" had been set up by the Moslems of' various sec-
tions to frustrate rule by Georgia and'Armenia. 
Within the borders of Armenia were the usouthwest 
Transcaucasian Republic'• of Kars and the nAraxian Republicu 
of' Sourmalou, Zangi and Vedi Bazars, Mili, Sharour, and 
Nakhitchevan. Both ffRepublicsn were supplied with Turkish 
\ army cannons, machine-guns;· rifles, and Turkish officers. 
They were financed by the Azerbaidjani and Turkish govern-
.V 
ments. The recognition of' the Armenian Republic by Az-
erbaidjan served as a means for the organization of sub--
versive activities after the arrival of Khan Tekinsky, the 
i/Republic, P• -264. 
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representative of Azerbaidjan~ in Erivan~ in March~ 1919. · 
Turkish regular forces were being strengthened along 
the Armenian border~ and the Turkish army had placed large 
numbers of agents within the territory of the Republic to 
organize the Mohammedan minority. Especially strong efforts 
had been made in the Olti area~ Sarikamish District~ Alash-
gerd District~ Ardahan~ Bardous, and Gaghzvan. The news 
that English troops were being withdrawn from Transcaucasia 
poured oil on the fire of Mohammedan ambitions. By May 15, 
the English troops were withdrawn from Kars~ and from 
Nakhi tchevan by MaY 30, 1919. These withdrawals~ which 
appeared to the Armenians to be a betrayal, were the signal 
31 for the Turkish-organized revolution of the Moslems. · This 
time~ there was to be nothing left to chance; the extermina-
tion of the Armenians was to be completed wherever possible. 
The Armenian army was pitifUlly inadequate to provide mili-
tary security for all areas of the Republic: its munitions 
were old and in short supply. Its men were poorly clothed 
and poorly fed and had no reserve supplies to fall back upon. y 
It had little heavy armament, · while the Turks had carefully 
provided large numbers of modern cannon and machine-guns to 
gfFo~ ·the -do~uments of correspondence between Tekinsky and 
his government, cf. Republic~ pp. 265-8. 
3/cf. Rawlinson, pp. 150-222, on Turkish arming and British 
withdrawal; also, Republic~ pp. 268-9. 
1/Republic, pp. 268-9. 
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the secretly-organized military formations. · 
2. The Moslem Uprising 
On July 1~ at Beoyouk-Vedi~ where some 4~000 Moslem 
fighters had assembled~ occurred the spark which turned 
Moslem-Armenian relations into a bloody war. On that date~ 
nine Armenian soldiers and twelve civilians were killed. 
The Armenian army sent a detachment to arrest the roNrderers 
and secure recompense for the relatives of the slain. Under 
the guise of negotiating~ the Moslems prepared an ambush and 
suddenly opened heavy machine-gun fire on the surprised and 
unprotected Armenian force. They killed five officers and 
thirty soldiers and wounded seven officers and one hundred 
twenty soldiers. The Armenians fled. A detachment of the 
Armenian army later attempted to take the town~ but failed, 
on July 8. Both sides began to assemble their forces. In 
mid-July, Turkish army colonel, Khalil Bey~ with his staff~ 
officers~ and about three hundred soldiers arrived in 
Shahtakht to assume command of the Mohammedan movement. A 
general uprising of the secretly-prepared Moslem forces 
surrounded the small Armenian military forces in various 
centers of Nakhitchevan on July 20 and 21, but, while many 
of the Armenian inhabitants and soldiers were slain, the 
greater part succeeded in breaking out of the sieges and 
5/RawlinsonJ -supra, reveals that, contrary to the surrender 
terms~ the Turks had secreted large amounts of modern arma-
ment. 
. y 
reaching relative safety in Zangezour •. j The hurling back 
i 
of the Mohammedans from a line Khatchi~-Nors prevented the 
overrLTianing of Daralagiaz, but Nakhitc~evan had been lost. 
A series of emergency measures we~e declared by the 
i government. On July 23, the 26, 27, atid 28 year old classes 
I 
were called to the colors in Erivan, E~chmiadzin, and Sour-
malou Districts. The whole country wad mobilized on August 
I 
18. On July 24, the death penalty for !treason or rebellion. 
was instituted, and a forcible collect~on of arms and ammuni-
tion and a compulsory military tax wer~ decreed. On' July 28, 
I 
all officers to the age of 40 were recalled. On July 30, a 
I 
three-man Security Committee was established, composed of the 
i 
Premier, the Minister of Internal Affaj_rs, and the Minister 
! 
of Military Affairs; that Committee wa~ given plenipotentiary 
powers to act fo~ the defense of the c~untry, using whatever 
I , 
measures it saw fit without the need of approval by the Par-
I 
! 
liament or Cabinet. At the same time,jurgent appeals had 
been sent to the Allies for military s~pport. On July 26, 
i I • 
representatives of the British and French commands arrived 
I 
in Erivan with several hundred Indian ~roops. They held a 
i discussion on August 2 with Khalil Bey~ but had no success 
I 
in getting the situation under control;. On August 10, the 
I 
Armenian army attacked Beoyouk-Vedi against extremely strong 
resistance by large, organized, well-s~pplied Moslem forces. 
i 
~Details-of-the withdrawal from Nakhi~chevan are given in 
Republic, pp. 269-270. 
The battle lasted several days, and, i~ the end, the Armenians 
i 
managed to stabilize their position of (control there. While 
the country waited in hushed expectatio~ to see whether 
Armenia would survive, the Armenian Bo~sheviks distributed 
! 71 
in Erivan a call on the Armenian soldi~rs to desert.-
! 
Meanwhile, a series of attacks ha~ been unleashed in the 
Sourmalou-Koghb .District against the Ar~enian troops.on 
August 7. After first repelling tl:l.e Mqslems, the Armenian 
forces were obliged to retire, taking ~ith them the Armenian··· 
and Yezidi population. In the last we~k of August, Turkish 
! 
villages near Etchmiadzin were in openirevolt, even firing 
on American relief workers. Turkish o~ficers and soldiers 
in Zangibazar declared non-recognitionjbY the Moslem minority 
of the Armenian Republic. In Kars ProVrince, regular forma-
tions of the Turkish army and irregula~ Turk and Kurd forces 
attacked the Armenians at Gaghzvan, bu~ were repelled; Kurd-
ish and Turkish ir~egulars unleashed a 1 series of raids in 
the latter part of August in various parts o~ Kars Province. 
The Armenian army went on the offensiv~ throughout all Kars 
Province at the end of the month, and qy its.demonstration 
of power combined with the restraint s~own by the Armenian 
.• .a/ 
government succeeded in pacifying that~area.-
f 
During the height of the Moslem r~bellions, William . 
Haskell's mission to Armenia on behalf1of the Peace Confere.IJ.ce 
2/Ib~d., ·pp. ·271-2. 
fi/Ibid., pp. '272-3. 
! 
q (_) '1 
~d.l 
arrived in the area, reaching Gharakililssa on August 20 and 
i 
I 
Erivan on the 21st. He assured the .Ar~enian government of 
I 
the protection of all the Armenian population everywhere, of 
. I 
military supplies, men, and relief suppllies, of protection 
of the boundaries of the state, of makjng Azerbaidjan cease 
its nefarious activities among the Mos~em minority, and on 
9J I 
many other subjects. · Despite his so]emn pledges in Erivan, 
when he went to Baku to visit the AzerJaidjan government, he 
I 
signed a pact on August 29 whereby Sh,our-Daralagiaz and 
Nakhi tchevan Districts were to become tlneutral territories, 11 
under the governorship of a person to ~e selected by him and 
without the armed forces of either sid1 present, thus becom-
, 
ing 11disputed territories.u The same document declared that 
! 
the Armenian government must use its i.rkluence to urestrain 
I 
the Armenians of Zangezour, 11 while the !Azerbaidjan govern-
1 
ment would permit the Americans to pro~ide food for the 
, Armenian population of Gharabagh and Z~gezour, and Azer-
baidjan would receive sole rights in ada authority over the· 
I . 
railroad bei~~ built between Baku and 1julfa. Thus, High· 
Commissioner for Armenia Haskell, was Yjlding Armenian Zange-
' zour also to the enemies of the Republic, in his ignorance 
I 
of the conditions prevailing. The Arm$nian Republic sent 
i 
A. Khatissian and Rouben Ter-Minassian ito explain to him the 
i 
§)FGr·the-text-of Haskell 1 s speech to the Armenian Parlia-
ment, as well as his promises to the government, Q!. Republic, 
pp. 273-6. ' ! 
(~ '.J f) 
~..~,J_ 
views of the Armenian Republic on the clauses pertaining to 
Zangezour and Gharabagh, and as he understood the situation 
better he declared those clauses invalid, whereupon the Azer-
baidjan government refused to accept the pact. 
After long negotiations, both governments agreed to 
send three representatives each to aid the American Governor-
General of Nakhitchevan, who was to assume authority over 
that area on October 23·, 1919, but, at the last minute, the 
Azerbaidjan Republic refused its cooperation. The entry of 
Edmund L. Bailey as governor in no way changed the real situa-
tion of Sharour and Nakhitchevan, which remained partly ~Ulder 
Armenian military rule and partly a non-governed Moslem 
l.Q/ 
lfstate." · 
3. The Gharabagh Issue 
Gharabagh, the mountainous continuation of the area 
under .Armenian rule, was far more overwhelmingly Armenian 
in population than any part of the Republic. Before the war, 
it had had 70 per cent Arme~5an and 27 per cent Moslem popu-
lation, but during the war years, with the influx of refugees 
from Turkey, Persia, and from the massacres and terror un-
leashed by the Azerbaidjanis in the adjacent lowlands, that 
preponderance had increased greatly. An integral part of 
Historic Armenia and deeply attached to the Republic, 
iQ/The declaration of American rule and the attitudes of the 
two governments is given in Republic, pp. 278-9. 
Gharabagh felt that it could belong only to the Armenian 
state. Indeed1 it is hard to understand the Azerbaidjani 
claims to the area except as an expression of a bitterly 
anti-Armenian1 pan-Turk mentality. 
The relations of the Christians and Moslems in Gb.ara-
bagh at first were excellent; when the Russian revolution 
broke forth, immediately they had organized a Turco-Armenian 
Interparty Bureau, which was to govern both Gharabagh and 
Zangezour, but which, in fact, received recognition only in 
Gharabagh. Armenian sections were ruled by Armenians; Tatar, 
by local Tatars. On the dissolution of the Transcaucasian 
Federation, the Turkish army and Caucasian Moslem irregu-
lars of Nuri Pasha moved over much of Azerbaidjan1 s terri-
tory, as already described in the section on the Defense of 
Baku. The Gharabagh Bureau refused to accept the suzerainty 
of Azerbaidjan and declared its self-government. A council 
of Commissars, including both Moslems and Armenians, after 
one month declared itself converted into the Independent 
People 1 s Government of Gharabagh. Agents of the Turks and 
Azerbaidjanis sent into Gharabagh gradually changed that 
peaceful scene to one of anarchy and bloodshed, as they 
aroused the Moslems of some villages to loot and kill the 
Armenians. Retaliations took place. Despite these lawless 
acts, general peace was maintained by the joint efforts of 
the local Tatar and Armenian leaders until the summer of 
1918. At that time, a brigade of the Turkish army, aided 
by local Moslems, moved from Evlakh to Shoushi, destroying 
the Armenian villages along the way and slaughtering their 
population. They cut the road to Zangezour and massacred 
the population of the large Armenian center of Gharagh 1 shlagh, 
which linked the two sections. On September 18 to 20, the 
Gharabagh Assembly met and decided to accept Azerbaidjanian 
suzerainty in the belief that that would stop needless 
bloodshed. On September 26, the Azerbaidjanis entered 
Shoushi unopposed, whereupon they immediately disarmed the 
Armenians. The Armenian pop~llation seized the collected 
arms before they could be removed, and a series of hang-
ings and arrests of Armenian leaders began. 
' 
The rural population, infuriated, cut all con_~ections 
with the city, for ·they considered the acceptance of Azer-
baidjani suzerainty treason, and prepared to fight, sending 
delegations to General Antranig in Zangezour to urge him to 
send aid. Azerbaidjani authority did not extend outside 
the city; to alter that situation, the government sent a 
division composed of both native Moslems and Turkish sol-
diers, together with a few Armenian collaborators, to 
pacify the area and establish Azerbaidjanian rule. That 
force was cut to pieces ru~d routed with heavy losses on 
October 18 by the irregular force of the Armenian villagers, 
who took mu~h booty, including two cannon. 
On the demand of the Allies, the Turkish soldiers with-
drew from Gharabagh on October 30, 1918. General Antranig, 
meanwhile, had made preparations to come to the aid of the 
Armenians there. On November 16, his troops had cleared 
much of the area and were moving on the city of Shoushi. 
Receiving instructions from the British commander in Tiflis, 
Antranig withdrew his forces to Zangezour and, immediately 
thereafter, the Moslems massacred the populations of Harar, 
Spitagashen, and Petrosashen Armenian villages, further re-
ducing the link between the.two sections. The British took 
charge of the area in December and permitted Azerbaidjan to 
appoint a governor-general for Gharabagh-Zangezour on 
January 15, 1919. Sultanov, the appointee, was considered 
by the native Armenians a war criminal, and the Armenian 
Republic sent a very strong protest against that action; 
stating that Gharabagh and Zangezour were inseparable, in-
tegral parts of the Armenian Republic. Azerbaidjan replied 
that that protest was interference in her internal affairs • 
. At the same time, the All-Gharabagh Provisional Assembly 
met on February 24 and sent a strong protest, declaring 
Gharabagh an inseparable part of Armenia. 
In late February a British force of four hundred was 
sent to maintain peace, accompanied by representatives of 
the Baku Armenian Council. Despite the strong pressure of 
the British and Sultanov, the representatives refused to 
sign a declaration that Gharabagh must be provisionally 
handed to Azerbaidjan. The British again proclaimed that 
the Armenians must submit to Azerbaidjani rule in Ghara-
bagh on April 3, and the fury of the Gharabagh population 
against the British was mounting daily. 
Strong Azerbaidjani and, especially, British efforts 
to make the Armenian-populated region accept Azerbaidjani 
rule continued unabated throughout April despite the strong 
protests and refusal to cooperate of the representatives of 
the local population. In May, with British approval, Sul-
tanov brought in large numbers of Azerbaidjani troops to 
force acceptance. On June 3, with Shoushi surrounded on 
all sides, Azerbaidjani troops took up positions within 
the Armenian quarter. Despite the British promise on that 
day that nothing would happen to the Armenians, on June 4 
general firing began from the Tatar quarter, but Armenian 
defense groups soon seized the Azerbaidjani strong-points 
in the Armenian quarter and began a savage resistance 
against the threatened massacre. On June 5, nearby vil-
lages were subjected to massacre, rape, and looting by the 
Moslems, under the noses of the British force, and several 
hundred Armenian men were slain. The following days saw 
massacre and looting become more general, with Azerbaid-
jani regular troops joining the marauders, and machine-
guns being provided to punish those villages which resisted. 
On June 12, the British force left Gharab.agh, leaving 
Sultanov completely free to deal with the situation as he 
wished. Hatred of the British swept the Armen2an people 
everywhere where there were Armenian settlements in the 
Caucasus. Demonstration took place inErivan and Tiflis in 
front of the British representatives. Proceeding more cau-
tiously, the Azerbaidjan government convened the All-
Gharabagh Assembly on June 28, with members of the Ghara-
bagh expatriate community in Baku and of the Azerbaidjan 
government in attendance, but without Sultanov or British 
representatives. Despite their feeling of solidarity with 
the rest of Armenia, the members of the Assembly thought 
it best to elect a three-man plenipotentiary negotiating 
committee, composed of three leaders of the Gharabagh Armen-
"' ians, Rouben Shahna.zarian, Aramais Ter-Danielian, and 
Gerasim Khatchatrian, to go to Baku for negotiations with 
the government there. En route, Gerasim Khatchatrian was 
assassinated by a Tatar. After discussions with the leaders 
of the Baku Compatriotic League, of Gharabagh Armenians and 
the Baku Armenian National Council, they prepared a prelimi-
nary agreement stipulating conditions by which Azerbaidjan-
ian sovereignty would be acknowledge. On August 12, 1919, 
the members of the All-Gharabagh Assembly again met and;-
after refusing to receive persons sent by Sultanov, sent a 
bitter protest to him about the murder of Khatchatrian. On. 
August 14, Sultanov personally visited the Assembly and de-
livered an ultimatum that they recognize the temporary sov-
ereignty o:f Azerbaidjan within forty-eight hours. After 
long discussions, the delegates became convinced that out-
side help coUld not be gained, because of the inability o:f 
the Armenian Republic to render sufficient aid, but largely 
because the British were supporting Azerbaidjan, thus 
cutting off any hope of aid from the Allies; on August 16, 
they went to Sultanov, to accept the ultimatum. On August 
22, 1919, an agreement placing Gharabagh under Azerbaidjan's 
temporary jurisdiction was signed, and the Armenian Repub-
, 11/ 
lie had lost an important part of Russian Armenia. · · The 
bitterness· caused by British pro-Azerbaidjani intervention 
can scarcely be imagined after the passage of so much time 
and until the present the effects of that betrayal are 
apparent in various aspects of Armenian political life. 
4~ Trouble in Zangezour 
Zangezour and Gharabagh had been ruled by a joint 
assembly for a short time after the Russian Revolution. 
That assembly, composed of both Moslem and Christian rep-
resentatives from either section, elected an Executive 
Body, centered at Goris. In mid-August, 1917, because of 
the growing disparity in economic conditions between 
ii/Summarized·from Republic, pp. 280-294. See ibid., pp. 
291-3 for the full text of the agreement. 
Zangezoux and Gharabagh~ but especially because of the 
rapidly worsening Christian-Moslem relations in the former~ 
it was decided to call an All-Zangezour Assembly. With the 
population of the entire district about one-half Moslem~ 
one-half Christian, though the Armenians had 65 per cent 
if certain all Moslem peripheral areas were eliminated~ it 
was agreed that each community would be allowed 31 delegates. 
on August 15~ 1917, the Zangezour Assembly met, with 24 
Dashnak and 7 S.D.~ S.R.~ or other Armenians~ 28 Mussava-
tist and 3 Social Democrat Turko-Tatars. An Executive Body 
of four members and a Territorial Committee of seven, in 
which both peoples were represented, failed to operate 
effectively because of the efforts of the Mussavat to take 
control of the area. Failing that~ the Turko-Tatar leaders 
declared the independence from the rest of Zangezour of the 
Turko-Tatar inhabited areas, and the situation grew more 
tense as spring approached. On January 25, 1918~ an inter-
Party Armenian committee (9 Dashnaks, 9 others) was ini-
tiated in Goris to organize the rule of the Armenian sec-
tions, but through inexperience and lack of funds it failed. 
As May approached~ the Armenian regions prepared local 
defense bodies to repel the migratory tribes of Moslems, 
who annually brought their flocks to the mountains of the 
Zangezour District, causing great destruction along the way. 
With the current food and political situation, permitting 
the nomads to pass would mean starvation in the winter and 
immediate Turkish or local Moslem control, with the des-
truction of the Armenians. In May, a part of the Khnous, 
Sassoon, and Van Turkish-Armenian refugees and military 
formations reached Zangezour and placed themselves at the 
disposal of the local defense groups. In June, 1918, great 
battles were fought between the nomads, supported by large 
numbers of local Turks, and the Armenians. After much 
bloodshed, the Armenians proved successful on all sides. 
Meanwhile, the Zangezour population had declared their dis-
trict a part of .Armenia, and they had petitioned the newly-
formed Republic to send an experienced military leader to 
head their forces. At the end of July, 1918, though not 
sent by the authorities of the Republic, General ~tranig 
arrived and was hailed by the people. In August and Novem-
ber, the Turks conducted unsu~cessful mass offensives 
against Zangezour. 
The arrival of the British after the surrender of the 
Ottoman Empire altered the situation. Strenuous unsuccess-
ful attempts were made by them to place Zangezour under 
Azerbaidjani administration. Instead, the Armenians called 
together a nine-man elected Zangezour Central Armenian 
Council, which began to rule at the start of December. It 
is significant that the Zangezour population achieved great 
success in making a success of re-establishing government, 
law~ and order in their district, with functioning law-courts, 
a tax system~ and even a compulsory military service for the 
Armenians. 
At the end of January, 1919~ the Zangezour Council 
sent A. Shirinian to Erivan to urge the government to im-
mediately send funds and arms~ as well as to hasten the 
sending of a governor. On March 6~ 1919~ Arsen Shahmazian~ 
the semi-secretly appointed governor (because of the opposi-
tion to Armenian sovereignty there by the British)~ arrived 
in Goris~ with his instructions calling for him to rescue 
Gharabagh and Zangezour from the British pressures and make 
certain the legitimate Armenian interest was safeguarded. 
On March 31~ an all Zangezour Assembly met~ received the 
resignations of the Council members~ and organized the 
Zangezour-Gharabagh_Regional Council to unite the two sec-
tions and make certain that these predominantly Armenian 
sections should become an official part of the Armenian Re-
public. That Council was composed of four Dashnaks~ two 
Social Democrats (Bolshevik), and one non-party person. By 
the end of July, 1919, that Council had effectively es-
tablished administration over all Zangezour. Yet, that 
reconstruction of government, which rescued Zangezour from 
chaos, had been performed despite almost constant warfare, 
for from April till the end of November a series of Turko-
Tatar-Kurd attacks had been unleashed against Zangezour by 
the Azerbaidjan Republic 1 s agents, leading to a number of 
bloody battles, with several thousands on each side. De-
spite its determination to remain Armenian, Zangezour was 
under strong British pressure to join Azerbaidjan. The 
British proposals were rejected in such vigorous fashion 
that the British representative left the area in May, and 
the Azerbaidjani government took over the task openly. 
After closing the Gharabagh issue, as already described, 
and having roused the Mohammedan insurrections within 
Armenia, the Azerbaidjanis collected large forces of regu-
lars and Mohammedan irregulars on three sides of Zangezour 
in October, to sweep it by a concerted drive. A demand. 
was made for the peaceful surrender of Zangezour by Sultan-
ov, but the Armenians were adamant, and, on November 1, the 
Azerbaidjani offensive began. For three days, the Moslem 
forces inched forward, only to be stopped by the desperate 
defense organized by Governor Shahmazian. On November 6, 
1919, the Zangezour Armenians routed the Azerbaidjani forces, 
taking one cannon, twenty machine-guns, and large numbers 
of prisoners and supplies; the Azerbaidjan army 1 s 2nd 
Cavalry Brigade was annihilated. News of the events in 
Zangezour caused great disturbances in government circles 
of Transcaucasia. Colonel Raye, acting for Haskell, and 
the British representative immediately called for peaceful 
discussions between the Armenian Republic and Azerbaidjan 
to st0p hostilities and settle the Zangezour issue. Azer-
baidjan at first denied its use of troops, claiming that 
only nvolunteerstt were involved., but when the full scope 
of the disaster to Azerbaidja.n:i arms became known, the Min-
ister of War hastened to agree to the Allied demand. 
On November 20, 1919., an agreement was made that: 
l. The governments of Armenia and Azerbaidjan 
are obliged to halt the present operations 
and new clashes shall not take place. 
2. The governments of Armenia and Azerbaidjan 
are agreed to take legal steps to open and 
repair roads leading to Zangezour for pe~ce­
ful transportation. 
3. The governments of Armenian and Azerbaidjan 
are obliged to settle all disputed issues, 
includlug the boundary issues, by means of 
peaceful agreement, until the decisions of 
the Conference stipulated in the next 
article. In the event that it shall not 
be possible to reach peaceful agreement, 
both sides shall be obliged to jointly se-
lect a neutral'person., whose decision shall 
be mandatory for both sides. For the pres-
ent, that person shall be considered Colonel 
James s. RaYe of the United States Army. 
4. The governments of Armenia and Azerbaidjan 
are obliged to select delegates immediately 
and of equal number for a conference to be 
opened in Baku on WednesdaY, November 20, and 
which is to be moved to Tiflis on December 4, 
where the sessions of the conference will be 
continued •••• That conference shall investigate 
all those issues which have brought forth dis-
pute and clashes between the two governments, 
and it shall have plenipotentiary power to 
settle those issues by agreement or by arbi-
. tration. 
• • • • 
Despite that agreement, while no military forces of 
either Republic were involved, the bitterness caused by the 
earlier clashes continued, and, at the end of November and 
throughout December, a number of clashes and massacres 
occurred. By the begil~ng of 1920, the Armenian area 
of Zangezour was cleared of .uinternal enemyu Turko-Tatars, 
and the Moslem areas were clear of tlinfidel cattlen Armen-
ians. 
5. Trouble in Goghtn 
Meanwhile, in the nearby area of Goghtn, a part of the 
Nakhitchevan District, the Armenian population had been 
greatly reduced during the Turkish military occupation in 
late July, 1918. After the Armenian occupation of 
Nakhitchevan in May, l9l9, Goghtn became a separate dis-
trict, with Agoulis as its center. The Armenian popula-
tion of Agoulis itself had not suffered heavily at the 
hands of the Turks and the section quickly became over-
whelmingly Armenian as refugees returned. 
The general Mohammedan rebellion within the Armenian 
Republic cut off Goghtn, and while many thousands of Armen-
ians were slaughtered throughout Nakhitchevan as a whole, 
part of the Armenian population of Goghtn, by bitter re-
sistance during July and August, succeeded in preserving 
their lives. Only six villages remained fre~, and these 
were in the last stages of starvation while staving off 
the attacks of the Moslem irregulars from surrounding areas. 
When that news reached Armenia's capital~ immediate prepara-
tions were made to send a rescue expedition with troops, 
food, and supplies. That force left Erivan on September 4. 
Under its leader Ghazar, the expedition quickly reached 
Goghtn by way of Zangezour and collected and organized the 
native population. A force of seven to eight hundred 
fighters was trained, which soon proved its mettle by beat-
ing off Turko-Tatar attacks in mid-November~ With greater 
forces~ the Moslems again attacked, but were beaten off on 
November 25, losing heavily in men and ·supplies. 
The Moslem population from Ordubad and its environs 
looted the large village of Nerkin Agoulis on December 18, 
but its inhabitants had fled to the safety of the small 
town of Verin AgoULis •. Azerbaidjani officials administer-
ing Nakhitchevan after the Mohammedan Rebellion were pres-
ent and guaranteed the safety of the town. Detachments of 
Azerbaidjani regulars assembled in fro~t of Agoulis and a 
large Mohammedan force gathered. On December 25~ Agoulis 
was annihilated in one of the most brutal massacres known 
in Moslem-Christian relations in the Nakhitchevan area. 
The women were subject to unmentionable treatment~ and the 
few survivors were a handful of women and girls who were 
taken as objects of lust by the Azerbaidjani administrators 
and later kept as household slaves. The anger of the 
l)!. 6 
r;. •• d:. 
Armenians in the mixed southern parts of Caucasian Armenia 
knew no bounds~ and for many months thereafter the Armen-
ians of Goghtn and Zangezour carried on a bloody retalia-
tion for the town which had placed itself under Azerbaid-
12/ 
jani government protection. · · 
6. Internal and External Progress in 1919 
Despite the Turkish-Azerbaidjanian plotting against 
the life of the Armenian Republic~ the Armenians succeeded 
in not only resisting 3 but in solidifying their internal 
and external position as well. Immediately after the 
ending of the Armeno-Georgian War, Avetis Aharonian had 
been sent to Europe to head the Armenian Delegation (not 
to be confused with the no~government National Delegation 
of Boghos Nubar Pasha) at the Peace Conference. On February 
12, 1919~ Avetis Aharonian and Boghos Nubar Pasha jointly 
presented the Armenian demands to the Peace Conference. 
Territorial demands were that Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, 
Kharpert, eastern Sepastia~ Erzeroum~ and TrebizandProv-
inces; Marash, Sis~ Djebel-Bereket, and Adana Sandjaks~ 
with Alexandretta; and all Erivan Province, the southern 
part of Tiflis Province~ the southwestern part (Gharabagh 
and Zangezour) of Eliza~etpol. Province, and all Kars Prov-
ince except the area to the north of Ardahan be a part of 
~Ib1d. 1 -pp.-295-3l0 relates the little known history of 
these-areas. 
the Armenian state, that is, that Historic Armenia be re-
constituted in major part. Other demands included inter-
national guarantee of Armenian territorial integrity and 
state security, either by the Allied Powers or by the 
League of Nations, a mandate to a major power for a period 
of twenty years, restitution to the Armeriians for their 
losses in the Turkish genocide, etc. Promises were secured 
that the United States would give preference to the accep-
tance of a mandate over Armenia. The public pr.omises and 
actions of the Peace conferees appeared to be very favorable 
for Armenian inter~sts during the spring and summer months 
of 1919, and the sending of the Harbord Mission to Asia 
Minor and the Transcaucasus to investigate the conditions 
relative to American accept~~ce of a mandate over Armenia 
w 
made a deep impression. · · 
In response to urgings from the Supreme Allied Council, 
the Armenian government bent every effort to better its re-
lations with neighboring Georgia and Azerbaidjan. That 
task was especially difficult not only because of boundary 
issues, but more fundamental divergences in political ori-
entation and inclinations. Especially, the bitterly anti-
White policy of Georgia and Azerbaidjan rendered agreement ... 
13/cfo, Missakian, pp. 74-90; Congress, pp. 6-7; James H. 
Tashjian, "The American Military Mission to Armenia11 (13 
parts), Armenian Review, Nos. 5-17, 1949-1952, for the 
diplomacy of the time; ·as well as on the sending of the Har-
bord Mission,. 
difficult, for the Armenians accepted the Russian Whites as 
a force capable of restoring order in Russia itself and 
felt that the worst enemy of freedom for the Transcaucasian 
states was Red Russia, with its cynical policies. The Armen-
ians liked the Russians as a people, while the Georgians and 
Azerbaidjanians were hostile to them, and the Armenians 
would have welcomed the support of a free and democratic 
Russia, making no secret of affection for the Russian people. 
Georgians were willing to go along with the strong desire 
of the Azerbaidjani leaders to cr'eate a 11 Confederation of 
the'Caucasus, 11 which would attack Denikin and Kolchak in 
the rear and war on the Russians, but the Armenian govern-
ment wanted no part of such a plan. First brought forward 
at the Conference of the four Caucasian Republics in Tiflis, 
on April 27, the 11 Confederationtt plan met the same .fate 
that every other topic discussed at the Conference over its 
three weeks of life suffered, for not a single topic brought 
agreement between the four states, whether boundary, refugee 
rehabilitation, common diplomacy, common defense, or other. 
Despite a quick Georgian-Azerbaidjani Mutual Defense 
Pact against White Russian attack, and a generally un-
friendly attitude in Armenian relations with its two neigh-
bors, Armenia and Georgia agreed to hold a conference to 
discuss transit, division of the railroad locomotives, divi-
sion of the Transcaucasian Republic's possessions, the 
citizenship question, the functioning of Armenia's credit 
in Tiflis, and the lifting.of customs prohibitions. Though 
' both sides made extensive concessions from their previously-
held positions, it proved impossible to reach agreement on 
the boundary issue when the conference opened on September 
17, 1919. Though unable to compromise finally on the bound-
ary because Georgia wanted to retain the copper mines of 
Allahverdi, while Armenia wanted to get back as much 
Armenian-populated territory as possible, on November 3 the 
two Republics signed two agreements, which settled the rail-
road and transportation problem and established that in.all 
matters of dispute or disagreement there would be a settle-
ment on the basis of either coming to a common agreement or 
resort to arbitration. Earlier, Georgia and Armenia had 
agreed to joint administration of the neutral zone of Lori, 
under British supervision; with the departure of British 
troops, the Rep~blics agreed to continue jointly financed 
administration under neutral supervision, to continue the 
position and the strength of their troops in Lori and of 
the villages unchanged, and to investigate through neutral 
officers whether both sides were abiding by the unchanged 
military strength clause. The relations of Georgia and 
Armenia had, thus, improved considerably during 1919. 
Attempting to better relations with Azerbaidjan also, 
the Armenian government held a conference in Baku, on 
December 14~ with the Azerbaidjani government. The agenda 
covered the boundary issue~ establishing a railroad and 
commerce pact~ improving the condition of the refugees, 
the juridical-legal relations of the citizens of the two 
republics, and the consular question. Despite long dis-
cussions, it proved impossible to discuss seriously any of 
the matters on the agenda because of the opposition of the 
Azerbaidjanis to set up a provisional border between the 
two states and their insistence on the organization of a 
nconfederation. 11 Though it was apparent that the Azerbaid-_ 
jani government and the Mussavat Party did not desire to 
reach agreement with Armenia, the Armenian delegation re- __ 
turned to Erivan for fresh instructions, and the confer-
14/ 
ence was scheduled for continuance in Tiflis. · The very 
fact that negotiations would continue in itself signified 
an improvement over the past year's relations with Azer-
baidjan, for, in effect~ the two republics had been on the 
verge of war almost continuously during that period. 
Internally many improvements were noticeable, and 
Armenian civil life made rapid strides. By summer of 1919 
Armenia was already a fully organized state, with ten dis-
tricts. In each district there were established courts 
(conducted in the Armenian language, except in Ardah~). 
A number of large villages had become city centers of 
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administration. On May 25~ the district governors had been 
called to a conference in Erivan with the Internal Affairs 
Mlnistry; the agenda included definition of administrative 
borders, training of police and the establishment of a 
police academy, improving the condition of the administra-
tors and police, the question of uniforms for all police. 
After that conference~ the task of recreating security of 
life and property under law, with police protection, pro-
12/ 
gressed rapidly. · · 
The government was proceeding slowly in 1tArmenianiz- -
ingn all the governmental bodies• functioning~ that is, 
converting them to the use of the Armenian language. The 
Turkish Armenian refugees and a number of the Caucasian 
Armenians demanded a radical speed-up of that program. 
On April 17, a conference was called of the editors of all 
the Armenian newspapers~ which were the most vocal in that 
demand. Partly under the influence of the strong resolu-
tion passed at that conference, on May 15 the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs sent a directive to all officials that 
all publications, speeches, minutes, and records were to 
be in Armenian, except in court cases or petitions pre-
sented., by non-Armenians, in which case Russian was to be 
permitted. By the end of the year, the Armenianization, 
program was already completed, in greater part, and on 
December 26, Armenian became the legal language of the 
16/ 
country.· 
Obtaining the services of noted engineer s. Zavalishin 
the government established a fund of four million roubles 
to investigate the hydroelectric and irrigation potential 
of the country. With seventy engineers, technicians, min-
ing engineers, geologists, and botanists, he surveyed the 
land and drew up plans for the development of Armenia's 
J:1./ 
water-resources after a year-long investigation. . . On 
May l~ the government took steps to assure the public ex-
ploitation of mineral wealth by nationalizing the salt-
mines of Goghb and instituting a state Salt Commission to 
distribute and sell that product. On May 3, the govern-
ment appropriated 36,200,800 roubles for repatriation and 
resettlement activity in Kars. On May 16 an act was passed 
to establish a university. On May 25 the first art festi-
val of free Armenia was held in Erivan, at which time the 
government, the Haicoop (Society of Cooperatives), and the 
Erivan City authorities p~ITchased a number of paintings to 
encourage artists in the Republic. On May 26 it was 
:L6(.fb:td., ·PP• · 321-2. 
lZ/That is the master plan which Soviet propa~anda for many 
years has claimed as one of the most outstand~ng examples 
of Bolshevik planning. Though the entire Zavalishin Program 
was expected to reac~and indeed was based on, completion 
· within 15-20 years, the Soviet regime to date has not com-
pletely fulfilled that plan, though Armenia has been Sovi-
etized since 1921. 
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decided to open the Kars-Bato~un route and to move food 
supplies by that route; that move was successful, and a 
quantity of flour was transported before the line of 
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travel was closed by the anti-Georgian Adjaristan rebellion. 
On May 30 the government decided to close all schools for 
repair and renovation of the buildings before the start of 
a new school year; 10,970,925 roubles were allocated for 
school use. By the end of the year, in Erivan, Kars, 
Alexandropol, Etclmrladzin, Lori-Pambak, Itchevan, and Nor 
Bayazit and Zangezour Districts, there were 431 elementarY 
schools, with 1,096 teachers and 38,015 pupils, and 20 
intermediate schools, with 288 teachers and 5,162 students. 
On June 24, 9,744,100 roubles were appropriated to pay for 
the transportation and resettlement of 20,000 Armenians 
from interior Azerbaidjan, the districts of Noukhi, Aresh, 
Shamakhi, Geoktchai, and Ghoubai. On July 9 the Armenian 
Republic granted 100,000 roubles of emergency relief to 
the Armenian Writers' Union, for distribution to needy 
authors. On August 25, it was decided to centralize re-
construction. On October 17, a five million rouble grant 
was made to the Society of Cooperatives (Haicoop), as the 
government gave great importance to the growth of the 
----------
18/ 
-----
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"""-' '::! 
cooperative movement. · · By these means and many other de-
cisions and acts not mentioned, aided by the relief work of 
the American agencies, by the hard work and efforts of the 
population, Armenia had rescued itself from the brink of 
national extermination, had begun to organize national life, 
had brought about an exemplary start toward restoring civil 
security, had proved itself capable of self-government, and 
had aroused such a high degree of enthusiasm among the 
Armenians outside the country that they were organizing to 
121 help the infant republic and even to migrate there. 
7. The Early Part of 1920 
At the beginning of 1920, despite minor disturbances,· 
massacres between the Moslems and Christians of Nakhitchevan 
and Zangezour, which had lessened to the point of only 
sporadic violence, the Armenian Republic found itself in a 
strong position. Everywhere within its borders peace reigned, 
and its frontier was free of organized violence. The rail-
road stations had been reconstructed and renovated~ the 
streets repaired. Urged on by conferences and meetings in 
iE/The·aoopePative movement advanced greatly in Armenia with 
the aid of the government. 11The Union o~ Armenian Coopera-
tives comprised 350 associations, totall~g almost lOO,?OO 
members. Since the familY averaged four people, the Un~on 
served 400,000. In 1919 the Union distributed to i~s me~ 
bers goods valued at 15,844,191 rubles. 11--S. Toro~s~an, 
r'Notes on Cooperatives in Armenia, u Caucasian Rev~ew l 
(Munich~ l955) ~ p. 174. ' · 
19/The foregoing facts are summarized from Republic, pp. 
322-4. 
the capital~ the population bent its shoulders to the 
enormous task of reconstruction with heartening results. 
Public opinion no longer was in doubt; the Armenian 
people had chosen freedom and had great faith in the future 
of the country. On january 4~ a meeting of the representa-
tives of the various cities took place to discuss various 
aspects of city life and to establish bodies to organize 
the advancement of solutions to municipal problems such as 
public health, sanitation, food supply, etc. The Allied 
Supreme Council, on january 19, 1920, recognized the Re-
public as having a de facto government, without prejudging 
. . . 20/ 
the borders of the state. · When that news reached Erivan, 
on january 23, the Armenian people were jubilant, and pub-
lic prayers of thank$giving that the sacrifice of so many 
Armenian lives had resulted in Armenian freedom were com-
mon. The Armenian Union of Unions, a labor and cooperative 
organization, met shortly thereafter and hailed Armenian 
freedom and progress. 
On March 7, representatives of the three 11White" 
states of Don, Kuban, and Terek arrived in Erivan and on 
March 8 they held discussions with_the leaders of the 
governme~t, asking, specifically, a united front against 
Bolshevism, mutual aid~ and the admission into Armenia of 
~FGP·the-text of the recognition doctunent, cf. Missakian, 
~. cit.~ p. 76. 
the Volunteers in the event .of retreat. Armenia's geo-
graphical position determined the answer, for the actual 
fight was far from her borders. However, a strong bond 
of sympathy and good cooperation was evident in relations 
between the Russian 11Whites 11 and Armenia, despite the known 
attitude of Denikin and other leaders that Russian Armenia 
was an inseparable part of the Russian state to be recon-
stituted. 
The visit of Metropolitan Khrisanfe, head of the Greeks 
of Pontus, to the Catholicos on June 1, seemed to assure 
Armenia 1 s future access to the Black Sea, for the agreements 
he reached with the government guaranteed close and friendly 
relations with the Pontic Hellenes, whether Pontus became a 
federated prov~ce of the Republic or remained tied only by 
reciprocal treaties. 
Me~while, on January 31, in Alexandropol was opened 
the Armenian University. The Mayilian brothers contributed 
1,000,000 roubles; the Shirak Cooperative, 100,000; a gen-
eral contribution campaign was carried on throughout the 
area. The first General Assembly of Armenian Doctors, held 
April 18, with 72 delegates of the medical profession in 
attendance also marked the Republic's reconstruction-
rehabilitation progress, and the most immediate health needs 
of the population were carefully investigated and programs 
drawn up. On January 27 a seed-collection agency was set 
up, which succeeded in raising 350,000 poods of seed~ and 
in February 225 million roubles were appropriated to pur-
chase additional seed; in March, the plan for loan of seed 
was announced, to be repaid either in crops or money after 
the harvest. Before May, some 332,660 poods of seed were 
distributed to the people, of a total of 375,000 poods; in 
addition~ fine quality seed for cotton, tobacco, and vege-
tables, to the amount of 500 poods, was provided for the 
planting of 1,517 dessiatins to cotton and 61 des. to 
tobacco. 
With many Armenians already migrating to the Republic, 
the government allocated funds to aid in the establishment 
of immigrants (especially taking interest in the tobacco-
raising i~grants from Soukhoum), provided farm tools and 
implements, appropriated 30 million roubles for the re-
habilitation of cotto~~raising and 15 million roubles· for 
vineyard and orchard workers. The major stress was placed, 
correctly, on food-raising for the benefit of the total 
population, and Kars Province received the largest share of 
that aid. In addition, the appropriation of 50 million 
roubles for the purchase outside the country of tractors, 
farm machines, threashers, planters, etc. quickly intro-
duced modern machine-farming methods on a small scale. 
A High Court was established on March 1. Boy Scout 
Day was proclaimed on April 18. The official Armenian Red 
Cross was organlzed on February 18. The gap between cost 
of living and income was closed (bread cost 26-28 r. per 
pound on February 7; officials 1 salaries ranged from 2,000 
r. to 8,150 r.; on March 1, the dollar was worth 580 Armen-
ian roubles; the Turkish gold pound, 3,000 r.; the pound 
sterling., 2,000 r.). The non-Armenian minorities were more 
21/ 
tractable and reconciled to Armenian rule. · Foreign 
Armenian communities were collecting funds for the rehabili-
tation of the land, and an influx of Armenian intellectuals, 
professors, doctors, engineers, agronomists, economists, 
22/ 
writers, artists, and specialists was helping in the 
transformation of the area. 
The attempted Azerbaidjani-led insurrection in the 
Ardahan District revealed an unexpectedly large degree of 
support in the Moslem community for the Armenian government. 
Though at the start of the rebellion some success was had 
from January 20 until the beginning of February, the Armen-
ian forces in the area., after peacefully trying to q~et 
the rebellion, were sent into action and the rebellion was 
put down by February 15. Then, an unprecedented event took 
place. The residents of Zaroushad, Aghbaba, and Chldir, 
which centerts extremists had provided the troops of the 
insurrection, disowned the rebellious and firmly declared 
gr;The-above-facts summarized from Republic., pp. 326-338. 
22/Congress, QJ;?.. c:tt., p. 6. 
the loyalty of the area to the Armenian Republic. The 
bloodshed which had taken place in northern Kars Province 
because of the trouble-rousing activities of the Azerbaid-
jani government was made the excuse for vicious attacks 
against .Armenia in the Azerbaidjani assembly, but the two 
Socialist Party deputies courageously placed the blame on 
the door-step of the Mussavat regime. Stable Moslem-Christian 
relations among most of the population of Kars Province were 
further demonstrated and strengthened when the Turkish~ 
Kurdish, and Armenian representatives met in the opening of 
the Kars District Council on February 17. At the beginning 
of March, the Araratian Kur,ds around Igdir declared their 
unconditional allegiance to the Armenian Republic even if 
their representatives should not be able to ~ to full 
agreement with Sebouh, the Armenian commander of the Igdir 
.. w 
garrison force, on all matters. 
j 
8. The Gharabagh Issue Again 
The temporary settlements concerning Gharabagh and 
Zangezotu~ were properly viewed by both Azerbaidjan and 
Armenia as unsatisfactory, more a short truce in the un-
declared war than an armistice. While Sulta.hov was preparing 
plans to convert the tttemporary11 Azerbaidjani status of 
Armenian Gharabagh into permanent possession, Zangezour and 
Goghtn threw off their ttsemi-secrettt participation as 
i3/Republic, pp. 338-340. 
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citizens of the Armenian Republic and openly were adminis-
tered by the authorities of that Republic. In November~ 
1919~ in response to the urgings of the All-Zangezour As-
sembly~ an Armenian civil governor was sent from Erivan, 
together with a military chief; Zangezour and Goghtn 
were reorganized into two civil districts (Zangezour and 
Kapar Goght) and three military districts (Sissian~ under 
Ter-Davtian; Kapar Goght~ under Nejdeh; and Zangezour, 
under General Ghazarian). In mid-December, General Dro 
arrived in Goris, and he was announced as the Commanding 
24/ 
General of all Zangezour and Gharabagh. , · 
The Armenian army had taken this step as a warning of 
war to Azerbaidjan because of the disturbing news from 
Gharabagh, where Sultanov was preparing for the forcible 
permanent seizure of both Gharabagh and Zangezour as parts 
of Azerbaidjan. By February 19, the steady build-up of 
Azerbaidjanian regular forces in Gharabagh had reached the 
point that nearly the entire army was there. The Ghara-
bagh population reacted by likewise making preparations, 
organizing self-defense corps under z. Messian, Arsen 
Mikaelian~ and other leaders, receiving arms and money 
from their compatriots in Baku and from the people of Zan-
gezour, establishing relations with the Armenian forces in 
~51 
Zangezour~ etc. The preparations were open on both sides. 
On February 19, 1920, Sultanov demanded for the Shoushi 
Armenian National Council that Gharabagh be declared a 
part of Azerbaidjan. The 8th All-Gharabagh Assembly, with 
96 delegates, met on February 22 and refused the demand, 
insisting instead that both sides abide by the August 22, 
1919~ agreement. 
On March 4, Azerbaidjanian troops began to take posi-
tions in the Armenian quarter of Shoushi; March 5, new 
forces arrived from Baku under army commander Prince Mahmet; 
on March 7~ five or six Armenians were murdered on the 
Khanadjakh road; on later days, more Armenians were murdered, 
and a number of Kurd and other irregulars were brought up; 
on March 10, Sultanov ordered all Moslem police to attend 
him on March 23, the Bairam day, when Moslem passion would 
be at its peak; at the same time, he ordered the villages 
of Kb.tsaberd.t Toumi, and Hin Taghlar "cleaned from the face 
of the earth. tt 
Recognizing the signs of an impending general massacre, 
the Gharabagh Armenians decided to forestall the Azerbaid-
jani preparations and began an insurrection during the night 
of March 22-3. With much blood-shed on both sides, the 
Armenians seized the Askeran Pass, cutting off the Azerbaid-
jani forces in Shoushi and Khankend. Bitter battles raged, 
while the Sultanov unleashed the Moslem population on the 
Armenian quarter of Shoushi; though most the Armenians fled, 
some three to four thousand suffered the usual Oriental 
barbarities, then w~re imprisoned. On March 26, the Azer-
baidjani regulars began a strong offensive, and after a 
battle lasting several days, succeeded in breaking the cor-
don at the Askeran Pass, on April 4 entering Shoushi and 
massacring the remaining Armenians there. 
On April 13, General Dro led his expeditionary force 
of Armenian Republic troops to the rescue of Gharabagh to 
prevent the completion of the Azerbaidjani plan of liquida-
tion. He took control of the government in that area, de-
creed a general mobilization, and remained with his forces 
in Gharabagh for forty-five days~ On April 22, the Ninth 
All-Gharabagh Assembly met, voting forty-four to one to re-
ject Azerbaidjanian suzerainty once and for all time, de-
claring that Gharabagh must be considered a part of the 
Armenian Republic. Azerbaidjan had timed its move poorly. 
Bitter fights were taking place in the Baku Assembly, 
as the Bolshevik movement grew apace and the Transcau~ 
casian Conference at Tiflis demanded immediate end to the 
conflict, as did the Allies also. Thus, few clashes took 
place during Dro•s occupation. Especially, Georgian 
Premier Jordania brought strong pressure on the Azerbaid-
janian government to respect the compromise of August 22, 
1919. Allied intervention was welcomed by the Armenian 
government and tardily acceded to by the Azerbaidjanian 
authorities. 
On April 9 a conference was held in Tiflis to settle 
the issue again. Delayed by Azerbaidjan•s inability to 
decide policy for a few days~ the conference drew up its 
agenda on April 11 to include: the question of bringing 
an end to the blood-letting in Transcaucasia~ creating a 
permanent body of the Transcaucasian states~ territorial 
questions, agreement on foreign policy, the question of 
a UConfederation~ 11 and economic matters. It was agreed 
that an end to blood-letting immediately be made in Ghazahl~, 
Nakhitchevan, Ordubat, and Gharabagh, and that no further 
opportunity be given to the population to begin such clashes 
again. Gharabagh was to revert to its former status, and 
mixed commissions of the three Republics were to tour 
Ghazakh., Nakhi tchevan~ and Gharabagh to prevent further 
blood-shed. Though the question of ttconfederation11 had 
been brought up by Azerbaidjan in order to form a common 
front against the Red danger from the North~ which had now 
replaced the White danger to Azerbaidjan, the Armenians in 
firm words pointed out that the Bolshevik alliance with the 
Turks was the real danger ·to Transcaucasia~ but that Azer-
'& 
baidjan continued to be deluded by its alliance with Turkey;·· 
gj/Fo~ ·a·b~ief·history of the generally pro-Turk orientation 
of the Bolsheviks~ cf. N. Beglar, lfThe Constant Factor in 
Moscow•s Turkish Policy,u Caucasian Review l (Munich., 1955), 
pp. 12-21; cf. also Republia 1 ·PP• ·400-3. · · 
that there could be no mutual trust till the outstanding 
issues, especially border questions, were amicably settled 
on the basis of fairness to the interests of each Republic, 
through ethnic division; that Turkey was a growing threat 
26/ 
to the very existence of the Transcaucasian states. 
Thus, in the moment of decision and crisis, because of 
the bitterness and distrust caused by previous events, be-
cause of the inter-racial fighting and deportations which 
had taken place, initially as the result of Turkish and 
Azerbaidjanian efforts to further the Pan-Turk movement, 
the three Transcaucasian republics could not join against 
the common danger. Azerbaidjanian chauvinism in pushing 
what that Moslem state believed to be its national inter-
ests prevented ~ty; the Azerbaidjanian army had nearly all 
its forces before Gharabagh, leaving the entire country ex-
posed; Armenia looked to the 11 southern11 (Turkis~) danger, 
for Turkish advances could push the Armenian people to the 
edge of extermination again and undo the great advances 
made toward rehabilitating the Armenian nation, if not end 
the nation outright; the Azerbaidjanian government was 
keenly aware of the ttnorthern11 (Russian) danger; Georgia 
was half-heartedly willing to cooperate against Russia, but 
not determined, as yet, against either danger, insisting in-
stead on safeguarding its favorable economic position. 
g§/Republic, pp. 341-6. 
All three states must share the ultimate guilt of per-
mitting the situation to remain so confused and unhealthy 
that Bolshevism could.become dangerous. Azerbaidjan 1 s 
military weakness in the eastern part of the country because 
of Sultanov's Gharabagh adventure was a golden opportunity 
for the Bolsheviks. Without resistance, they landed troops 
in Baku on the night of April 28 and established the Soviet 
Republic of Azerbaidjan. From the first day of its life, 
that Soviet Republic) established with the help of the Turks 
and unopposed by Turkey's Azerbaidjanian-government cohorts, 
declared its enmity toward the Armenian Republic. On April 
29, 1920, it sent the following ultimatum to Armenia: that 
Armenia withdraw its military forces from the Gharabagh and 
Zangezour regions, remain behind its borders, and cease the 
' ?2) 
inter-racial massacre. · Three days time limit was given, 
and, if Armenia did not agree to that ultimatum, the 
Soviet Azerbaidjanian Republic would uconsider itself in a 
state of war with the Republic of Armenia.n 
9. The May Rebellion and Bolshevism in Armenia 
The number of Bolsheviks in the Armenian Republic be-
fore 1919 was extremely small. Though by early 1920 there 
were a 11 few instructors at the Religious Seminary of 
Etchmiadzin~ ••• a sprinkling of professors at the University •••• , 
gj/Ibid•; ·P• ·347, gives the entire text of that ultimatum. 
some misguided students, and a few railroad workers" who 
28/ 
were Communist, · · the Bolshevik organization had made 
little headway in Armen2a. Though there were a number of 
Armenian Social-Democrats in Russia, Georgia, and Azerbaid-
jan, their influence in Armenian life was negligible. The 
organization of an Armenian Section by the Soviet Com-
missariat of Nationalities after the Bolshevik Revolution 
of October, 1917, did not greatly advance Bolshevik popu-
larity, for the Armenians who cooperated with that body 
were generally considered renegades by the people as a 
'£11 
whole. 
Because of the mild socialism of the Dashnak Party, 
a socialism.about equal to that of the Farmer-Labor Party, 
the Bull-Moose Progressive Party, and the New Deal Demo-
crats in American political history, a certain sentimental 
attitude at first deluded a number of Armenians into think-
ing that Bolshevism was less of a danger than it later 
appeared. The idea that the Armenian Republic must be a 
sanctuary from persecution for all Armenians was the cause 
of one of the Republic 1 s worst errors for that concept led 
the government to admit within the borders, after securing 
gejcongress1 ·P• 9. 
~On the relations of the Bolsheviks and the Republic, cf., 
ibid., p. 9; Republic, pp. 348-370, 399-411; Missakian, · 
106-111, 113-4; Simon Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian 
Question, pp. ol-65; V. Navasardian, Bolshevizme yev Dash-
naktsoutyoune, pp. 47-219; s. Vratzian, Haiasdang·bolshe-
vikian mourdj_: y_ev Trkakan sali m.ichev, pp.- -6-199• · · · · 
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a solemn pledge of refraining from propaganda and anti-
government activity~ a number of Armenian Communists flee-
ing from anti~Bolshevist persecution in Georgia and Azer-
3Q/ 
baidjan in late 1918. · · Though the Bolsheviks~ generally 
speaking~ abided by their promise~ a faction kriown as the 
11 Spartakiststt began to carry on underground activity. 
In September of 1919~ the representatives of the Bol-
shevik Transcaucasian Regional Committee held a secret meet-
ing in Erivan at which a basic policy was accepted for the 
Sovietization of the Republic and the Armenkom (Armenian 
Committee of the Communist Party) was formed. At a secret 
Armenkom conference in Erivan in January~ 1920~ the Bol-
shevik Party uadopted a thesis in the sense that, upon the 
approach of ~ Red ~' and in the event of the sovieti-
zation of neighboring republics~ the sovietization of Armenia 
would be the first question on the agenda. The Armenkom 
presumed that the neighboring regions of Kazakh and Kara-
311 
bagh would serve as focal points to spring the revolution. 11 · · 
As the report of the investigation of the United States 
government of the Sovietization of Armenia states: 
Having decided on the forcible overthrow of the 
Government, the Armenkom now kept in touch with the 
Russians through the Transcaucasian Regional Committee 
3Q/Gongressi ·P• 9; Republic, pp. 348-9. 
31/Congress, p. 10; in more detail in Republic~ pp. 354-6. 
('-~a· . ~ ...... 
...... , 
which, from its headquarters in Tiflis, supplied it 
with funds, literature, instructions, and field 
workers. The Armenian Communists impatiently awaited 
the arrival of the Russian Army to raise the banner 
of rebellion against the free and independent Govern-
ment of Armenia. Inside the country, they carried on 
an intensive antigovernmental propaganda, incited 
intraracial ~interracial' is obviously meant? pas-
sions, sabotaged the Government's reconstruction 
effort, and took advantage of every occasion to weak-
en the state machinery and to discredit the Govern-
ment in the eyes of the public. Outside of the country, 
they promoted hostility to the Armenian Republic and 
its leaders through lies and slander, not even stopping 
at outright cooperation with the enemies of the Armen-
ian people.J.Y 
That the government of the Republic was aware of the 
dangerous situation partly created by its own charity, for 
it had sheltered the Bolshevik refugees and even given them 
minor administrative and teaching positions to provide them 
with a livelihood, is apparent in the fact that several 
Communist agitators were arrested on January 31, 1920, in 
Erivan and Dilidjan. The government, which had earlier de-
nounced the persecution of Armenian Bolsheviks in Georgia 
and .Azerbaidjan, was in a difficult position, hesitating to 
use the same oppressive measures yet forced by its detailed 
knowledge of Bolshevik plans. The naive romanticism of the 
times toward the threat of Bolshevism is to be seen in the 
storm which exploded in the Parliament on news of the 
arrests, for the Armenian Social-Revolutionary leaders, 
jgjGongress,-p. 10; details of agitation in the January-May 
period in Republic, pp. 353-8. 
though anti-Bolshevik strongly condemned the government's 331 . 
t1illegal 11 act.·· 
In late April the Armenian Republic~ deeply disturbed 
by its knowledge of Russian Communist-Kemalist Turkish 
Cooperation~ sent a special mission to Moscow to negotiate 
recognition of the Armenian state by the Bolshevik author-
ities and otherwise safeguard the Armenian position. That 
delegation met with procrastinations and evasions on the 
part of the Soviet negotiators~ while secret negotiations 
were being rushed by the Bolsheviks with newly-arrived 
3.41 
Turkish plenipotentiaries.· · At the same time, apparently 
acting under instructions from the Transcaucasian Regional 
Commdttee rather than Moscow, the Armenian Communists made 
their supreme bid for power. A large part of the Bolshe-
vik leadership and followers had concentrated in Alexan-
dropol~ where conditions were still of chaotic poverty, 
with large numbers of refugees~ few ~ood reserves, and a 
large number of railroad workers. A long delaY in ship-
ment of American relief food supplies had been exploited 
for the past three months by the Communist agitators, and 
several food demonstrations had resulted. 
33/Republic1 pp. 349-352. 
WFor the details of that mission, see Hambardzoum. Ter-
tarian, 11The Levon Chanth Mission to Moscowu (2 parts)~ 
Armenian Review~ Nos. 30-1. For a brief summary of the re-
sults·of those-negotiations, cf. Congress~ p. 11. 
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On May l, Bolshevik demonstrators assembled all pos-
sible anti-Dashnaks and began a demonstration against the 
government whlch soon changed to open rebellion. At first 
satisfied with raiding the Dashnak Party headquarters of 
Alexandropol, the Bolshevik supporters brought up an armored 
car (the t1General VardanH) and took control of the city, as 
the Dashnak Party leadership and the government authorities 
stood confused by the rapid ttiTn of events and desirous of 
avoiding a civil war which would pit Armenian against Armen-
ian. The commander of the armored car refused to obey 
orders which were immediately sent to him to withdraw to 
the Ghamarlou area, where the Armenians had a force on 
guard against Moslem raiders. The rebellion was on. 
When the order was repeated by General Nazarbekian~ 
the armored car commander Mousayelian raised the Bolshevik 
flag over it and assembled a group of Bolshevik leaders, 
who then formed the ~'~Armenian Military-Revolutionary Com-
mittee, 11 which proclaimed itself the government of an 
Armenian Soviet Republic. That ugovernment11 immediately 
sent telegrams to Kars, Sarikamish, Gharakilissa, and other 
centers demanding recognition by the military and civil 
authorities. It received some support among already propa-
gandized military forces and minority groups. On May 9, a 
Revolutionary Committee was formed in Kars which demanded 
the surrender of the fortress and submission to the 
871 
Alexandropol rtgovernm.ent 11 within twenty-four hours. Sup-
ported by a part of the garrison troops, the Molokans, and 
the Greeks, the Revolutionary Committee held Kars for two 
days. 
Bolshevik agents reached Sarikamish and Gaghzvan and 
with the aid of a small part of the troops there established 
a Revolutionary Committee, which attempted to get into con-
tact with the Turkish forces in the adjacent areas to fur-
ther nbrotherly cooperation. 11 On May 13, a more serious 
movement began in the Nor Bayazit area, where a military re-
bellion succeeded in dividing the Armenian army's forces. 
General Silikian and his staff were imprisoned, and the 
rebels occupied the city itself on May 17. In general, the 
working population refused to participate in or support the 
rebellion, and it remained largely the work of troops de-
moralized by Bolshevik propaganda. Everywhere the words 
of the Bolsheviks were the same: nThe Red army is coming 
to liberate Armenia from the yoke of the Dashnak Party; 
brotherly Russia is sending bread to feed starving Armenia; 
already from Baku are moving toward Armenia cars loaded 
with flour and oil, 11 etc. The Bolsheviks had well "Lm.der-
stood the psychology of disaffection and were making wonder-
ful promises to win the support of the people. 
To meet the challenge of the rebellion, Parliamentary 
methods were deemed insufficient, and on May 5 the resignation 
of Khatissian's ministry was accepted, together with a one 
month suspension of representative government. A dictatura 
of the Dashnak Party Bureau was established which declared 
the country endangered and appealed to the people. A 
mobilization of the entire party membership was decreed, 
and the military groups formed were placed under proven 
leaders. The organizations of the people, the town coun-
cils, the Armenian Social-Democratic Party, the Catholicos, 
prominent Armenian lntellectuals, the Armenian Popular Party, 
the Ramgavar Party, the Nonpartisan Union, and the Coopera-
tives hastened to proclaim their horror at the treason 
which endangered the remaining Armenians by opening the 
borders to the Turkish danger, their support of the govern-
ment of the Republic, and their determination to preserve 
the freedom of united and independent Armenia. 
The government tried to quiet the rebellion by peace-
ful means, to prevent blood-shed and fratricidal conflict, 
but its efforts were rebuffed. On May 13, Mousayelian's 
armored car attacked. the forces of the Republic between 
Ani and Aghin, but was beaten off. Meanwhile the military 
forces in Alexandropol, which had accepted the rebellion 
at first, in order not to bring about civil war, gradually 
followed the lead of the populace, which openly denounced 
the Bolshevik adventurers and demanded submission to the 
Republic. On May 13, the Revolutionary Committee desired 
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to reopen negotiations with the government, and the Re-
public's dictatura instructed the commander of the Alex-
andropol forces to give them until 6 A.M. of May 14 to 
submit. During the night, some of the Bolsheviks fled to 
the Turks of Aghbaba and others hid in,the city. On the 
fourteenth, the Republic's forces entered Alexandropol and 
were joined by the local troops. The population celebrated 
the end of the Bolshevik Rebellion. Only one instance of 
violence occurred, the slaying in the street of General 
Khatchatrian, who bad gone over to the rebels. The hiding 
insurgents were arrested and placed before an emergency 
court, only Nouridjanian escaping of the prominent leaders. 
The Kars Revolutidhary Committee had faced immediate 
hostility on the part of the population, except for the 
Turkish Council, the Greek Council, and the Russian Co~tn­
cil, which had promised to cooperate with the Bolsheviks. 
On May 12, the rebels opened fire on the populace, which 
was demanding submission to the Republic. A bitter fight 
occurred, but the loyal forces being prepared by a Committee 
for the Salvation of the Fatherland were not ready until 
May 13 to begin military activity. During the night of the 
twelfth the Bolsheviks fled toward Alexandropol, but were 
overtaken and made prisoner, though some escaped. Sarika-
mish and Gaghzvan quickly yielded when the news arrived from 
Kars, the aeserting troops quickly returning to their 
,- 7, 
~ ·:t 
s.tations, and the Bolshevik agitators imprisoned. Like-
wise, Nor Bayazit was soon reoccupied by the Republic 1 s 
forces, aided by the local population; although the fight-
ing there was heavier, by May 19 the area was under firm 
Republican control. 
Bolshevik fugitives reached Azerbaidjan and created 
an anti-Republic furore there which led to the advance of 
part of the 11th Red Army into Itchevan, without resistance 
by the local Armenians, on May 21, although the revolt was 
over. Within a few days, that force was hurled from Armenia 
by the Republic's newly-arrived forces. Emergency courts 
tried the leaders of the rebellion in Alexandropol, Kars, 
Erivan, Nor Bayazit, and Dilidjan, proving very cautious, 
to prevent the creation of f-eelings of bitterness or sym-
pathy. Less than ten received the death sentence. The 
May Rebellion had fateful consequences for Armenia, how~ 
ever, for the Armenian army, which till then had been the 
best disciplined and had the best morale in Transcaucasia, 
had literally come apart because of Bolshevik boring from 
within. Large parts.had remained neutral while army fac-
tions committed to the Republic and the Revolution fought 
each other. Discipline was badly shaken. The Republic no 
longer could rely on its army, and the poisonous propaganda 
of the Bolsheviks had succeeded in robbing Armenia of an 
effective protective force just as it was about to need a 
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strong army most, for Kemalist-Bolshevik aggressive plans 
35..1 
were already matLuing •.. 
10. The Summer of 1920 
The unity of the Armenian political parties, the en-
thusiastic popular support of the government, the ability 
to survive the t~eat from within, the ability to act de-
cisively for the protection of the land, all these were 
signs of Armenian political progress which encouraged those 
who believed in Armenian independence. More important, in 
the long run, were the developments on other fronts during 
the fateful summer of 1920. 
Encouraged by the threatened Armenian civil war, the 
Turkic populations within Zangezour, Vedi Bazar, Zoul, 
Goghb, and other places greatly increased their raids, 
plundering expeditions, and murders against the Armenians. 
Sharour-Nakhitchevan had passed under the administration of 
Khalil Pasha, a general of the Angora (Kemalist) Turkish 
army. His influence was rapidly spreading, and the Moslem 
\ 
populations of many places were in open rebellion. With a 
patriotic cooperative spirit roused by the suppression of 
the May Rebellion, the government decided to suppress im-
mediately that Moslem rebellion and, by any measures neces-
sary, reduce the will and ability of the Moslems to weaken 
3i/Summarized from Republic, pp. 348-371; cf. also, Vrat-
zian, Haiasdane, pp. 85-142. 
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Armenia from within in the face of the Turkish-Bolshevik 
threat. On June 18, an ultimatum was given the Moslems 
of Zangi Bazar to recognize Armenian sovereignty, surrender 
their arms, and send away the Turkish and Azerbaidjanian 
agents among them. On receiving no reply, the Armenian 
army quickly occupied that area, badly defeating the Moslem 
force. 
On June 18 also~ a campaign began to secure for Ar-
menia the coal mine area of western Kars Province, still 
under Turkish occupation. The expedition was capped by 
success when, on June 21, the Turkish regulars and irregu-
lars of Khalil Pasha were routed, leaving behind artillery, 
machine-guns, munitions, large supplies of food and live-
stock, and hundreds of corpses, including regular army 
officers. The Armenian army suffered light casualties only, 
. . 
and the Armenian border now extended almost to Oiti. 
Next, the Armenians moved to crush Beoyouk Vedi, where 
\ 
the Turk population had risen with 3,000 fighters and ample 
stocks of artillery and munitions. The Armenian force 
assembled twenty-six companies and seven squads of cavalry. 
After strong resistance, the Moslem forces fled, leaving 
much military stores to the Armenian army, thus capping 
with success that operation of July 10-12. At the same 
time, strong clean-up campaigns had been started in Dara-
lagiaz., and thousands of Moslems were fleeing before the 
advance of the Armenian army in that area by July 16. On 
that date, the mopping-up campaigns were halted, while the 
Nakhitchevan Mohammedan National Council representatives 
came to Erivan to beg peace. The Armenian government im-
posed heavy conditions needed to guarantee the military 
security of the area, and, when the representatives returned 
home for instructions, they did not return. 
On July 22, the Armenian army moved forward again, 
crushing a three-day desperate defence by the Moslems, and, 
on the occupation of Shahtakht on July 25, the Moslem popula-
tion as far as Nakhitchevan c~ty fled to Persia. Likewise, 
after bitter fighting the Armenians had seized the entire 
eastern shore of Lake Sevan, and the Moslem minority there 
had, in large part, fled to Azerbaidjan. Thus, by a long-
delayed show of complete military force, the Armenian Re-
public imposed loyalty, or at least peaceful relations, on 
all the remaining Moslems, halting the inter-racial clashes 
initiated through the agitation of Turkish and Azerbaid-
janian instigators, and driving out those who were unable 
to live at peace with the Armenian population. 
The addition of the Sourmalou area to actually incorpo-
rated parts of the Republic had great significance for the life 
o:f the Armenian people, the 1920 harvest of that area alone pro-
viding to Armenian food supply, of melons and watermelons, 
lo,ooo,ooo poods; wheat, 3,5oo,ooo poods; barley, 1,5oo,ooo; 
. I , .. !"'fa 
"'-it 
rye, 20,000; oats, 20,000; corn, 25,000; onions, 50,000; 
chick peas, 25,000; beans, 10,000; lentils, 1,000; tobacco, 
2,000; a total of 15,153,000 poods of food-stuffs and 
tobacco. Besides that figure, a total of 500,000 poods of 
. ' 
pears, 80,000 of apples,. 60,000 of peaches, and 25,000 of 
plums and other fruits was secured. A large amount of rice 
was also secured from Sourmalou, and, of that commodity 
3.21 
alone, Zangi Bazar provided 400,000 poods. · · 
Equally strong efforts were made to stabilize Armen-
ian money and commerce. Until August, .Armenia had outstand-
ing 2,ooo,ooo,ooo roubles in paper money, and government 
needs were increasing that amount in recent months by six 
. ' 321 . 
to eight hundred million per month.-. A gold fund to 
stabilize the currency was initiated, and received world-
wide .Armenian support, women in other lands even donating 
their wedding rings to help Armenia. Foreign Armenian com-
munities founded special funds for the creation of an air 
force. The Melkonian brothers bequeathed their entire 
wealth of $10,000,000 to help the new state. A $20,000,000 
3.W 
loan floated for government needs was supported generously.·· 
An income tax was imposed on citizens of the state. Gifts 
3£7Republic, -pp. 372-6. 
32/Ibid., p. 377 • 
.:ill/Ibid., pp. 377-9; Congress, p. 6. 
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of all sorts began to pour into the country, from medical 
supplies to typewriters and machinery. Reputable Swiss and 
Swedish.firms were given the right to deal in various 
places in dairy supplies and agricultural machinery ~~d to 
found work-shops for their manufacture. Plans were drawn 
and concessions made for the construction of a trolley sys-
tem in Erivan (by a joint Armenian-Japanese company)~ a 
transit line through Erivan-Elenovka-Dilidjan-Aghstafa, 
' 
and another Yelenovka-Nor Bayazit-Keshishkent-Goris. 
Cement-making negotiations were under way for Vedi Bazar. 
A concession for the construction of an electric railway 
from Batoum (or whatever other Black Sea port was given the 
Republic) to Kars to Sardarabad, which included plans for 
the construction of a series of hydroelectric facilities, 
was under negotiation with a group of Armenian financiers. 
Industrialization made great strides, under government en-
couragement; textile plants were established in Erivan, 
Sarikamish, Kars, Alexandropol, Etchmiadzin, Nor Bayazit, 
Dilidjan, Djalal Oghli; shoe and leather plants, in Kars, 
Etchmiadzin, Nor Bayazit, Ghamarlou; other types of plants 
and work-shops were becoming common in many places, partly 
through the help of the Near East Relie~ Progress had 
been so rapid that a large part of the countryrs textile, 
clothing, and leather goods needs were already being met 
33.1 
in Armenian work-shops and plants. · · The architectural, 
city planning, and reconstruction work programs had been 
thoroughly investigated and were already under WaY by fall. 
Tomnani an's plan for the city of Erivan was placed in 
effect, and the city gradually began to assume a new appear-
40/ 
ance •.. 
At the start of 1919, Armenia had only nine hospitals, 
with 300 beds. At the end of the year, it had thirty hos-
pitals (with 1,600 beds), five medical centers, and five 
clinics. That number rose perceptively during each month 
of 1920. Drug centers had been established by'the govern-
ment, where medicines were given free to the poor, at half 
rate to workers. A strong anti-malaria and swamp-drainage 
campaign was under way. The initial steps necessary for 
placing Zavalishin's Program into effect had been completed, 
41} . 
and preliminary work was begun. · · Geological explorations 
were made, and plans were under way for exploitation of 
. 42/ 
mineral resources.·· In 1920, the government gave in 
3§}Repuhlia1 -pp. 377-383. 
40/This plan has been another source of Soviet distortion, 
fQr the Soviet regime follows it and claims credit for it. 
:l:JJR~public, pp. 384-7. 
42/As an example of the remarkable spirit of hope, planning, 
~d progress during the Armenian Republic 1 s freedom, Qt. 
Hagop A. Karajian, Mineral Resources of Armenia ~ Anatoli~. 
grants and loans to the cooperative movement to the extent 
of thirty million roubles~ later loaning 250·million roubles 
£1 
more •.. 
The work of education went forward rapidly~ with the 
1920-1 school year to have 1~ 500 _elementarY schools. Plans 
for opening specialized academies had been approved. The 
University had been transferred to Erivan and by October l 
some 632 students were registered. A state Conservatory of 
Music had been opened. In September was opened the Tech-
nical Institute at Alexandropol~ a second Technical Insti-
tute was to be opened in Erivan in October. A military 
school in Kars was ready to open; the seminary at Etchmiad-
zin was reopened; Erivan was to have a Medical School, a 
Teachers 1 College, etc. The plans drawn up during the past 
year were just being put into action or had just been acti-
vated by mid-October, 1920. In mid-July, an Art and Ar-
chaeology Mission conducted activities throughout an impor-
1.4/ 
tant part of the country.·· 
Steamboats were placed under construction for use on 
Sevan. On July 5, a general citizenship act was passed. 
Though the border issue still could not be settled, and the 
Georgians reacted negatively to the Armenian citizenship 
act, relations between the two Republics continued to improve. 
43/Repub1ie1 -pp. 387-8; Torossian~ Q£. ~., p. 174. 
44/Republic, pp. 389-392. 
Transit of munitions to Armenia was now allowed, without 
the almost confiscatory transportation tates formerly 
assessed on them. On August 2, the Armenian Social-
Revolutionary Party officially declared its recognition of 
Armenian independence; no mandate seemed in sight, and they 
were convinced that Armenia must live by her strength and 
arms alone. Now all parties in Armenian life except the 
Bolshevik had firmly declared their recognition of the 
Armenian Republic and its independence. From all over the 
world, the Armenians were flocking toward Armenia, most 
without waiting for the permission of the 4-I'menian govern-
ment. Independence was a legally recognized fact by 
ill 
August, for on August 10 was signed the Sevres Treaty · · 
which ratified a free, united and independent Armenia. 
Armenia still sought foreign protection and aid, for dur-
ing the long delay of sixteen months in securing a peace 
treaty with the Turks, the Kemalist movement, actively 
supported by France, Italy, and the Bolsheviks, became a 
46/ 
power to contend with.·· 
11. The Sovietization of Armenia 
Though Armenia had already received an ult~atum from 
Baku, the llth Red Army sent a new ultimatum on May 1, 1920, 
A5/The-above-facts selected from Republic, pp. 392-8 • 
. . 
46/Congress, p. 7. 
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to withdraw all forces from ttSoviet Azerbaidjann with a 
twenty-four hour time limit. Despite strong protests to 
Moscow and the Red leaders, Armenia was forced to give way, 
and, on May 26, General Dro's protective forces withdrew 
.from Gharabagh to Zangezour. Long negotiations with Soviet 
Azerbaidjan continued during the entire summer and early 
fall, without any possibility of result, for the Bolsheviks, 
allied to the t1brotherlytt Kemalist Turks, pursued the same 
policy of trying to establish a land-pridge with them through 
Zangezour, SharoUl~, and Nakhitchevan as the Azerbaidjani 
Mussavatists and the Turkish Ittihadists earlier. During 
the summer months also, the Baku Bolsheviks carried on a 
' propaganda campaign to whip up public enmity toward the 
Armenian Republic. Gross lies concerning the May Rebel-
lion's suppression were widely circulated, even that Miko-
yan had been killed, though Mikoyan had never been to 
Armenia. The Armenian mission to Moscow in late April can 
trace part of its failure, if not all, to the distortions 
and outright lies circulated by the Armenian and Transcau-
casian Bolsheviks, which created a deep suspicion and hos-
tility in the minds of the Bolshevik leaders that Armenia 
was to be used as a springboard for 11 imperialistn a,ggres-
±Y 
sion against the Soviets. · · 
4Z/Republici ·PP• 399-409. 
The plenipotentiaries of the Armenian Republic had 
secured the agreement of the Bolshevik leaders to the fol-
lowing conditions: 
a)Recognition of the independence of Armenia and 
inclusion of Armenian-populated regions of Kara-
bagh and Gulis tan within the boundary of Armenia. 
b)Acceptance~ at least in principle, of the annexa-
-tion of the Turkish Armenian provinces to Armenia. 
c)A promise of non-interference in the internal 
-affairs of Armenia, including Communist propaganda 
and underground activity. 
d)Permission for the return of Armenian refugees re-
siding at the time in northern Caucasus and Russia.48/ 
The Azerbaidjanian and Armenian Communists interfered 
before that treaty could be signed~ urging delay while the 
Red Army tried to destroy the Republic. The negotiations 
were interrupted and transferred to Erivan, where Soviet 
plenipotentiary Legran was to complete them. On July 5, 
Zangezour was attacked by divisions of the Red army. The 
Red army moved slowly forward to the Daralagiaz borders, 
while part went into Nakhitchevan. A fortnight later, 
Armenia was also attacked from Ghazakh. Perhaps because 
General Dro unleashed a c~unter-offensive from Daralagiaz 
on August l which reoccupied all Zangezour (though a few 
~ 
weeks later reinforced Red forces drove the Armenians out),.-
~GGngPessi ·P• 11. 
12/Republic, p._ 410. 
• 
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thus revealing that .Armenia itself, not in the disputed 
provinces, but in the Erivan region, could still put up a 
strong resistance to a take-over attempt, Legran agreed to 
a temporary truce. On August 10, a peace agreement was 
signed, stipulating borders which cut off from Armenia its 
important population cent~rs, agricultural districts, and 
5Qj 
border provinces of Nakhitchevan, Gharabagh, and Zangezour •.. 
On that same fateful day, the Treaty of Sevres had been 
signed. 
On October 12, in Erivan, were reopened the negotia-
51/ 
tions with the Communists, headed by Legran. . . Though an 
agreement was reached and Legran expressed himself as satis-
fied, he departed for Baku to receive the final word of the 
Soviet Russian authorities and did. not return. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish-Bolshevik alliance had prepared 
well for the destruction of the Armenian Republic. Legran 1 s 
part in that plan was to rouse Armenian hopes that Russia, 
socialist Russia, the Russia which was so concerned for the 
welfare of the poor-oppressed laboring people throughout 
the world, would guard Armenia, protect the Armenian people 
against new massacres, would bring about peace between the 
5Q/Ibid•; ·PP•·410-l; Congress, p. 11. 
51/For the text of Legran's demands and the uagreement,n 
gf. Republic, pp. 411-2. -
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Turkish and Armenian populations. By delays~ the Bolsheviks 
were weakening the ability of the government to protect the 
country, destroying the will to resist of the Armenian sol-
diers~ and rendering more difficult the Armenian diplomatic 
position in Europe. Turkish forces~ operating under the 
terms of the alliances previously signed between the Kema-
lists and the Soviets, prepared for war. The long delay 
of Legran in coming to Erivan for the continuance of the 
negotiations was dictated by high policy, for during that 
delay the Turkish armies under Klazim Karabekir moved 
against Armenia. He had under his command four divisions 
of eight to ninethousand troops each, plus Kurdish and 
Turkish cavalry and irregulars. Without a declaration of 
war, Turkey began a general offensive against the badly 
outnumbered Armenian army in western Kars Province on 
S2J 
September 23. · · 
The Turkish attack on Armenia caused great disturbance 
not only for the Armenian public~ but the Georgians as 
well; a wave of sympathy swept the country, and except for 
a few chauvinists who saw in that new war a chance to settle 
the Akhalkalak and Lori question~ the Georgians followed 
the war news closely. The Turko-Soviet alliance was no 
~For the detailed relation of events leading to the out-
break of the war, £(., Republic, pp. 413-426, and Vratzian, 
Haiasdane~ ~~. cit.i 157-170. 
secret for Georgia or Armenia at that time~ and both knew 
the outbreak of war could spell doom for their infant re-
publics. Though Armenia had warned the Allies that Turkey 
and the Soviets were planning to attack Armenia to link 
their forces for a common war against the Allied interests~ 
attested by numerous documents~ it received no aid except 
for a small quantity of.munitions and uniforms sold by the 
British in ret1.1I'n for gold. After the outbreak of war, a 
:iJI 
new appeal met with a similar total discou~agement. · · 
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Armenia was in no condition to fight. It received no 
oil supplies from Baku. Her army had been badly disor-
ganized by the May Rebellion; Bolshevik attacks in Ghazakh~ 
Basargetchari, Daralagiaz, and Sharour kept Armenia in a 
state of tension and forced it to keep its army badly divided. 
Armenia had only 3,500 soldiers available in all Kars Prov-
ince, plus 2~500 in Sourmalou; against them were nearly 5.Y . 
30,000 Turkish regulars. · · Armenia took desperate measures 
to defend itself, on September 30 calling all men to the age 
of thirty-five to the colors~ and declaring a state of 
emergency. In early October, the Armenian forces before 
Kars proved poorly organized; communications were bad; staff 
relations between the various officers needed improvement; 
53/Republici P• 427. 
Wibid., pp. 427-8. 
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Bolshevik sabotage caused heavy losses in personnel on the 
rail line. To improve morale, which was very shaky among 
the troops retreating toward Kars, the commanders decided 
on a counter-offensive which ended in failure. The biggest 
factor in that demoralization was the belief that had been 
so carefully spread by the Bolsheviks that they were going 
to protect Armenia, that the Turkish Kemalist forces were 
allies who would preserve the interest of the common people. 
The word had been spread that nwe must not fight 11 against 
the Bolsheviks and their allies, for they are brothers and 
2il 
will not harm Armenia. · · Bolshevik propagandists had in-
filtrated the army and were issuing proclamations reading: 
rtA.rmenian soldier; when you see the Turk advancing do not 
. . ~ 
fire upon him. He is your brother, your fellow worker. rt · · 
Despite that propaganda, a large part of the troops .. 
before Kars continued to fight courageously, putting up a 
stiff resistance on October 28 and 29. The refusal of a 
body of troops to obey an order to advance on October 30, 
when the Armenian forces were in position for a counter-
attack, led to a breakup of real resistance, and the city 
fell on October 30. The civilian population fled, with the 
5.5/B. ·BGJ?:ian1 -Armenia, International Diplomacy, .anQ. the 
Union of Soviet-Socialist·Republics 1 ~in·Russian) 1 -v. II, 
P• ·121.- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
~Congress, p. 12. 
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military following in disorderly retreat. Three thousand 
Armenian soldiers were taken prisoner in Kars, and the 
52.J 
front collapsed. · · 
At the same time, the Turkish attack on Sourmalou had 
been met by determined resistance, with no weakness in 
military morale evidentc From October 20 to October 26, 
the Armenian forces were pushed back by sheer weight of 
numbers from the Armenian border to within artillery range 
of Erivan, but only after having inflicted heavy losses on 
I 
the Turkish forces. In a general counter-offensive on 
October 26, which continued for some few days, the Armen-
ians crushed the strong resistance offered and drove the 
!ilil 
Turkish forces out of the district.·· 
The loss of the citadel of Kars, taken by the Turks 
without a shot fired because the garrison thought it was 
a Bolshevik force approaching, was a heavy blow to the 
Armenian people and Republic. In Kars city alone, some 
6,000 Armenians were slain by the Turkish conquerors, though 
many Bolsheviks naively showed their membership cards think-
Xl/ 
ing that would save them.. On November 6, Armenia and 
Turkey began peace_discussions. The Turkish conditions were 
31/Republic,; P• 430-1. 
1§/Ibi~., pp. 429-430. 
12/Communist (4rme~ian newspaper of Baku), No. 42; quoted in Republiei p: 432. 
accepted~ and on November 7 the cease-fire occurred. On 
November 8, new Turkish demands were made which would place 
Armenia at the nmercyu of Turkey; the Armenian government 
protested this breech of the armistice~ and, on November 11, 
the war began again. Armenia, fighting on four fronts, was 
soon brought to its knees, the Turkish forces driving back 
the Armenian forces on the Alexandropol front in a two-
pronged attack on November 14. New armistice talks were 
begun. A desperate plea for aid and supplies was made to 
the Allies with no result. Moscow's intervention, after an 
appeal to Chicherin, at least was secured, and Mdivani was 
sent from Baku to Tiflis to participate in the talks which 
were to be held in Alexandropol on November 25. 
At the peace conference on that date, the Armenian 
delegation demanded all Russian Armenia, the Van sandjak, 
a part of Bitlis Vilayet, the Moush sandjak, and Bayazit 
sandjak, together with an outlet on the Black Sea at Riza; 
in return, Armenia would renounce the Treaty of Sevres. On 
December 2, Kiazim Karabekir presented the draft of a treaty 
between Turkey and Armenia, which would make the latter a 
helpless dependency of Turkey, in ultimatum fashion. Mean-
while, the Armenian government had resigned, and a new 
government was formed on November 25. On November 29, the 
Ghazakh front flamed into activity again as Armenian Bol-
sheviks, aided by Azerbaidjan, seized Itchevan. On November 
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30~ Legran presented an ultimatum demanding the sovietiza-
tion of Armenia. There was no alternative but to negotiate 
terms. As a later United States government report stated: 
•••• despite the military catastrophe~ the 
Armenian Government worked out a treaty which~ al-
though accepting the sovietization of Armenia--as 
the only alternative to new massacres and the com-
plete physical destruction of the Armenian people--
was far from an abject surrender. In fact~ under the 
conditions~ the terms of the treaty were the best 
possible.60/ 
On December 23 1920~ with General Dro and Hambardzoum 
Terterian signing for Armenia and Legran for Soviet Russia; 
the treaty came into force, and the fiFree~ United, and In-
dependent Republic of Armenia11 became the nsovietic Repub-
. 61/ 
lie of Armenia. u .. 
12. The Anti-Soviet Rebellion of February 18~ 1921 
The signature on December 2 of a pact sovietizing the 
government of Armenia coincided with the signing of a peace 
treaty with Turkey. The Armenian Independent Republic was 
no more. Caught between two allied enemies, the Armenian 
experiment in freedom~ which had in the short space of two 
and one half years already laid the foundation for a great 
economic advance, had assembled a large part of the 
scattered remnants of the Armenian nation, had, rightly or 
QQ/Gongpess$ ·P• 12. 
Ql/See Appendix of Doc~unents, this manuscript, for text. · 
wrongly, converted large areas of mixed populations into 
distinctly Armenian-settled areas of Armenia, seemed dead. 
BL1t a nation is hard to kill when it is ready to sacrifice 
for its freedom. Though the great majority of the Armen-
ian people received Soviet rule with dislike, there was, 
at least, the consolation that there was no more threat of 
annihilation; there was a wave of hope that Armenian rights 
would be granted in the independent Soviet Armenian state. 
Turkey was in occupation of the entire Alexandropol area; 
by the treaty, Russia would see to it that her ally 1 s 
forces left. So the people thought, while Turkey continued 
to massacre 30,000 Armenians in that area and strip it of 
everything worthwhile. 
The Revcom (Revolutionary Committee) came to Erivan 
on December 6, and its agents immediately began a campaign 
of suppression, completely unexpected and shocking. As 
communist historian Borian relates: 
The Revolutionary Committee started a series of 
indiscriminate seizures and confiscations, without 
regard to class, and without taking into account the 
general economic and psychological state of the 
peasantry. Devoid of revolutionary planning, and 
executed with needless brutality, these confiscations 
were unorganized and promiscuous. Unattended by dis-
ciplinary machinery, without preliminary propaganda 
of enlightenment, and with utter disregard of the 
country's unusually distressing condition, the Revolu-
tionary Committee issued its orders, nationalizing the 
food supply of the cities and peasantry. With amazing 
recklessness and unconcern, they seized and national-
ized everything--military uniforms, artisans 1 tools, 
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rice mills, water mills, barbers 1 implements, bee-
hives, linen, household furniture, and livestock.62/ 
The Dashnak Party and its members were declared out-
side the law; the Armenian army was dissolved and its 
officers, to the number of 1,500, forced on a winter death-
march through the snows of the Caucasus Range to Russia; 
Dro and his staff were exiled to Russia; thousands were im-
prisoned, and, of these, a large part were the cream of the 
Armenian intellectuals, national leaders, and clergy. On· 
the nights of February 16 and 17, in the Erivan Prison, 
over fifty of the most popular of these leaders were 
butchered by axe. 
The revolution against Communist tyranny had actually 
begun in the week preceding in other parts of the Armenian 
Republic. A unique event in the history of Soviet rule, 
the February 18 revolt of the Armenian people is the only 
occasion on which a people has risen against Soviet rule, 
driven out the Communist government, and re-established a 
free government. The entire country was seething, and the 
population was united against the Communists because of 
their misrule. When the news reached the capital city that 
the population of outlying areas of the Republic had thrown 
out the Communists and were rapidly marching on the capital, 
the entire population, arming itself with whatever weapons 
Qg/Translation as given in Congress, p. 13. 
it could secure~ drove the Communists from Erivan also. 
The Committees of Salvation~ which had been organized at 
the start of the Rebellion, were given the task of govern-
ment, and, though the Dashnak Party had not been the insti-
gator of the rising, when it had seen the enthusiasm of the 
people and foresaw the inevitable consequences if the move-
ment were left unheaded, it had officially participated in 
the successful restoration of a free government. 
Upon the re-establishment of the Independent Republic, 
though its northern parts were still occupied by the Turk-
ish army, the restored Premier Vratzian appealed to the free 
world for aid and supplies. The foreign relief personnel 
had fled before the threatened war as soon as the Turks had 
started operations. The country was starving, for its har-
vests had been seized by the Turks and Russians, destroyed 
during the military operations, or seized after the so-
vietization and transported to Russia. No new relief sup-
plies were forthcoming; no aid or support of any kind. Yet, 
the Armenian people had determined to stay free; the short 
taste of Soviet rule had made nearly the entire population 
determined to fight and die rather than submit again. 
Against the desperate resistance of the Armenians, the 
punitive Bolshevik forces could make no headway at first. 
Greatly reinforced, especially after the sovietization of 
Georgia, when the entire power of the Red Army in 
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Tr~scaucasia was thrown against the Armenians, the Com-
munist forces gradually drove back the Armenians by sheer 
weight of numbers. April 2 saw the reoccupation of Erivan.1 
but many of the Armenians still would not yield, withdraw-
ing into the mountains to the south. The Red Army continued 
to press the attack, and, finally, in August, 1921, all 
Armenian military resistance came to an end, for the Armen-
ian fighters, still refusing to surrender, could no longer 
cope with the masses of Red soldiers being sent against them 
in the fastness of Zangezour and withdrew to Persia, or 
died in heroic last-ditch stands. The story of the February 
18 Rebellion is an epic of heroism not often matched in the 
937 
annals of history.· 
That it had not been in vain is. seen in the fact that 
.when the Red forces restored the rule of a Soviet regime, 
the leaders had personal instructions from Lenin to treat 
the Armenian people with more consideration and to be more 
circumspect in effectuating policies. On the diplomatic 
front, however, the Armenian people made no difference to 
Lenin in pursuing his fatuous dream of taking over the en-
tire Middle East by means of a Turkish alliance. On March 
16, 1921, the Russian Bolsheviks signed a treaty with 
~Its -story-is only sketchily told. The important sources 
are: Republic, pp. 440-1; A. R. F. Students Union of Prague, 
Pedrvar la, in toto; Armenian Youth Federation of America, 
Blue Book No. YJl, -pp. 90-9; Oliver Baldwin, Six Prisons 
~-hQ. Revolutions, pp. 44-153, 170, 190-1. 
296 
Kemalist Turkey to cede all the western portions of the 
Republic•s territories to Turkey, two areas (Nakhitchevan 
and Gharabagh) to Azerbaidjan, and the remainder 11 labeled 
•soviet Armenia,' they annexed to Russia. They also repu-
diated the Wilson award to Armenia, and proclaimed that 
. 64/ 
Armenia had no case against Turkey. 11 •• 
A practically identical treaty was forced on the 
Armenian administration as well, for,despite their desires, 
Q5J 
the Soviet Armenian leaders were obliged to participate in 
the Treaty of Kars between Tmkey and the three ttindepen-
dentn Soviet republics of Transcaucasia. That treaty, signed 
on October 13-, 1921, denied Armenia's right to protection 
under the Sevres Treaty, the Wilson award granted under its 
terms, and gave large parts of Armenia's territories to its 
neighbors. Armehia was no-;;v reduced from 29,000 square miles 
as an independent state to 11,580 square miles of poor~ 
w 
mountainous territory as a Soviet administrative area.· · 
As even the Communist historian Borian was forced to state: 
The Kars Treaty was one of the most unjust in 
history, and that because the Soviet government, be-
cause of their desire to court the continuing favor 
of their Turkish allies, w~s forced to bear down on 
~Ambassadop.James w. Gerard, quoted in Congress, p. 14. 
Q1/As seen in Borian 1 s remark that the Soviets bore down on 
APmenia, Borian, QQ. cit., V. II, p. 163. 
QQ/Congress, p. 14; ~tissakian, QQ. cit., pp. 114-115. 
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the Armenians. That the injustices done the Armenians 
by the Soviet authorities has not been forgotten goes 
without need of constant repetition. T~ough Soviet 
Armenia was forced to appear reconciled to Soviet rule 
in later periods, the Armenians within the Soviet Union 
cannot have accepted the 1Soviet settlement' of the 
Armenian border questions~ of the Armenian case, of re-
tribution for the genocide, of recompense for the es-
timated six billion dollar loss to the Armenian popu-
lation, or of the demand for 1free, united, indepen-
dent Armenia. 1 
